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Abstract: 
 
9/11 consequently demonstrated a vulnerability to terrorism, both national and personal. 
The ‘need to protect’, was evidenced by the swift enactment of the ATCSA 2001. Risk and 
threat rhetoric was underpinned by a sense that everything could change imminently. This 
‘need to protect’ escalated the perception that a ‘balance’ between security and rights was 
operational.  
This thesis focuses on three pieces of UK anti-terror legislation throughout the period of 
2001-2006. It argues that while the term ‘balance’ is often used to describe how legislation 
is legitimised in favour of rights or security, the process of ‘balance’ is less explicit through 
political debate than may be expected.   
This thesis uses a mixed method approach consisting of both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. This was informed by the parliamentary debate located in Hansard. Whereas the 
quantitative data collected presented a broad overview of debate from the House of 
Commons during 2001-2006 specific to rights and security, the qualitative assessment 
reduced the breadth of review and focused on one case study from each of the acts 
examined. This examination highlighted various influences between conceptual 
interpretations and the allocation of roles with the constitutional framework in the UK. 
Seven key observations emerged through which this research established that there are too 
many influences on parliamentary debate to be able to ascertain precise data of how 
parliament actively creates legislation. This is further complicated by the existence of a 
number of shortfalls in the validation process of legislation within the UK parliamentary 
system. These findings pave the way for a review of human rights law incorporation within 
the UKs constitutional framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 3 of 323 
 
Acknowledgements 
A long and difficult journey, this thesis would never have been completed if not for my 
supervisor Kate Williams, whose selfless time and care were sometimes all that kept me 
going. Her nurturing of me but most of all her understanding of my difficulties have steered 
me through the last six years to finally reach this point for which I am eternally grateful. I 
would like to thank Ann Sherlock whose clinical carving of my early research identified areas 
of weakness allowed me to strengthen this submission. I would also like to thank Chris 
Harding, in his support at the later stages of my thesis.  
I would like to thank the student accessibility team at Aberystwyth University for supporting 
me with my difficulties, working alongside me to help get me the support I needed and most 
importantly committing their time to help me through. Extra thanks goes to the student 
support team who have accepted that I have no filter, cannot concentrate for extended 
periods of time, and watched me cause chaos with mind maps around the office white 
board space.  
I have a number of friends and family who although have continued to mock the length of 
time taken to complete this research, have nonetheless been there to support me. I would 
like to thank Safety and his beautiful family who I love and cherish, Sophie Coughbrough 
who became my rock in difficult circumstances, Emily Oliver who has stood by me even 
when I became miserable and frustrated with my research and who gave me a mile when I 
could only give and inch – I owe you more than I could ever tell you, my Aberystwyth friends 
who put me up and fed me at weekends when I was commuting between London and Aber, 
and my family who still don’t understand what a PhD is yet smile, nod and agree. 
In December 2010 the tragic loss of my soul mate in particularly difficult circumstances 
almost ended my PhD. However, months later, I pulled my life back on track and focused on 
finishing this work I started. I therefore dedicate this submission to the man I loved more 
than he knew Alex Baldock. I hope he is proud of the ‘graft’ I have put into this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 4 of 323 
 
DECLARATION 
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being 
concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree. 
Signed ...................................................................... (candidate) 
Date ........................................................................ 
STATEMENT 1 
This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where *correction 
services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s). 
Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. 
A bibliography is appended. 
Signed ..................................................................... (candidate) 
Date ........................................................................ 
[*this refers to the extent to which the text has been corrected by others] 
STATEMENT 2 
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library 
loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. 
Signed ..................................................................... (candidate) 
Date ........................................................................ 
NB: Candidates on whose behalf a bar on access has been approved by the University (see Note 9), 
should use the following version of Statement 2: 
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library 
loans after expiry of a bar on access approved by Aberystwyth University. 
Signed ..................................................................... (candidate) 
Date …………………………………………………..  
 
 
 
 
 
Page 5 of 323 
 
Table of Contents: 
List of Abbreviations 
Table of Cases 
Table of Figures  
Introduction:          13 
- Methodology         15 
- Limitations of study        19 
- Overview of thesis        21 
- Concluding remarks        23 
 
Section I: 
Chapter One: Emerging themes and concepts in rights and security debate 25 
1.1. Overview        25 
1.2. Scholarly thought       27 
1.3. Theory of Rights       28 
1.4. Security: The collective impact     32 
1.4.1. Security the Force Multiplier     34 
1.5. Influences in the justification of Security    36 
1.5.1. Risk        37 
1.5.2. The use of pre-emptive measures     41 
1.5.3. The influence of intelligence     43 
1.6. The quest for balance in current settings    45 
1.7. Concluding remarks       51 
           
          
Chapter Two: Oversight mechanisms; the practical balance   56 
2.1. Interface of Government and oversight mechanism   57 
2.2. Parliamentary scrutiny       60 
 2.2.1. JCHR        64 
2.3. Judicial review and the influence of case law    68 
 2.3.1. Changes in the role of the judiciary in a post HRA era  69 
 2.3.2. The paradigm of war      73 
2.4. Concluding remarks       74 
    
   
 
Page 6 of 323 
 
Chapter Three: Quantitative findings:      79 
3.1. ATCSA 2001        82 
3.2. PTA 2005        87 
3.3. TA 2006        93 
3.4. Other legislative themes      99 
3.4.1. ID Cards       100 
3.4.2. Immigration and Asylum legislation    102 
3.5. Areas of political discussion      103 
3.5.1. ‘Terror attacks’      103 
3.5.2. Defence of the world      104 
3.5.3. War in Afghanistan      104 
3.5.4. War in Iraq       104 
3.5.5. The Middle East      105 
3.5.6. Northern Ireland      106 
3.5.7. Coalition on Terror      106 
3.5.8. Defence of the UK      107 
3.5.9. ‘Terrorism’       108 
3.6. Concluding Remarks       108 
 
Introduction Section II:        113 
  
Chapter Four: ATCSA 2001 – The need for derogation:     119 
4.1. Background to the ATCSB 2001      120 
4.2. Origins of Part 4        121 
4.3. Key themes to emerge out of ATCSB debate    124 
 4.3.1. Speed of the process      124 
 4.3.2. Media and Public Reaction     125 
 4.3.3. Importance of a sunset clause     127 
4.4. JCHR         128 
4.5. The trigger for derogation      138 
4.6. Derogation        143 
4.7. Human Rights discussion       154 
4.8. Concluding remarks       157 
 
Prelude to Chapter Five: Re A       165 
 
 
 
Page 7 of 323 
 
Chapter Five: PTA 2005 – Control orders      177 
5.1. Background to the PTA 2005      178  
5.2. Key themes to emerge out of PTB 2005 debate     179 
 5.2.1. Rights v Security; the establishment of balance  179 
 5.2.2. Sunset clause       180 
5.3. JCHR         182 
5.4. The ‘necessity’ of procedural differences in control orders  187 
 5.4.1. Executive position on derogation    188 
 5.4.2. Non derogation and Derogation – the debate   190 
5.5. Decision making powers       197 
 5.5.1. The Executive position      198 
 5.5.2. The role of Judicial Review     199 
 5.5.3. Independence       200 
 5.6.4. Accountability the role of parliament    202 
5.6. Concluding remarks       204 
  
Chapter Six: TA 2006 – 90 day pre-charge detention    208 
6.1. Background to the TA 2006      209 
6.2. Key themes to emerge out of TB 2005 debate   209 
6.2.1. 7/7 and the threat to the UK     210 
6.2.2. Peripheral view on rights and security   213 
6.2.3. Risk        213 
6.2.4. Individual & collective rights     215 
6.2.5. Failure of enhancing security with constrictions  217 
6.3. JCHR         219 
6.4. Pre-charge detention the 90 day debate    223 
6.5. Executive position on 90 days     224 
6.6. Clause 23 – Overview       226 
6.6.1. Police provisions      229 
6.6.2. 60 day pre-charge detention     237 
6.7. Concluding remarks       238 
 
Conclusion           245 
Bibliography          275 
          
 
 
Page 8 of 323 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AG - Attorney General 
ATCSA - Anti-Terror Crime and Security Act 
ATCSB - Anti-Terror Crime and Security Bill 
CP - Constitutional Principles 
ECHR - European Convention of Human Rights 
ECtHR - European Court of Human Rights 
EU - European Union 
GCHQ - Government Communication Headquarters 
HC – House of Commons 
HL - House of Lords 
HR - Human Rights 
HRA - Human Rights Act 
ICCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
IRA - Irish Republican Army 
JCHR - Joint Committee on Human Rights 
MOU - Memorandum of understanding 
MP - Member of Parliament 
NGO - Non-Governmental Organisations 
NS - National Security 
PM - Prime Minister 
PTA - Prevention of Terrorism Act 
PTB - Prevention of Terrorism Bill 
SIAC - Special Immigration Appeals Court 
Page 9 of 323 
 
SIS - Secret Intelligence Service 
SRC - Security Council Resolutions 
TA - Terrorism Act 
TB - Terrorism Bill 
UK - United Kingdom 
UN - United Nations 
UNCAT - United Nation Convention against Torture 
US - United States 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 10 of 323 
 
Index of Cases:  
- A v. Secretary of State [2004] UKHL 56: 18, 62, 68, 83, 109, 159, 161-171, 174, 177, 
178, 202, 203, 205, 247, 251, 252, 256  
- R. (Abassi and another) v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office [2002] EWCA Civ 1598: 175 
- Aksoy v. Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 553: 164 
- Brannigan and McBride v. UK [1993] 17 EHRR 539: 163, 219 
- Brogan v UK (1988) 11 EHRR 117: 219 
- Chahal v. UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413: 111, 112, 136 
- Council of Civil Service v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 : 112 
- De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries, lands and 
Housing, [1999] 1 AC, 69, 80: 165 
- Ex parte Hardial Singh, [1984] 1 WLR 704: 163 
- Fette v France (2002), 38 EHRR 438: 168 
- Greek Case, (1969) 12 YB: 136, 163, 164 
- Ireland v. United Kingdom, (1978) 2 EHRR 25: 137, 138 
- Kurt v Turkey (1998) 27 EHRR 373: 167 
- Lawless v. Ireland(No.3) (1961) IEHRR 15: 67, 136, 163,  
- Marshall v. UK. (2001) Appn No 41571/98: 164 
- Pickin v British Railways Board [1974]; AC 765: 53 
- R v Halliday, ex parte Zadig [1917] AC 260: 67 
- Secretary of State for Home Department v. Rehman [2001] UKHL 47:  112, 117, 133, 
170, 251 
- Soering v. UK ECHR (1989) 11 EHRR 439: 111, 152 
Page 11 of 323 
 
Table of Legislation 
- Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 
- Criminal Justice Act 2003 
- Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 
- Immigration Act 1971 
- Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 
- Northern Ireland Act 1998 
- Parliament Act 1911 
- Parliament Act 1949 
- Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 
- Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 
- Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005 
- Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 
- Special Immigration Appeals Court Act (SIAC) 1997 
- Terrorism Act (TA) 2000 
- Terrorism Act (TA) 2006 
- The Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) 
- The Geneva Convention to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) 
- The Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees  
- The UN Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of 
the Country in which they Live (1985) 
 
Table of International Instruments 
- European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950 
- European Convention on Refugees 1951 
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 12 of 323 
 
Index of Figures 
 
- 1 – Overall % of discussion points raised on security and rights across the three 
debates ATCSB 2001: 80 
 
- 2 - Percentage of total discussion points raised across three timetabled debates 
ATCSB 2001:  82 
 
- 3 - Overall percentage of discussion points raised on security and rights across the 
three debates PTB 2005: 84  
 
- 4 – Total number of discussion points raised on security and rights PTB 2005: 85 
 
- 5 - Percentage of discussion spent on right, security and constitutional principles PTB 
2005: 87 
 
- 6 - Percentage of total discussion points raised across five timetabled debates PTB 
2005:  88 
 
- 7 - Overall percentage of discussion points raised on NS and HR across the six 
debates TB 2005: 90 
 
- 8 - Total number of discussion points raised on security and rights TB 2005: 91 
 
- 9 - Percentage of total discussion points raised on rights, security and constitutional 
principles across six timetabled debates – TB 2005: 94 
 
- 10 - Percentage of total discussion points raised across six timetabled debates TB 
2005: 95 
 
Page 13 of 323 
 
Introduction 
Identified as the trigger in the ‘War on Terrorism’ the events of September 11th 2001 and 
discussion on terrorism have played a central role in United Kingdom (UK) Parliamentary 
debate.1 Anti-terrorism legislation has evolved, both domestically and supra-nationally in 
response to terror atrocities in the UK and overseas.2 The UK has endured terrorist attacks 
for decades however, the more recent events of 9/11 not only shaped foreign policy in the 
UK but also in the wider Western world. The events of 9/11 symbolised the ‘vulnerability of 
us all’.3  
A number of academics have sought to examine 21st century responses to terrorism through 
various theoretical lenses. Particular attention has been placed on the infringement of 
human rights. Tsoukala identifies that while academics such as Guild,4 Bigo5 and Ewing6 
analyse the nature of state emergency and the relationship between the rule of law and 
politics in democracy others question on the one hand the frame and the grounds for 
protection of human rights in present liberal democracies and, on the other hand, the 
effects of counter-terrorism on social groups and policies that are a priori unrelated to 
terrorism.7  
Scholars, such as Lazer and Lazer,8 focus their study on the way public discourses on 
terrorism have framed the threat, structuring arguments in favour of the introduction of 
new, liberty-restrictive counterterrorism. However, Waldron9 suggests that such public 
discourses show that the legitimisation of infringement of rights was being established in 
                                                          
1
 The terrorist events which took place in the USA on September the 11
th
 2001 are also known as 9/11. In later 
discussion, particularly that from the Houses of Parliament, these terms are used interchangeably. 
2
 It is important to acknowledge that even with devolved powers to national parliaments, Westminster 
currently still legislates for the whole of the UK on issues of defence and terrorism along with a number of 
others. As such, parliamentary debate as used in this research is that of Westminster.  
3
 Blunkett, D. (2003); Integration with Diversity: globalisation and the renewal of democracy and civil society. 
Pp. 66. 
4
 Guild, E. (2003); Exceptionalism and Transnationalism: UK Judicial Control of the Detention of Foreign 
“International Terrorist”. 
5
 Bigo, D. (2008); Understanding (In)Security . 
6
 Ewing, K. (2007); ‘The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: a Comment’. 
7
 Tsoukala, A. (2008); Security, Risk and Human Rights: A Vanishing Relationship. Pp. 1. 
8
 Lazar, A. and M. Lazar. (2004); ‘The Discourse of the New World Order: “Out-Casting” the Double Face of 
Threat’. 
9
 Waldron, J. (2003); ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’. 
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the name of promoting security. Further, they were grounded in the idea of a balance 
between security and rights.10 
With these observations at the forefront of scholarly thought, is there an explicit balance 
between rights and security in parliamentary debate during review of anti-terrorism 
legislation in the UK? Three initial influences will be examined to assess this question; first is 
the establishment of balance. Does balance, as a ratified concept, exist and consequently do 
Members of Parliament (MPs) make an explicit choice to balance measures or does balance 
emerge as a product of debate? Examination of whether balance emerges within the debate 
will be examined in Section II of this thesis through three case studies. The second influence 
to be reviewed is the understanding assigned to the concepts of rights and security and 
their associated thematic discussion. Each concept is well established both politically and 
legally, however, both remain subjective enough to provide flexibility when required. 
Chapter One will discuss the conceptualisation of both of these concepts. The final influence 
examines whether the concept of the role of ‘balance’ is deferred, either directly or 
indirectly, outside of parliament to the courts. De Londras and Davis, in their article 
‘Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on Effective 
Oversight Measures’, speak of methods of controlling executive behaviour, each separately 
supporting alternative methods of effective oversight. De Londras places emphasis on the 
judiciary and the role of the courts whereas Davis calls to look for support from the 
legislature and popular democratic processes.11  
Evans and Evans note that examination into the performance of legislatures has previously 
focused on ‘the role of the judiciary; the extent to which international and comparative 
constitutional law may influence judicial decision making; the role of the executive; and the 
effects of a bill of rights’.12 They also argue that scant attention was paid to the role played 
by legislatures in the domestic protection of human rights, despite their central role in 
governance and the democratic legitimacy they lend to the recognition and conferral of 
                                                          
10
 Tsoukala, A. (2008); Security, Risk and Human Rights: A Vanishing Relationship. Pp. 1. 
11
 De Londras and Davis. (2010); Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on 
Effective Oversight Mechanisms. Pp. 23/24 
12
 Evans, C and Evans S. (2006); Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures. Pp. 547. 
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rights. This relationship has arguably been shaped more recently by the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act (HRA).13  
The decision to infringe or restrict rights and liberties in favour of extended security must be 
qualified within the legislative process. Holding both rights and security as equals seems 
contradictory and untenable; it is difficult to maintain both an ideal of rights relying on 
internal and external commitments while at the same time being fully committed to the 
ideal of national security. The central aim of this thesis is to identify the use of ‘balance’ 
through specific case studies and consider if this is used to legitimise rights or security in 
establishing support, or used in rejection of draft legislation.14 This analysis will be 
performed on UK anti-terror legislation between the periods of 2001-2006. To reflect this 
period of anti-terrorism legislative development, three case studies will be reviewed in line 
with UK anti-terrorism legislation enacted during this period.15 
Methodology: 
Parliamentary discussions were selected based on their association with terrorism, security 
or rights. Debates from both Houses of Parliament were analysed between September 11th 
2001 and March 30th 2006. These dates were selected to allow for a thorough examination 
of post 9/11 and post 7/7 UK anti-terror legislation. In a similar process to that identified by 
Huysmans and Buonfino16 debates were accessed and searched for through Hansard.17 The 
review of data initially included every debate containing the word ‘human rights’, ‘security’ 
or ‘terrorism’. This process was supplementary to the anti-terror debates already identified.  
Content analysis was performed in order to organise the raw data into categories. The 
categories were developed from the data, rather than from pre-determined categories, as 
the initial data found from the debate was deemed too broad to fit within a pre-determined 
set. To ensure familiarity with the data, Hansard was read several times prior to final 
                                                          
13
 This will be discussed further in Chapter Two. 
14
 This will be performed through the examination of political discourse. 
15
 These case studies have not included the anti-terrorism legislation specific to Northern Ireland although this 
was considered in the quantitative review and will receive limited exposure within the quantitative findings in 
Chapter Three. 
16
 Huysmans, J and Buonfino, A. (2008); ‘Politics of Expectation and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and 
Terrorism in Parliamentary Debate in the UK’.  
17
 The debate was accessed electronically from the parliamentary website ‘Hansard’ available 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/   
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analysis. Relevant quotes were extracted from the debates and coded based on their 
content.18  
Refining the coding process in the second stage of selection involved reading the debates 
and looking for references to the terms. Unlike the work of Huysmans and Buonfino,19 the 
terms selected were not explicitly confined to the specific group of words used to ascertain 
the initial catalogue of debate as a wider examination was being undertaken. Each 
discussion point was allocated a coding field of its own as required. The debate categories 
identified were then read for meaning, structure and connection with other themes.20 The 
purpose of this was to understand if, and how, the debates constructed formed a link 
between rights and security. This research was not designed to be a statistical assessment of 
parliamentary debate but has used quantitative assessment to support the qualitative 
findings. The coding process started with a summary of the text being examined, which in 
this case was the debate found in Hansard. The initial process, known as ‘descriptive 
coding’, essentially formed a summary description of what was contained within the 
transcript and text. This was then broken down further by the coding process through 
‘analytic or theoretical’ coding. The codes here were based on themes, topics, ideas, 
concepts, terms, phrases and keywords. The coding system in this research is considered to 
be ‘flat’ as the coding is non-hierarchical. This quantitative data makes sense of the findings 
by organising them, summarising them and analysing them. Each statement was counted 
once from each intervention, regardless of its probable repetitions.21 In the quantitative 
findings, percentages refer to proportions of discourses relevant to this study.22 To provide 
the most useful data possible, in line with the question presented by this thesis, individual 
codes were amalgamated into themes. This was designed to offer resilience to later 
                                                          
18
 Whilst debates were analysed in full, some of the positions presented in debate were not deemed relevant 
to the coding process. Things that were not coded included comments such as ‘I am almost tempted to quote 
Ricter the conductor when he said to the third flute “you’re damned nonsense I can stand twice or once, but 
sometimes always, by God, Never!”. Whilst comments such as these were limited, it is important to 
acknowledge that they are removed from the coding process. (HC Vol. 439, Col. 532, Sir P. Cormack). 
19
 Huysmans, J and Buonfino, A. (2008); ‘Politics of Expectation and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and 
Terrorism in Parliamentary Debate in the UK’. 
20
 This connection between themes created the discussion strands for the quantitative presentation of data. 
E.g. the theme ‘Security’ incorporated a number of sub codings such as ‘threat’ and ‘risk’. 
21
 Tsoukala, A. applied the similar limitations on her research. In: (2006) Democracy in the Light of Security: 
British and French Political Discourses on Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies  
22
 Discussion presents the security/rights and constitutional principles debate and does not present the wider 
collection of data such as issues on party politics, existing legislation, and the grouping of misc.  
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discussion and provide weight, substance and usefulness from the quantitative data. This 
process was methodised in line with the process identified earlier in this chapter. The 
content analysis uncovered two key themes: national security and human rights discussion; 
and discussion on constitutional principles. Due to the specific aim of this thesis, the 
presentation of the case studies centres on a selection of quotations that are believed to be 
representative of their whole coverage.23 
Having identified the lack of attention paid to examination of the legislature, Evans and 
Evans note two significant challenges to research of this nature. Firstly, is the conceptual 
analysis, namely, what standard of human rights compliance can the reviewer coherently 
employ, given that human rights are often contestable and that democratically elected 
representative institutions often have a legitimate role in identifying their contestability. 
Secondly, the challenge is to ensure that the methodology is sufficiently nuanced and 
flexible to accommodate the complexity of the legislative and policy process.24 A shortfall 
identified with this study was that, by focusing on parliamentary and judicial discussion 
through debate, committee reports and judgements, the analysis presented may arguably 
be deemed too subjective.25 Given previous criticisms of the susceptibility of content 
analyses to research bias, steps were taken to reduce this. To reduce the ambiguity and 
subjectivity which may be attributed to the qualitative data, a quantitative assessment is 
provided. This data was amassed from the initial coding process. This combination aims to 
reduce the criticism of the useful nature of quantitative content analysis. This broad content 
analysis is believed to meet the scope of this thesis.26 
Focusing on domestic counter-terrorism policies, this thesis seeks to highlight the key 
arguments used by politicians, opinion leaders, experts and the judiciary. The research is 
based, at first, on a thematic content analysis of all relevant debate including reports from 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). Review of the JCHR has been performed 
because, as Hiebert notes, the JCHR act to assert a role as ‘parliamentary guardians’ of the 
                                                          
23
 Tsoukala, A. (2006); Democracy in the Light of Security: British and French Political Discourses on Domestic 
Counter-Terrorism Policies. Pp. 610. 
24
 Evans, C and Evans S. (2006); Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures. Pp. 549. 
25
 For further discussion on the interpretation of debate and judgements see Holland, J and Webb, J., (2010) 
Learning Legal Rules.  
26
 For a similar approach in the use of qualitative and quantitative data see Tsoukala, A. (2006); Democracy in 
the Light of Security: British and French Political Discourses on Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies. Pp. 609. 
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Human Rights Act (HRA).27 The JCHR findings contained within the reports reflect the 
interpretation of six members from each House of Parliament. Therefore, for the purposes 
of this research, it is to be representative of parliamentary advocacy and used in 
conjunction with the case studies. However, the findings have not been incorporated into 
the quantitative analysis as it was considered that the data accrued from this specialist 
body, with access to specialist information, could skew the data with its heavy focus on 
human rights considerations. This decision was further compounded by the aim of this 
research to assess the discussion undertaken on the House floor. However, key findings 
have been indicated in the qualitative considerations as the issues raised help in 
understanding the information and advice to which the Houses of Parliament may have had 
access if it had arrived in a timely manner for review. 
The sheer volume of research undertaken through five years of Hansard, supplemented 
with committee reports, case law and further scholarly analysis required a filtration process 
for the information presented. In line with the three acts examined, one case study from 
each was selected to represent a snap-shot of discussion. The first criterion for selection of 
the case studies was that the case study had to have been raised as a concern within the 
JCHR. This ensured that the case study legitimately raised issues of concern to reflect human 
rights. The second criterion was that each case study had to reference security by the 
executive as a justification to warrant the measures contained within the Bill. Each of the 
case studies, therefore, raised explicit debate on both rights and security measures as a 
result of the government proposals. Each case study aimed to offer insight into if, and how, 
the process of ‘balancing’ one criterion over the other was presented. 
Case law also played an integral role in this thesis based on its influence in shaping 
legislation. A brief review of case law is presented in the introduction to Section II to provide 
a contextual backdrop to the framework, parameters and constraints in which the executive 
and the legislature felt they had authority to work. Further examination of the influence of 
case law and the role of the judiciary will emerge as a theme throughout this examination in 
particular, the role of the judiciary as an oversight mechanism.   
                                                          
27
 Hiebert, J. (2005); Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures. Pp. 677. 
Page 19 of 323 
 
Following the same rationale as that applied by Huysmans and Buonfino, this analysis does 
not seek to evaluate the constitutive or causal impact of parliamentary language in anti-
terrorism legislation. This research seeks to understand the terms through which the 
political elite in the UK modulated the rights and security nexus through political discourse. 
These are important in defining both the politically sanctioned language of public debate, its 
central dividing lines and identifying what fills the gap if balance is not identified within 
parliamentary debate.28  
Limitations of this study: 
As with any research there are some limitations which must be noted. Firstly, by reflecting 
only a snap-shot of the legislation through the lens of a specific case study for each Bill the 
validity of any summative conclusion is weakened. As stated at the outset, it was not the 
intention of this thesis to provide a definitive answer to the balance dilemma but to 
investigate whether balance is explicitly used in the creation of legislation. 
Another limitation of this study is the imprecise and sporadic nature of the debate found 
within the Houses of Parliament. Lack of coherent debate may result in the lack of clarity 
emerging from the examination of the rationale, effectiveness, and legality of measures. 
Throughout debate evidence exists that a number of concerns were raised, however, the 
encapsulation of significant examination does not emerge, leaving issues of clarity and 
legality unchecked beyond their superficial acknowledgment.  
A further limitation of this study is the difficulty in the evaluation of rights and security 
based on the contestability of their composition. As Evans and Evans identify, the 
subjectivity of the concepts gives rise to ‘pervasive disagreement’. This is particularly so with 
rights. What one group may regard as a step forward for rights another may regard as a 
violation of rights. This contestability means that in many instances there is no external 
standard to which the evaluator can appeal.29 This further diminishes the ability to delineate 
definitive answers.  
                                                          
28
 For similar process in coding see - Huysmans, J and Buonfino, A. (2008); ‘Politics of Expectation and Unease: 
Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debate in the UK’. 
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 Evans, C and Evans S. (2006); Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures. Pp. 550/551. 
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This study will focus on the UK parliamentary system and, whilst some of those who 
comment speak of comparisons with other Commonwealth nations such as Canada and 
Australia, the scope of this thesis does not allow for expansion on, or cross-examination of, 
the procedural similarities or differences which may exist.  
This research does not have the capacity to immerse itself in the wider constitutional issues 
which may be raised. This research looks to examine the working relationship between the 
executive, the judiciary and parliament through the lens of rights and security dialogue. 
Associated issues of separation of powers, judicial review and rule of law, whilst mentioned, 
the methodology chosen in order to isolate and analyse the security and rights dialogue 
does not really touch on or reveal useful analytical consideration of these concepts.  
Whilst a number of documents were available for analysis including ministerial speeches, 
the media and committees such as the Home Affairs Committee, these have been omitted 
from this political discourse analysis. Although each of these texts offer enriching discussion, 
alternative insights, overviews and further assessment of the legislation examined in this 
thesis, only the JCHR emerged more than occasionally within the coding of the material 
located within Hansard. Ultimately, whilst an eclectic array of supporting materials and 
discussion exist outside of those examined within the case studies, the aim of this thesis 
remained to consider and critically review the political discourse presented within the 
Houses of Parliament, and this discourse selected its own literature and dictated the 
materials to be considered in this thesis. Similarly, the core analysis in the thesis is of the 
discourse rather than the content of those other documents, consideration of their content 
is used to give context and allow critical assessment of the law-making discourse. 
This research will not focus significantly on the historic notion of human rights. This thesis 
recognises the existence of both theoretical and legal rights and their protection under 
various statutes. It, is not a definitive piece of research into human rights adjudication but 
rather an exploratory investigation, however, although a brief overview is presented, the 
wider theoretical debate associated with human rights will not be documented here. In line 
with the restrictions identified on constitutional issues, this methodology has been chosen 
in order to isolate and analyse the security and rights dialogue within parliamentary debate 
and, as such, does not reveal any useful analytical consideration of these concepts. 
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Overview of thesis: 
Section I of this thesis contains a brief presentation of influential theoretical concepts, 
constitutional principles and the quantitative findings relevant to the focus of this research. 
Chapter One will look at key concepts that penetrate the discussion on balance, rights and 
security. The aim of presenting the concepts raised by the examination of debate is to 
eliminate wider unrelated discussion which, from the findings, offers little direction or 
bearing on the case studies examined. Chapter Two will discuss the performance of balance 
through current oversight mechanisms. The final chapter, in Section I, will present the 
quantitative findings from the coding displaying a statistical indication of the debate 
attributed to rights, security and constitutional principles.30 Following the focus on key 
findings within anti-terrorism legislation, a brief narrative will be provided identifying 
substantive areas of discussion outside the case studies examined. These have been 
included based on the potential influence they may have had on the direction of anti-terror 
specific debate or subsequently account for why some positions went unchallenged in the 
primary focus.  
Section II focuses on the specific case studies and reviews the extent to which rights, 
security and their balance emerge. The case studies are not reflections on the quantitative 
study, nor are they used to present a subjective view-point of what constitutes a powerful 
or implied debate. What they aim to do is establish whether a balance of the conceptual 
influences was evident in the approach adopted by parliament to substantiate the claims in 
favour of or against security and rights.  
Chapter Four looks at the necessity of derogation from the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) based on the potential detention without trial of non-national terror 
suspects.31 Examination of the JCHR reports will be presented and followed by a thematic 
review of the Houses of Parliament dialogue on derogation. This chapter also incorporates a 
separate debate on human rights which was held during the limited gestation of the Bill. 
This debate on human rights was deemed too substantive to omit from the examination as 
                                                          
30
 This chapter will present only the findings from the House of Commons. The rationale for this was that, in 
line with the rationale for using case studies, this research has only limited capacity. As such, a snap shot of the 
quantitative findings was also found to be appropriate give the scope and the aims of the thesis. The House of 
Commons was therefore selected based on the democratic nature of its composition.   
31
 Found within Part 4 ss21-23 ATCSA 2001. 
Page 22 of 323 
 
it may have been a key influence in the decision-making process. Following this examination 
of the Anti-Terror, Crime and Security Bill (ATCSB) 2001, a prelude to the examination of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Bill (PTB) 2005, will be presented. Following the detention of 
sixteen non-nationals under Part 4 regulations, and concern raised by the Privy Council and 
other agencies, particularly Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as ‘Liberty’, the 
Home Office maintained Part 4 as essential and shelved the alternatives as unworkable.32 As 
Walker notes, ‘there the matter rested until the judges intervened and forced a rethink’.33 
As a result of the judicial intervention, deeming ss 21-23 ATCSA 2001 incompatible with the 
ECHR, a brief assessment of A v Secretary of State (Re A)34 is presented to act as a bridge 
into the following chapter.  
Chapter Five reviews debate on the introduction of control orders found in the PTB 2005 in 
light of the House of Lords judgement in Re A.35 Control orders fell into two categories 
depending on their severity; derogating and non-derogating orders. Both types of control 
order operated within different procedural parameters, most notably from the debate on 
the standard of judicial review afforded to the differing process. This case study will 
examine the debate undertaken on procedural differences of the two processes and will 
incorporate discussion on the proposed extension of powers awarded to the Home 
Secretary.  
Chapter Six presents the final case study; this focuses on the proposal of 90 day pre-charge 
detention found within the Terrorism Bill 2005. The Times illustrated that ‘the origins of the 
Act can be located in the London bombings of July 2005’.36 Walker suggests that, at the 
same time, the Act was being used to implement the Council of Europe Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism of 2005. The police powers of detention after arrest were extended 
to 28 days, and not 90 days, after Parliament rejected the proposal.37 A review of the debate 
presented in this rejection will be discussed here. This particular chapter acknowledges that 
amendments to the draft Bill were made prior to review by the House of Lords. However, on 
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 Counter-Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society: A Discussion Paper 
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. (2004); Part 2 Para 31.  
33
 Walker, C. (2006); Clamping Down on Terrorism in the UK. Pp. 1140. 
34
 [2004] UKHL 56. 
35
 Ibid 
36
 The Times, 6 August 2005. 
37
 Walker, C. (2006); Clamping Down on Terrorism in the UK. Pp. 1141/1142. 
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arrival at the House of Lords, the legitimacy and necessity of 90 day pre-charge detention 
were still debated. From this debate in the House of Lords an amendment from 28 days pre-
charge detention to 60 was proposed. This, however, failed to receive the required support 
in the House of Lords and, therefore, did not progress back to the House of Commons for 
further debate. A brief review of this 60 day debate will be examined in this chapter as to 
omit it may give rise to improper oversight.   
The concluding chapter draws on the findings represented to identify whether, and how, 
the balance between human rights and national security is lobbied in anti-terror legislation38  
and the influence of wider overarching issues such as the function of oversight mechanisms. 
A brief summary of the main findings of this thesis will be presented, supported by 
discussion of the political and constitutional implications this research has unearthed. This 
will include discussion on the relationship between the executive, legislature and the 
judiciary; a discussion which remains an important underlying issue in the quest for balance 
in the security and rights debate. 
Concluding remarks: 
The ambition in this thesis is not to decisively resolve the considerable challenges in the 
‘balance’ between rights and security. Instead, the aim is to demonstrate the substance of 
debates associated with specific case studies relevant to each Bill examined. If equally 
important commitments to rights and security are demonstrated then balance becomes not 
a balance between the concepts themselves, but requires a review into the institutions 
which scrutinise rights and security. Hence, this thesis progresses to review its emergent 
findings through a lens of the discourse related to the competing functions of the judiciary, 
the legislature and the executive, assessing the findings through an ‘effective oversight’ 
paradigm.39  
 
 
                                                          
38
 An act of terrorism offers society a means to reaffirm human bonds that have been corroded and draws on 
the emotive nature of human kind. It is also an area of recent debate and public interest. This is why this area 
of legislation was selected over others. 
39
 De Londras, F and Davis, F. (2010); Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives 
on Effective Oversight Mechanism. Pp. 23. 
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Chapter One 
Emerging themes and concepts identified in the rights and 
security debate: 
‘The choice between security and liberty is a false choice…insecurity threatens liberty’.
40 
1.1 Overview: 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether a ‘perceived’ balance between security 
and rights was demonstrated within the legislation scrutinised and more specifically through 
the case studies examined.41 Security42 and rights both have their own heritage grounded in 
legislation and theory and, while often assumed to be in conflict, the two concepts are not 
necessarily so. This chapter will not provide an in-depth historical account of rights and 
security, but rather a number of thematic concepts which emerged from the analysis in the 
debate when reviewing the existence of balance between security and rights. This chapter 
looks into a number of emergent themes specific to the anti-terror debate reviewed; what 
this research does not have the capacity to do is examine the underlying rationale for 
political agendas. 
As mentioned above, following a brief introduction, a number of thematic concepts will be 
discussed. On such an emotive and politically driven subject as the response to terrorism it 
became apparent, from the outset, that a significant number of theories and scholarly 
interpretations existed. The concepts demonstrated in this chapter are by no means 
exhaustive, nor are they intended to be; rather this discussion is reflective of the debate 
that emerged from the Houses of Parliament.43 As noted earlier, this dialectic display of 
opinions underpins the limitations acknowledged in the methodology.  
This chapter will start out by addressing a brief review of human rights, including conceptual 
interpretations and theoretical perspectives underpinning rights in an age of terror. It will 
                                                          
40
 National Commission on Terrorist attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) Report 2004. Pp. 395. 
41
 Unique to each act, the case studies will be reviewed in line with the methodology outlined in the 
introduction. These findings will then be examined in Section II of this thesis. 
42
 It is important to note that for the purposes of this thesis, when speaking of security we are speaking of 
security of the population through the protection of national security. 
43
 This chapter will not review the issues associated with constitutional principles and the influence of the 
judiciary. This assessment will be performed in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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further encompass a review of rights in light of their relationship with security measures. 
This review will not provide a historical account of rights beyond identifying the foundations 
of their legalisation. This is because, for the purposes of this research, review is undertaken 
within the legally protected framework of human rights under the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the HRA. As such, the origins and legitimacy of human rights are 
not disputed although varying interpretations of ways to protect them remain evident. The 
inclusion of this discussion aims to provide sufficient backdrop to rights discussion when 
considering the strengths and weaknesses of parliamentary debate.   
Following this the concept of ‘security’ will be addressed. This will explore what is meant by 
‘security’ for the purpose of this thesis and present the possibility of collective security as a 
right in itself. Ultimately this review will reflect security as implied from the debate. This 
chapter will then move on to look at influences on the justification of ‘security’. This 
examination draws on the three central themes to emerge from the debate analysed, 
namely; risk, pre-emptive measures and the availability of evidence and intelligence. These 
themes were used in the debate not only as a tool for justifying moves but also used as a 
benchmark for challenge. The final emergent theme for review in this chapter looks at the 
quest for balance.44 Significant scholarly explorations exist on the notion of balance, 
whether it exists, how it is framed, what the constraints on balance are, and the wider 
implications of balance.45 This examination does not open up all of these areas, rather it 
considers how the idea of ‘balance’ is presented particularly in light of security and rights. 
This focus is chosen because, in looking at rights and their reconciliation with security, 
innumerable themes are illustrative of the difficult juxtaposition of rights and security in 
which a delicate balance may be less in evidence than a fervour for erosion of rights in 
response to a perceived crisis. As such, in a bid to protect security, rights may be infringed 
calling on the notion of balance to justify such measures. Finally, concluding remarks will 
guide the reader into the following chapter with a focus on oversight mechanisms and their 
role in performing balance between rights and security.         
 
                                                          
44
 This looks at the ‘conceptual’ understanding of balance. 
45
 Such scholars include Golder, B and Williams, G. (2006); Ashworth, A (2007); and Zedner, L (2005). Further 
discussion on balance will be undertaken later in this chapter. 
Page 27 of 323 
 
1.2 Scholarly thought: 
Prior to moving into the thematic assessment of discussion it is important to explore some 
of the scholarly work which has been undertaken since the events of 9/11 as such works 
undoubtedly feed into the wider context of this thesis. There exist numerous analyses on 
the various relationships between security and rights. For example, Lazarus and Goold46 
document the search for language reconciliation between security and rights; Zedner47 
reviews the sidestepping of due process in seeking security by eroding rights; Gearty48 
reviews the principles of rights adjudication and Douzinas49 reports on the end of human 
rights.50 Each of these scholars has taken rights and security and reviewed them in line with 
their present interpretation of the subject matter, with each analysis conveying varying 
political, social and legal implications. The fact that security and rights are rich in thought-
provoking text, and fluid in interpretation, is a root cause of the ‘perceived’ need to balance. 
No formula exists to provide a definitive framework in which to interpret rights or security. 
As such, the boundaries within which these concepts are reviewed are flexible. Ashworth 
notes a key problem in producing a definitive framework is that the list of rights remains 
open to debate, further constricted by the broad manner in which rights are drafted, thus 
leaving much to interpretation.51 With broad definitions of rights, and the potential for 
rhetorical manipulation of security, it is unsurprising that debate regarding balance has a 
role to play in anti-terrorism legislation.  
It is clear from the outset of this examination that both rights and security are well 
established legally and theoretically. The integrity of each concept, however, has varied 
historically in the protections it has been afforded. These variations have been based on 
fluctuating interpretations of priority, need, constitutional principles, and established 
heritage. This overview of rights, security and associated values, is by no means exhaustive. 
This chapter aims to provide a backdrop to some of the substantive concepts which arose 
within the case studies examined.   
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 Goold, B and Lazarus, L. (2007); Security and Human Rights. 
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 Zedner, L. (2007); Seeking Security by Eroding Rights: The Side Stepping of Due Process. 
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 Gearty, C. (2005); Principles of Human Rights Adjudication. 
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 Douzinas, C. (2000); The End of Human Rights. 
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 Ashworth, A. (2007); Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights. Pp. 204. 
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1.3 Theory of human rights: 
Human rights are legally protected and currently form part of an expanding repertoire. 
9/11, and the ensuing ‘War on Terrorism’, test the limits of just how rights can be used, are 
relied upon, manipulated and overridden.52 On the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights Mary Robinson highlighted the significance of human rights 
claiming:  
‘We must learn that human rights, in their essence, are empowering. By protecting 
human rights, we can create an environment for living in which each individual is 
able to develop his or her own gifts to the fullest extent. Providing this assurance of 
protection, in turn, will contribute to preventing so many of the conflicts based on 
poverty, discrimination and political oppression which continue to plague 
humanity’.53  
Douzinas argues that ‘there can be no general theory of human rights’54 but that scholars, in 
discussing rights, draw on a number of common themes. The consideration of rights here is 
to delineate how individual rights and what are termed collective rights which states must 
provide – such as security, might be separated and differently understood.  This discussion is 
necessary as it is not always clear that any separation is understood by the law makers.    
Even though rights are established, individual interpretation of rights is fundamental to a 
deeper understanding of the influence which rights hold in cases of ‘balance’. This fluidity 
can lead to misinterpretation by MP’s and facilitates the misuse of rights compromising 
their protection. Rights, as understood in modern society, are largely the product of 
Western thought.55 In identifying three ways in which rights are generally understood 
Waldron suggests firstly; a right is nothing but a particularly important interest: it is assigned 
a greater weight than ordinary interests and therefore counts for more in utilitarian or other 
welfarist calculations. Secondly, according to Waldron, interests protected by rights are 
given lexical priority over other interests. They are to be protected and promoted to the 
greatest extent possible before other interests are taken into consideration. Thirdly, and 
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most controversially, Waldron suggests that rights are understood not as specially or 
lexically weighted interests, but as the basis of strict constraining requirements of action. 
Rights, in other words, define the boundaries of practical deliberation.56 Each of these 
interpretations allows viewing of the lexical weight given to a position of rights dependant 
on the lens through which they are viewed offering a practical, not historical, way to view 
the application of rights. The question, therefore, becomes how we expose the underlying 
rationale of a particular rights interpretation, if indeed it is possible at all. Any right-based 
moral or political theory has to face the issue whether the rights it endorses are ‘natural’ or 
‘human’ rights; are they universally valid and determinable; or are they historically 
determined by the concrete institutions of a particular society?  
In his lecture in 2006, Professor David Feldman discusses the necessity of worrying about 
the protection of rights. He identifies that democracy must maintain the moral and ethical 
high-ground suggesting that an essential strategy in countering the extremism that breeds 
terrorism is to win 'the contest of ideas' by rigorously defending basic human rights and 
freedoms.57 This position is supported by Von Doussa who notes that this task becomes 
infinitely more difficult if democracies undermine their own human rights credentials. 
Undermining principles can be prevented by commanding a rigorous review process of 
policy prior to enactment.58 As such, the compromise of rights in favour of security, or vice 
versa, must be adequately weighed.  
The compromise made between rights and security, however, requires consideration of 
whether rights and freedoms are good in themselves and, more specifically, whether such 
freedom is a good thing as seen through a deontological view or whether it is only ‘good’ 
whilst contained within certain frameworks as viewed by the teleological approach. 
Presenting a deontological stance, Rawls recognises that there are certain specific and basic 
liberties which should be entrenched in a constitution.59 Hart, however, through the 
teleological (or choice) approach argues that freedom and liberty should not be more valued 
than an improvement in the general material conditions of the whole of society. Ultimately 
liberty is not prioritised. This singles out the rights bearer in virtue of the power he has over 
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the duty in question.60 Defenders of choice theories argue that a person has a right when 
others have duties which protect one of that person’s choices.61 Both these positions 
present the dichotomy frequently associated with rights and freedoms. If, in itself, freedom 
of the individual is a ‘good’ then arguably it is necessary to limit any interference with this 
freedom, certainly state power needs to be curtailed, even where it is being exercised for 
the collective good. If individual freedom is not necessarily a ‘good’ in its own right but only 
when it fulfils other purposes, then it is legitimate to curtail freedom to the extent that it 
does not advance the ‘good’ which is being prioritised, or at least should never be allowed 
to operate when it will jeopardise that ‘good’. This becomes more complicated when 
various goods are in conflict as demonstrated here.  
Even though both deontological and teleological theories exist, the strongest principle in the 
Western world is based on liberal rights discussion and scholarly thought. This particular 
approach looks at the respect for one another’s moral autonomy. Accordingly, each 
individual should be allowed to select their own identity. Outside of these theories, Waldron 
identifies the benefit or interest theory as recognised by Bentham,62 and later Raz.63 This 
suggests that an individual (1) has a right if another individual (2) has a duty to perform 
some act or omission which is in the interest of individual (1). Therefore, the benefit in the 
interest theory should only be to the intended individual and consequential benefit does not 
accrue.64 Falling between both teleological and deontological, Raz believes that whilst 
people are autonomous and, therefore, should be able to choose for themselves, he also 
acknowledges that such freedom is valuable largely because it protects the collective good. 
As such, Raz takes the middle ground in that freedom is necessary to increase individual 
autonomy and choice so that each individual may act for themselves, even if that is contrary 
to the best interest of the state or the culture, and it is important in order to protect the 
culture.65 Debate between choice and interest theories has been related to aspects of 
‘moral personality’. They have been seen as protections for interests related to choice and, 
therefore, duties correlative to rights are mainly negative in character. In any such theory, 
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not every interest will be regarded as a right. These interpretations, combined with the 
earlier identified array of interpretations available of how rights are understood, provide a 
backdrop for political clashes in justifications, validations and influence from the rights / 
security nexus. 
In cases of conflict there should be significant review of the deep considerations which back 
them up.66 Further to this, it is also established that international human rights law 
recognises that, in some instances, emergencies may justify a suspension of some 
international human rights protections.67 Each of these acknowledges that not all rights are 
absolute and that some instances require relative assessment. This flexibility exposes 
weakness in the system of protections, thus reaffirming that the broad manner in which 
rights are drafted leaves too much to interpretation. Such width leaves individuals 
susceptible to having rights encroached on, made redundant or squeezed to such an extent 
that they are almost unrecognisable. It may be argued that politicians rely on this flexibility 
to guide interpretations and decisions however, this can leave them exposed to producing 
an interpretation that is incompatible with the wider democratic picture. Politicians are not 
alone in vulnerability of rights’ interpretations. Judges are also left vulnerable in balancing 
the rights of individuals, deciding how rights are protected and further, whose rights should 
be protected.  
In his examination reviewing the notion of an end to human rights, Douzinas acknowledges 
the claim by Dworkin that rights are restraints on social policies and political choices. As a 
result of this, they have a threshold weight in relation to collective goods against which they 
act as trumps. However, using the example of anti-terror legislation Douzinas notes that 
governments, in responding to terror, legislate drastic restrictions exploiting ‘widespread 
revulsion against the perpetrators’.68 As such, the trump of rights is of little value when 
these rights come ‘into direct conflict with strong surface and illiberal emotion’.69 Ultimately 
for Douzinas, these examples of legislating in such settings demonstrate ‘the instances 
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where the protective value of human rights is at the highest, but their effectiveness at the 
lowest’.70  
Irrespective of what human rights position is adopted, in the UK at present the law 
illuminates and formalises a number of different rights theories and political discussion. It 
takes them all and creates law that has to be obeyed even when there is strong evidence to 
suggest such measures are wrong. It seems an impossible task to explicitly ascertain an 
overarching and universally appealing standpoint of human rights rhetoric. This not only 
complicated the attempt to elicit a balance of rights and security from the case studies, it 
further diluted the ability to ascertain real meaning in the political understanding of what 
the notion of rights stand for. Indeed, it may be conceded that to anticipate such definitive 
categories of human rights may undermine the diversity of political affiliations accrued in 
parliament. As Douzinas notes, ‘no grand synthesis can arise from such a cornucopia of 
philosophical thought’.71 It may be considered that each human rights interpretation is 
underpinned by a number of external influences, some of which will now be discussed.  
As such this thesis, rather than focusing on the emergence of particular theories of rights, 
looks to identify if and how individual rights of the person are balanced against justifications 
of security. As identified earlier, this is complicated by the fluid meaning of rights and can 
lead to the misrepresentation of rights with potentially harmful results. Having established a 
backdrop to human rights, this chapter will advance to establish some overarching 
considerations within the concept of security.   
1.4 Security: the collective impact: 
‘Security’ in the context of national security and rights is a contested matter. It generates 
questions of whose security is protected and whether public security can be protected by 
maintaining national security (although interpretations are not limited to this). Whose 
security counts? Is it society, the state, a group or an individual? Whilst focusing on the 
security of the state may damage the security of individuals within it, likewise emphasising 
the security of individuals may make it difficult for states to respond optimally to threats. It 
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is, therefore, not clear or obvious whose security takes precedence or within which 
parameters these questions operate.72  
While it is recognised that individuals have rights, legislation also recognises that this 
includes the right to security and ultimately a right to life.73 Governments must, therefore, 
employ strategies to protect these rights.74 The Canadian Attorney General Irwin Cotler75 
and Australian Attorney General Phillip Ruddock76 both suggest, however, that the assumed 
animosity between rights and security can be reconciled through reconceptualising counter-
terrorism legislation as ‘human security legislation’. This is directed towards securing the 
necessary preconditions for the enjoyment of human rights themselves.77 Cautious of this, 
Hoffman suggests that interpretations and strategies such as these must not be at the 
expense of individual human rights. As such, to accept the perception of anti-terror 
legislation as human security legislation may infringe on rights, but through a rhetoric 
shrouded by the offer of greater support to security.78  
There is clear theoretical grounding in Western79 thought of the primacy accorded to the 
state in response to security management. Theorists,80 such as Hobbes, propose that 
humans traded their individual sovereignty upwards in return for protection. Locke indicates 
that people chose the charter of their state and government, and consequently, therefore 
have obligations to state authority. Weber argues further that ‘a state is a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory’.81  In an article on state crime, Williams asserts however that not all 
force by a state is justified. Justification for force can only be established as legitimate when 
                                                          
72
 MacFarlane, N. (2007); Human Security and the Law of States. Pp. 348/349. 
73
 ECHR Article 2 – the right to life. 
74
 Whilst security of the individual is explicitly protected, ‘collective security’ is not a ‘right’ in the pure, legal, 
sense. It is however one of the ‘interests’ which states can use to contain some rights. 
75
 Cotler, I. (2001); Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy. 
76
 Ruddock, P. (2004); A New Framework – Counter-Terrorism and the Rule of Law. 
77
 For a further examination of this see: Golder, B and Williams, G. (2006); Balancing National Security and 
Human Rights: Assessing the Legal Response of Common Law Nations to the Threat of Terrorism. Pp. 44. 
78
 Hoffman, P. (2004); Human Rights and Terrorism. Pp. 949-950. 
79
 See authors such as Hobbes, T, (1985); Leviathan; Fredman, S. (2007); The Positive Right to Security; Lazarus, 
L. (2007); Mapping the Right to Security. 
80
 These are not the only theorists, but two prominent thinkers on the issue and are used only as an example 
of ideas rather than as a presentation of the correct theory. 
81
 Weber, M. (1919); Essays in Sociology [online]. Translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: 
Oxford University Press. pp. 77-128. Available at: http://socialpolicy.ucc.ie/Weber_Politics_as_Vocation.htm  
(Accessed 23/07/13). 
Page 34 of 323 
 
the force is considered ‘proportionate’ enough to restore social order.  Williams however 
argues that this ends-based definition is unsatisfactory. For Williams, this is because it not 
only takes ‘the state as the point of departure for legitimising its own behaviour’, but also 
because ‘the restoration of order is subjective’.82 As such, the state in deciding the 
legitimacy of force and the framework, within which social order is to be restored, both 
defines most crimes and is the authority under which crimes are prosecuted.83 The security 
concerns of individuals are therefore bundled into the state collectivity.84  
Dworkin notes that ‘rights are best understood as trumps over some background 
justification for political decisions that state a goal of the community as a whole’.85 The 
influence of the notion of state collectivity is further underpinned by institutional 
frameworks. United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions (SRC) such as 1373 explicitly 
require states to protect their citizens and have subsequently been relied upon by states in 
the justification of potentially draconian moves. On the backdrop of this, and the vast 
theory which discusses the concept of security in the rights framework, ‘security’ for the 
purposes of this thesis will be examined through the lens of ‘collective security’ ascertained 
through the protection of national security.86 States take their duty to protect their citizens 
seriously endorsed by constitutions. The basis for collective security is constituted by 
collective identity of mutual responsiveness developed and determined by a common 
response. In view of the foregoing, it is easy to understand that collective identities and 
shared values as well as shared understandings as regards threat perceptions, are of 
significant importance in supporting the notion of collective security. As such, collective 
security is based on the formation of a common identity of like-minded selves in opposition 
to the perceived enemy.   
1.4.1 ‘Security’ the force multiplier: 
In Europe, terrorism presents an unavoidable dilemma between striving to protect citizens 
from attacks while upholding the rights enshrined in the ECHR. Human rights safeguards do 
not constrain states from enacting far-reaching offences with high maximum penalties, as 
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long as the laws are clear and the penalties not so disproportionate as to breach Articles 3 
or 5 ECHR.87 This reiterates that it is not incompatible with rights for states to respond to 
threats providing that the actions undertaken are justifiable and proportionate.88 Definitions 
depend on states’ perception about threats and safety. Thune argues that, on security, ‘no 
precise definition has ever been achieved and probably never will be’.89 The term security 
ultimately remains a vague concept.  
Whilst support for security over rights is frequently driven by the presumption of the 
greater good, others maintain that coercive measures in support of security are not the 
answer to resolving threats but can, in fact, fuel reactionary movements.90 This was 
ascertained earlier in the assessment of Waldron's interpretation of goal based 
duties/rights. Although resistance to coercive measures was evident from the examination 
undertaken, Zedner maintains that ‘security’ is so powerful an aspiration that it tends to 
trump all other considerations and silence countervailing concerns. The rhetoric utilised to 
portray the importance of security in modern terms relies heavily on the populist response. 
This was refined further by the need to be ‘seen’ to be doing something.91 ‘Security’, 
therefore according to Zedner, can carry with it license for draconian measures.92 These 
measures are fundamentally driven by the ‘unknown’ and are effectively argued based on 
residual risk to the public.93 While the ability to ‘prove’ threat is often difficult, the ability to 
prove that the threat does not exist is just as problematic. The impossibility of knowing 
these threats can generate a state of fear and allow for manipulation of the unknown into 
becoming justifications for legislative ‘protections’. This position is reaffirmed by Ignatieff 
who emphasises that:  
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‘The political costs of under reaction are always going to be higher than the cost of 
overreaction…Since no one can know in advance what strategy is best calibrated to 
deter an attack, the political leader who hits hard – with security roundups and 
preventative detentions – is making a safer bet, in relation to his own political 
future, than one who adopts the precautionary principle of ‘first do no harm’.94  
Bigo and Guild suggest that post 9/11 security rhetoric has produced an ‘insecuritisation’ of 
the world. This ‘insecuritsation’ can allow for arguments of self-defence through national 
security in order to protect citizens.95 This may indicate that ‘self-defence’ and ‘collective 
security’ are synonymous with one another and, as such, when used interchangeably may 
legitimise the justification for legislation. 
What this brief overview of security identifies is that there are a number of factors which 
have to be considered in modern politics to justify that ‘security’ is assigned a particular 
status comparable with rights. These factors include justification, accountability, necessity, 
and proportionality - all of which trigger examination of risk and associated actions. Each of 
these is compounded by the influence of rhetoric and the manipulation of the public 
response. This has been further framed with initial responses to 9/11 through the paradigm 
of war.96 Having established that the notion of security requires the satisfaction of certain 
pre-conditions, a brief insight into emergent themes from the examination of debate will 
now be presented. Each of these themes is used as a proponent for supporting rights and 
security at various stages within the debates examined, most of which were framed within 
the oversight of security; both positively and negatively.  
1.5 Influences in the justification of security:  
As identified above, security, or at the very least the justification for security, is contributed 
to by a number of factors. The notion that the rules of the game have changed and that the 
threat from international terrorism places the nation at grave risk of attack pressurises the 
boundaries of balance between rights and security. By ignoring the claim that the ‘rules of 
the game’ have changed we place our lives and the lives of others in jeopardy. However, 
                                                          
94
 Ignatieff, M. (2005); The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. Pp. 58. 
95
 Bigo, D. and Guild, E. (2007); The Worst Case Scenario and the Man on the Clapham Omnibus. Pp. 108. 
96
 This will be reviewed in the following chapter. 
Page 37 of 323 
 
acceptance of these claims of risk and threat is not clinical.97 The importance of rights in the 
UK is embedded within constitutional protections underpinning democracy. Parliament 
should perform their review functions grounded within the framework of ‘justification’ and 
‘necessity’. The quality of proof and reasoning therefore becomes the litmus test for 
legitimising ‘risk’ and its associate proponents. Dialogue is undertaken between the 
constitutional actors who represent the political and legal, through the legislative, executive 
and judicial functions.98 However, the impossibility of eradicating risk becomes apparent, 
ultimately determining the realistic benchmark in just how far measures should be stretched 
in favour of security or rights. 
The ability to demonstrate these criteria can place the executive in a vulnerable position. As 
Freedman notes ‘Governments that say nothing when aware of a possible threat will be 
accused, should one materialise of failing in their duty. Governments which warn regularly, 
but without much happening, will be accused of alarmism - bad advice generating panic at 
one extreme and apathy at the other’.99 With such a dichotomy, extensions of powers 
contained within proposed legislation may require greater evidence and wider discussion on 
the parliamentary floor. This discussion may be further substantiated with experts offering 
direction and guidance; a prime opportunity to utilise the findings of the JCHR. In reviewing 
the influences on justifications for security, three themes emerged as prominent in the 
justification of moves. These were risk; pre-emptive measures; and the use and availability 
of evidence. Each of these will now be briefly considered.   
1.5.1 The Influence of Risk: 
‘Risk’ is frequently referenced in the restriction of rights and the extension of security and 
the notion of risk can consequently legitimise the introduction of pre-emptive measures. 
This has been epitomised in modern anti-terror legislation by the use of control orders in 
the PTA 2005. Risk, its impact on pre-emptive measures and the influence of intelligence will 
now be briefly reviewed as a conduit for justification in enhanced security measures as 
emerged from the case studies examined.  
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As noted by Beck, ‘risk inherently contains the concept of control, further it presumes 
decision making has to be undertaken. Ultimately when we speak in terms of risk, we are 
talking about calculating the incalculable’.100 Nonetheless it has also been suggested that ‘if 
we wait for threats to fully materialise, we will have waited too long’.101 It is perspectives 
such as these which instigate precautionary action to be undertaken. Different types of 
terrorism raise different concerns for risk, warnings and targets. Whilst the UK suffered 
terror attacks on mainland Britain from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) up until the cease-
fire in 1998, the challenge has been documented as significantly different to the threat 
posed by current international terrorism. There is a strong political affiliation to risk, in line 
with the justification of security. At the 2005 Labour conference, Mr Blair stressed that 
trying to fight twenty-first century terrorism with nineteenth century methods was a failure 
of duty to protect. Further, Mr Blair identified that a complete change of thinking must 
happen. The IRA targets were political and military, even though some civilian lives were 
lost, the attacks were not unpredictable and indiscriminate like the attacks of the twenty-
first century. As Freedman notes, the warnings given by the IRA allowed them to 
demonstrate who the attacks were aimed at and, therefore, legislative moves could reflect 
responses to a clear campaign being pursued. Arguing that the terrorism of Al Qaeda is 
significantly different, Freedman suggests this is based on the organisation itself who act 
with no strategy, indiscriminate killing and have the psychological objective of creating 
terror.102 The emphasis placed on the ‘risk’ of twenty-first century terrorism whilst 
projected through the organisation of Al Qaeda does not, however, subject the UK to a 
qualitatively different threat to that posed previously by the IRA according to Feldman.103 
Nonetheless, the scenes of 9/11 reverberated around the globe and consequently 
established themselves as evidence that the risk and threat to the world had changed. Beck 
suggests that the ‘specific characteristics of terrorist threat replaces accident, active trust 
becomes active mistrust, the context of individual risk is replaced by the concept of systemic 
risk, the power of definition of experts has been replaced by that of state and intelligence 
agencies; and the pluralisation of expert rationalities has turned into the simplification of 
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enemy images’.104 This ‘terror’ or the creation of the ‘unknown’ arguably leaves no option 
but to produce vulgar risk assessments, from which infringements on rights may occur.  
When politics becomes about fear, and in this instance the fear of the unmanageable risk of 
international terrorism, the political struggle for existential security ‘can become twisted’.105 
Risk, or the notion of risk, permeates the membrane between the political and the public. In 
its use of language to justify executive motives, the ability to mobilise public support for 
balance based on personal fears is not an uncommon modus operandi of a governing body. 
YouGov polls have reaffirmed this position on several occasions.106 According to Beck, what 
happens in world risk society is that a world of uncontrollable risk is entered and there is not 
a language to describe what is being faced. The hidden central issue in world risk society is 
how to gain control over the uncontrollable in politics, law and everyday life.107 This moves 
us to consider what then happens when threat assessment is turned into a risk 
communication? Here, further distortions occur because of the wider purposes of risk 
communication. The act of communication transfers responsibility for dealing with risk. As 
Runciman notes, ‘should worst case scenarios if they are sufficiently terrible trump all other 
considerations when politicians have to decide what to do?108 This stance, however, does 
not take seriously enough the downside of getting things wrong.109 Due to limitations, and 
because the available information is normally poor, the consequential threat assessments 
are often speculative.110 By communicating publically, from a standpoint of vulnerability, 
Furedi suggests this encourages an attitude of pessimism, dread and foreboding. This is 
because perceptions of vulnerability have a free-floating character and attach themselves to 
a wide variety of phenomena encouraging explorations of speculative risk.111 Consequently, 
methods for strengthening against vulnerability push precaution to exceed the logic of 
calculability.112 
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Nonetheless, whilst the public may be in support of executive measures based on the notion 
of ‘risk and threat’, it has been demonstrated that parliament may not be as receptive as 
the public. Justifications based on public support have often been challenged by 
parliament’s duty to perform the job it was elected to do; it was not elected to ‘listen to the 
tabloids’.113 As Bigo notes ‘worst case scenarios are never certain and are so often nearly 
zero in probability that to give them priority at the level of public policy is to be driven by 
nightmares and fears, not by rationality’.114 Even so, the notions of risk and threat were 
utilised by the executive throughout the debate examined to support the need and rationale 
for moves.115   
An associated factor in prescribing the use of risk is the use of ‘emergency’. ‘Emergency’ is a 
direct means of response which leaves no time for analysis, forecasting, or prevention. 
Binde suggests that ‘it is an immediate protective reflex rather than a sober quest for long-
term solutions. It neglects the fact that situations have to be put in perspective and that 
future events need to be anticipated’.116 As such, risk based on international terrorism 
which has created an emergency allows governments to dictate rhetoric surrounding 
necessity for moves. Reviewing risk in line with the current situation, Bigo suggests that if a 
new kind of terrorism is being faced117 then the framing of new boundaries between law 
and politics, between executive and judicial powers, between military and civilian rules, 
between security and liberty, is legitimate. If a new kind of terrorism on this scale is not 
being faced then existing solutions and legislation should be reviewed before establishing an 
exceptional moment.118 This is, then, when reliance on the impact of ‘risk’ is disseminated 
into a demonstration of proof, accountability and justification for moves. While risk alone 
may be enough to satisfy the public, the potential hiatus caused by pre-emptive measures 
on individuals requires stringent examination for necessity of moves.  
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The uncertainty and indiscriminate nature of terrorist attacks render conventional risk 
assessment techniques inadequate as standalone assessments. However, it subsequently 
moves to incorporate this uncertainty into policymaking as a basis for pre-emptive action. 
Suskind has called this the ‘one percent doctrine’ or the ‘security paradigm’.119 It states that 
nations should act to pre-empt security threats even if there is only a one percent chance of 
a particular threat coming to fruition.120 This moves on to consider the use of pre-emptive 
measures as a result of risk. 
1.5.2 The use of pre-emptive measures as a result of risk: 
Experts agree that there are two types of counter terrorist initiatives,121 deterrence based 
and pre-emptive based. Harcourt notes that whilst police deterrence aims to prevent or 
block the success of a terrorist attack and reduce the likelihood that an attack will cause 
injuries, pre-emptive policy aims to dismantle terrorist organisations.122 With the 
emergence of a ‘new threat’, pre-emptive policy has become a driving force in anti-terror 
legislation.  
Pre-emptive legislation has both supporters and critics. While some worry that anti-
terrorism legislation containing pre-emptive measures cuts across different laws,123 others 
argue for extending existing law in times of insecurity. The rationale for this extension based 
on the observation that ‘the State is an artificial entity created for the purpose of securing 
its citizens’;124 demonstrates how this type of measure favours the notion of collective 
security.   
Debate exists as to whether pre-punishment as a result of pre-emptive measures is 
justifiable. One school of thought implies that if the evidence is strong enough to suggest 
that an individual is about to commit a crime that person, according to Statman, is ‘pre-
deserving’ of punishment.125 The other school of thought as presented by Smilansky, is that 
even with such evidence as a democratic society we must respect the individual as a moral 
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agent with the integrity to walk away from the anticipated crime.126 As Zedner notes, if 
security is a precondition of freedom in the absence of imminent harm it is not logical ‘to 
license measures that are liberty-denying’.127 So where does the trigger lie for inducing pre-
emptive actions, and additionally, how is pre-emptive action administered as a result of 
this? 
As Zedner notes, the impulse towards a pre-emptive response or ‘radical prevention’ in the 
case of prospective danger is at some level understandable. It is this rationale for such a 
manoeuvre, however, which validates the acceptability of moves for Zedner. Actuarial 
justice is the means by which ‘high-risk populations are identified, classified, and contained. 
It is questionable whether this is driven principally by the demand for security or rather by 
the very possibility of calculation’.128 The personification of risk or threat can foster the use 
of such methods as the precautionary principle. As a guiding framework for public decision-
making, the precautionary principle is only now beginning to influence thinking about the 
risks of crime and terrorism. It requires that where there is a threat of serious harm, ‘lack of 
full scientific certainty’ should not be used as a reason for inaction’.129 This position 
proposed by Zedner operates on a similar principle to that earlier established in the one 
percent theory proposed by Suskind.130 
Legislative moves in the UK may also be influenced by the developments in European and 
international policy. It is well established that preventative measures are supported within 
the European framework with Sunstein noting that the precautionary principle is a ‘central 
plank’ of EU policy.131 De Goede identifies that the EU strategy articulates a security 
environment beset by radical ‘new threats’ that render the ‘traditional concept of self-
defence’ obsolete.132 This implies ‘that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. 
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Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early’.133 Such interpretations as 
this present a strong indicator for the use of pre-emptive measures pursued by the state.  
Outside of Europe and on the international scene, security measures found in resolution 
1267 and 1373 obligate all UN member states to freeze assets of individuals and 
organisations listed by any other member state on the basis of alleged ties to terrorist 
groups.134 Measures such as these then become embedded in anti-terror legislation and can 
be used to orchestrate support for ‘pre-emptive’ measures even if they fall outside of the 
context of the SCR. With such influential external measures, it is unsurprising that the 
executive interpret their pre-emptive actions and measures as legitimate.  
Each of the Bills reviewed included pre-emptive measures. Indeed, each of the case studies 
is associated with pre-emptive measures in some way, with control orders being a 
particularly clear example. However, when risk is presented and pre-emptive measures 
proposed, the significance of intelligence is called into play, both as a precursor to risk and 
as a justification for pre-emptive action.  
1.5.3 The influence of Intelligence: 
When looking to determine the necessity and justification of risk and pre-emptive actions, 
the importance of intelligence cannot be overlooked. Risk and threat should be grounded in 
intelligence. Obtaining ‘good’ intelligence is the most effective way to prevent, or pre-empt, 
acts of terrorism. Since ‘surprise is the cornerstone of successful terrorist operations’, it is 
the primary function of the intelligence and security services to detect them and to thereby 
provide sufficient warning to enable counter operations to be conducted.135 As Peter Chalk 
notes, ‘current, accurate secret intelligence is indispensable for the prevention or pre-
emption of terrorist activities’.136 The problem is that evidence is often omitted from 
discussion and deliberation at various levels and in some instances even from the suspect. 
Whilst intelligence is fundamental to the preservation of life against modern day terrorism, 
the lack of intelligence based evidence fails to convince critics of the threat, risk, necessity, 
or the benefit of extending powers.  
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Where intelligence is available for review, the influence of risk becomes a staple part of the 
assessment process. With risk and vulnerability presented, emphasis relies on evidence 
supplied by the executive to articulate proof and accountability. The framework of 
accountability is therefore dictated by the executive, and the select few, privy to 
information. The transparency of moves has begun to play an integral role in the checks and 
balances process following events such as the WMD fiasco and the Hutton enquiry. 
Needless to say, accountability emerged as a leading theme in the debate examined and 
particularly as the driving factor on 90 day pre-charge detention.137  
Risk, pre-emptive response and intelligence all form part of the justificatory framework for 
security. Whilst each is dependent on the other to provide a substantive case, quite often in 
debate the links were not formatted into a cohesive chain of reasoning as such debate 
jumped significantly from one aspect of discussion to another, with limited exposure to 
themes, trends, consistency and even previously established principles within the debate. 
Indeed each of the themes examined thus far also incorporates constitutional principles in 
the relationship between parliament, the government and the judiciary. As such, this will be 
examined further in the following chapter. Aside from constitutional influence, each of 
these themes helps feed into the widely examined debate of the existence, emergence or 
quest for balance. Although the themes examined are not exclusively aligned with the 
balance debate, they help establish how influences in the current debate may be informed. 
The following examination will now address the balance debate as established in light of 
rights and security measures. As with the previous examinations, this is not exhaustive 
however it aims to provide a subtle backdrop for a review of the quantitative and qualitative 
examinations.   
Accepting these boundaries it is arguable that, as with many other uncertainties captured 
within this debate, these influences on justifications of security create a further layer in the 
balance debate by incubating two competing risks; the risk from an attack competing 
against the risk to individual rights. Whilst these risks can be marginalised (with some known 
influences such as which rights may be infringed) the real assessment remains in ‘calculating 
the incalculable’.138 As with the examination undertaken to establish whether a balance 
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between rights and security exists, in practical terms, the process of weighing up 
contributory factors occurs much less explicitly at various junctures of debate dependant on 
how the information is filtered through committees and parliamentary discussion.       
Now that both rights and security have been reviewed, it is important to address the 
conceptual issue of balance. This review is made in line with security and rights balance as 
opposed to the practical issues of where the balance is made or should be made.  
1.6 The quest for balance in current settings: 
Should human rights always ‘trump’ the protection of national security? Rights are generally 
not absolute as in some instances they can be rescinded or modified for the protection of 
national security.139 It is this rationale which leads Golder and Williams to assert that a 
balancing approach is the ‘proper’ method for assessing anti-terror law.140 In this balance, 
the importance of the relevant human right is weighed against the importance of the 
societal or community interest in deciding whether to take legislative action (or, from the 
position of a judge, in deciding whether a certain law is valid). 
If certain human rights can be derogated from, and in this case as a response to security 
measures, then the question must be raised of the most appropriate method of balancing. 
For Golder and Williams ‘balancing’ appears to be simply another metaphor or standard, 
such as ‘reasonableness’, ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’, subsuming crucial policy 
decisions beneath a vague concept of uncertain, and malleable, content. As a result of this it 
says nothing about which rights or interests are to be balanced or what concepts are to 
guide the decision maker in their attempt to balance.141 If this subjectivity is to be taken in 
line with arriving at a reasonable and justifiable answer, how can the problems manifested 
with the concept of balance be minimised and, further, is balance the correct protocol to 
employ? 
Publically, it is assumed that we are living amidst a conflict between rights and security. In 
2005 the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stated that the ‘rules of the game’ must change 
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whilst the Home Secretary expressed that the ECHR was established over 50 years ago in a 
quite different international climate and was now being used in an ‘outdated and 
unbalanced’ way’ by rights advocates.142 Interpretations and comments such as these 
indicate, particularly through the eyes of the executive, that security and rights are 
competing. There is also a suggestion that there is a requirement to balance the two 
concepts, that is, that security and rights are not as rigidly defined as previously 
experienced. As such the presentation of ‘exceptional’ circumstance necessitates the re-
evaluation of the self-indulgence of individual rights and liberties.143 As Ignatieff notes, ‘the 
belief that our existing rights and guarantees should never be suspended is a piece of moral 
perfectionism’;144 a principle established earlier by Dworkin,145 Waldron146 and Hart147 et al. 
This claim by Ignatieff reiterates the inescapable tension caused by the competing balance 
of rights and security. In conflict with the position of Golder and Williams, Waldron argues 
that to secure a justifiable outcome should not have to rely on the goal based logic of a 
‘balance metaphor’.148  Whatever view is adopted, suggestions point to the need for some 
form of weighing up to take place.  
It is clear that there is a political value to balancing rights with security. Ashworth identifies 
two theories which address this balance; firstly the ‘fundamental contradiction thesis’, a pro 
rights argument; secondly the ‘balanced response thesis’ which articulates that 
governments must strike a balance between the dilemma of security and rights. Embedded 
within the fundamental contradiction thesis lies the belief that to undermine rights similar 
to those encountered by terrorist actions, governments are acting in the same way and are 
in some respects ‘colluding with the terrorists’. Many supporters of this thesis believe that 
‘if there is to be a ‘fight against terror’, it should be a fight for human rights and for the rule 
of law’,149 a position evident within the debate on anti-terrorism legislation.150 This latter 
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position is supported by Hoffman who claims that the war on terror undermines our 
security more than any terrorist bombing, suggesting further that history has shown that 
when societies trade rights for security most often they get neither.151 Opposite to the 
fundamental contradiction theory is the balanced response thesis. This presents that to fight 
terrorism adequately the curtailing of rights is necessary. Ashworth notes that this theory 
appears to assume a ‘hydraulic relationship between rights and security’.152 As a result of 
this ‘hydraulic’ nature, Ashworth argues that public interest does not include protecting 
fundamental rights, arguing further that ‘the term ‘balance’ tends to disarm opponents 
because it has no tenable antithesis: nobody, that is, would stand up and argue for 
imbalance or indeed for disproportionality, unreasonableness or unfairness’.153 What these 
interpretations reaffirm is that the balance of rights and security is, as expected, an 
unpredictable process.154 Additionally, in many interpretations, these concepts often 
compete although they are not necessarily incompatible. It is, consequently, not surprising 
that such complications are witnessed in the debate by politicians.  
As has been seen, there are significant variations and interpretations of how both rights and 
security are viewed. It is these variations that pressurise legal frameworks when justifying 
legislative moves. However this is viewed, rhetoric and interpretation are crucial in the 
understanding of this debate. Post 9/11, it would appear that the ‘balance’ between 
security and rights has become inseparable.155 This perceived ‘inseparability’ is a 
fundamental review point in this thesis through anti-terror legislation.156 The 
internationalisation of terrorism has driven forward the perceived need for extended 
control powers by the government. This is reinforced by the state’s ability to monopolise 
coercion. This need for ‘control’ has normalised infringement on rights and liberties 
underpinned by the UK’s derogation from the ECHR. Such a view demonstrates prioritisation 
between rights, freedoms and security and requires that the concept of balance itself 
receives close scrutiny. In particular, moves often drift towards a ‘balance’ that involves 
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restricting rights of a small minority157 in the hope of enhancing the security of the majority. 
Another flaw in this position is that the resulting curtailment may have an unintended 
effect, notably that of expanding the powers of the state so as to augment another threat to 
security.158 This was a core argument in the debates examined, and was evidenced by the 
impact which internment had on generating support for the IRA during the ‘Troubles’ in 
Northern Ireland.159  
Looking at balance between security and rights however, particularly in a balance metaphor 
scenario, requires questioning of what tips this balance, in whose interests and what lies 
within the scales of balance? When reviewing how to reconcile security and rights this also 
encompasses other balances, all of which feed into the overall security and rights debate. 
These include balancing between the ‘individual and the collective, between the political 
and the legal and between political sovereignty and the rule of law’160 to name but a few. 
Only when it is established how this balance is made is it then possible to question what 
should then be done when rights are in conflict.161 The problem this presents is that no 
formula exists. Each school of thought will dictate its own interpretation which may or may 
not be significantly different to others. To establish this emphasis it must be accepted that, 
at least politically, the balance metaphor exists. 
So how is balance arrived at? National security/emergency are both emotive phrases which, 
compounded with visual evidence and catastrophic scenes, can be very powerful; however, 
can rhetoric be powerful enough to overshadow long established rights and constitutional 
principles? How does a government prove that a restriction on rights will provide for 
increased security; a concern raised by Mr Khan in 2006 when examining the implications of 
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the TA 2006.162 As previously established, in justifying security measures the executive 
should demonstrate a number of external factors, including risk and threat, to legitimately 
pursue the intended objective. This however has led to political struggles mounted by the 
opposition in a bid to identify how these two social goods compare to one another. Loader 
suggests that in this balance between social goods it is easier for ‘political, professional and 
media actors’ to ‘mobilise a populist appeal to the idea of security’; a concept alluded to 
earlier.163 This in itself requires consideration of what the influence of populist support is 
and whether it can validate the political integrity of decision making on behalf of the 
electorate. These influences will hopefully be extrapolated throughout the analysis of each 
case study.   
An act of terrorism offers society a means to reaffirm human bonds that have been eroded. 
Emergencies take on a different role depending upon what they represent to particular 
societies, at particular times, rather than based on objective indicators such as real cost and 
real lives.164 Accordingly, terrorism can be used as a tool to orchestrate change, asking the 
question of what governments accrue from such extension of power. An emotive agenda is 
no more clearly demonstrated than by the language used to generate a sense of fear. The 
supposed novelty of terrorism and threat in current years has been exaggerated by the 
radicalisation of the ideology and language of war. This language of war mobilises the 
population by demonising the evil enemy. Coercive measures, specifically excluded by rights 
obligations on an individual level are acceptable in the name of protecting the freedom and 
rights of the collectivity. As already seen, these measures are supported with the use of 
YouGov polls by the executive. Bigo suggests that ‘the issue of a right to sacrifice individual 
rights in the name of collective security and freedom arises only if we are living in an 
exceptional moment’.165 The question still remains, however, as to what constitutes an 
‘exceptional moment’.  
Ashworth identifies that the process of balancing or ‘trading off’ various alternatives to 
achieve the best result is difficult. For Ashworth, this is because not only does this ‘trading 
off’ involve assigning weights to different rights, but also to ascertaining the levels of 
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confidence in predictions of consequences. Ultimately, both of these alternatives are likely 
not only to be highly contestable, but further, require a comparison of the weight of certain 
rights against certain consequences.166 How these comparisons are made is dependent on 
the tools relied upon to justify the so called ‘trade off’. Whilst against the backdrop of mass 
casualties and threat some express that ‘security should outweigh rights, that we should not 
be left wondering what would be the next phase’ while others maintain that constitutional 
heritage, democratic validity and the rule of law demand ‘rational’ and ‘provable’ actions.167 
This is a split clearly identified in debate. This reiterates the necessity for governments to 
provide transparent justification for measures presented thus satisfying requirements of 
necessity and proportionality.  
Following their examination into balancing rights and security, Golder and Williams suggest 
guidelines for constructively weighing rights and security when balancing. Their aim is to 
give content, structure and direction to what is an imprecise task. First, when balancing it is 
identified that it has to be recognised that some rights are more important than others. As 
such, this should be a contributory factor in the weighing up and balancing of security and 
rights. The second guideline suggested is that, if the decision maker is required to balance 
the importance of a non-fundamental right against national security, the decision maker 
should require the most cogent empirical evidence available that the proposed means of 
achieving the goal, national security, will actually be effective. This however is not without 
its limitations.168 Thirdly, for Golder and Williams, if the desired goal of national security can 
be achieved through means which do not derogate from human rights, or which do so to a 
lesser extent, then that is the legislative course which should be adopted.169 Finally, when 
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looking at the simplicity of rights and security balance it should not be glossed over that in 
fact the balancing process can be racially, and religiously, unbalanced a position clearly 
documented as emerging from Part 4 ATCSA 2001.170 There is no explicit use of these 
guidelines publically or politically but they do identify a checklist which could be used as a 
tool when examining the necessity of a balancing process. It also indicates, however, that 
there must be prior knowledge and preparation to know whether existing legislation could 
achieve the objectives required by the balance being discussed. Importantly, wider social 
implications should not be overlooked. This process clearly involves a much wider obligation 
than simply one that parliament alone can offer.  
Aside from parliament, in applying human rights, judicial bodies have recognised the need 
to weigh rights against other concerns such as national security. This reaffirms that there is 
a wider balancing process to consider. The need to weigh rights against other non-rights 
interests is also inherent in general concepts of the nature of human rights.171 It is therefore 
crucial to articulate what is meant by balancing, what interests are being balanced, and 
whether balancing is a sufficiently precise and descriptive metaphor for what we are seeking 
to achieve in legal and policy terms.172 
Concluding remarks: 
There are a number of overarching issues when analysing anti-terrorism legislation, the 
primary being the perceived balance or trade-off between rights and security.173 Zedner 
believes that ‘a sympathetic, though hardly benign, interpretation is that the British 
Government has found itself bound to uphold human rights at precisely the historic 
moment when world events and public opinion seemed to call for a sacrificing of individual 
freedoms in the name of collective security’.174 As Kellner notes 9/11 was so far-reaching 
and catastrophic that it flipped the political world upside down, put new issues on the 
agenda and changed the political, cultural, and economic climate almost completely 
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overnight. More importantly the attacks demonstrated a vulnerability to terrorism. 
Ultimately this new vulnerability identified that technology such as airplanes or the internet, 
could be weapons of destruction and could threaten anywhere and anytime.175 Although 
rights are established, as Waldron notes, it is their interpretation which leaves the politically 
delicate nature of rights in the balance.176 It cannot therefore be denied that such a wide 
margin of appreciation on all concepts influential in the balance debate demonstrate both 
the vulnerability of parliamentary debate on challenging legislation, but also 
implementation of legislation by the judiciary following its enactment. The concept of rights 
(whether to security or freedom) is ‘flexible rather than stable, fragmented rather than 
unitary and fuzzy rather than determinant. It belongs to the symbolic order of language and 
law which determines the scope and reach of rights with scant regard for ontologically solid 
categories’.177  
When action is taken by governments to reduce threat from the unpredictable measures 
employed by terrorists, the impingement on rights has often been spoken of in terms of 
balance. We must balance our rights with our security. This approach, however, has been 
considered both as misleading and unhelpful. Freedom cannot be guaranteed by a reduction 
in rights ascertained through a simple balance process. Stone suggests that ‘necessity’ 
rather than ‘balance’ should be used. Ultimately, given the threats, it is suggested that it 
would be beneficial to consider the minimum steps necessary to respond effectively. 
Individual rights should only be restricted when the need exists and is real therefore it 
should not simply be when it might be regarded as helpful to extend powers.178 However, as 
established, the cost of getting the balance wrong may be a contributory factor in the 
inability to separate the emotive from the political, and as such, operates on the assertion 
that the notion of security is so powerful that it can ‘trump’ all other considerations.179  
With all this taken into consideration, including an understanding of the real impact 
draconian moves may have delivered through a balance process, Bigo and Guild identify 
that to best review this balance is to acknowledge that security and rights appear to be 
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underpinned by two parameters. The first of these is the driving force of the novelty and 
intensity of the threat. The novelty and intensity of threat will evoke risk assessments, 
preparation of moves and the consultation on effective measures. The second parameter, 
acknowledged by Bigo and Guild, is identified by the limits of the exceptional movement; 
namely its necessity, legality and legitimacy.180 The effective control of security-focused 
state action is to be judged on the extent to which it consists only of action that is necessary 
and proportionate. Arguably, by reviewing the situation within such frameworks an 
appropriate balance can be struck between security and rights. De Londras believes this 
commitment to such balanced action is the ‘lynchpin of liberal democratic governments’.181 
The existence of these parameters will be extrapolated from the examination in this thesis.  
As noted earlier, whilst Cotler182 and Ruddock183 suggest that to adopt a positive stance on 
‘human security’ evades the messy and blurred boundary debates associated with 
balancing, Golder and Williams184 argue that, at least with the undertaking of a balancing 
process, the opportunity exists to sift the legislation and open avenues for challenge. This 
challenge, however, must be made and it is this, or at least the need for challenge, which 
emphasises the necessity for discussing the influence of constitutional principles.  As 
previously mentioned, balance does not necessarily fall into the hands of parliament. What 
is vital is that executive actions must be curtailed when necessary. The manipulation of risk, 
security, necessity of pre-emptive measures and the clandestine nature of intelligence all 
feed into the control in the hands of the executive.  
Freedman185 establishes that the threat from current terrorism is ‘new’, Feldman186 notes 
that the end result of this ‘new’ terrorism is not qualitatively different and therefore does 
not need such emancipation in anti-terror law. Whichever position is adopted, whether for 
existing measures or the extension of powers, if balance is not grounded in intelligence or 
evidence established on real threat but on projected numerical assessments of attacks 
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rights may be unnecessarily corroded. This is where the constitutional roles performed by 
parliament, and supplemented in some cases by the judiciary, must challenge for evidence, 
proof and accountability through the methods available with checks and balances. 
Terrorism, however, continues to present symptoms of the ‘knowable versus the 
unknowable’.187 These approaches continue to place emphasis on the need for security 
measures to demonstrate why they are encroaching upon rights. This would include an 
emphasis on risk assessments of actual risk, residual risk and intelligence based threat 
assessments, all of which have to be substantiated by evidence and most of all 
accountability demonstrated.  
As Zedner notes ‘security’ is so ‘slippery’ and ‘open textured’ it can furnish justification, it is 
a moving target.188 As established in the limitations of this study, and further supported by 
the representations presented in this chapter, individuals can be genuinely committed to 
rights and yet still differ on philosophical issues such as their scope, whether a particular 
objective is consistent with the project of protecting rights and whether legislation complies 
with notions of proportionality.189 De Londras and Davis establish that ‘within a system of 
separated powers, there are three potential responses to the limitation of individual 
liberties resulting for executive actions during the times of violent, terrorism related 
emergency: (1) trust the executive to behave responsibly and lawfully; (2) rely on the 
legislature and the popular democratic processes to force the executive to behave 
responsibly and lawfully and minimise judicial interventions; or (3) call on the judiciary to 
intervene and restrict unlawful behaviour produced by the executive, the parliament or 
both acting together’.190 These ‘potential responses’ identified by De Londras and Davis are 
important to this research because the response adopted will influence the interpretation of 
data and ultimately the conclusive findings. Chapter Two will draw on the inferences from 
this chapter and take them forward, not only in the analysis of ‘balance’ as a concept but 
further that balance can only be understood if where the balance lies within the legislative 
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process is explored. As such, the following chapter reviews the challenges made by the 
influence of constitutional principles.   
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Chapter Two: 
Oversight mechanisms; the performance of balance 
When reviewing and coding parliamentary debate it became evident that the assessment of 
rights and security could not be performed without acknowledging the influence of key 
constitutional principles, such as the separation of powers. From the quantitative findings, 
the influence of constitutional principles (in all three anti-terror Bills reviewed) accounted 
for significant quotas of debate. Whilst the aim of the case studies was not focused on 
constitutional principles, it cannot go unrecognised that indirect influence from the judiciary 
exists, in ascertaining the direction and ultimately the balance of measures in the 
rights/security debate. It is the influence of the judiciary which has led commenters191 to 
consider potential competing functions between the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary particularly over who is best placed to carry out particular review functions. The 
aim of this chapter is not to discuss the historical notions of constitutional principles but to 
review broad principles of scrutiny measures as currently presented by scholars. This will be 
furthered by discussing the case law relied upon by the executive prior to the enactment of 
the ATCSA in support of their extensions of power. The case law presented helps 
demonstrate just how blurred boundaries appear to be, particularly over extensions of 
power, and reinforces the continued necessity for multi-agency reviews and along with 
functional and effective oversight mechanisms.  
There is no doubt that constitutional principles play a pivotal role in the functioning of the 
legal system in the UK. From the quantitative findings presented in Chapter Three of this 
thesis there was sufficient evidence to suggest that constitutional principles were 
influential, both in the law making process as well as within debate over the functions of 
oversight mechanisms. Therefore, constitutional principles will be briefly examined here 
with the intention of examining challenges to executive supremacy by parliament and the 
judiciary as part of the oversight mechanism framework. This chapter will consequently 
                                                          
191
 See: De Londras, F and Davis, F. (2010); Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing 
Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanism; Phillips, M. (2006); Londonistan. How Britain is creating a 
Terror State Within.  
Page 57 of 323 
 
address the influence and mechanisms of scrutiny rather than discussing factors which 
influence the conceptual balance as discussed in the previous chapter.  
2.1 Interface of the Government and oversight mechanisms: 
The government proposes legislation but only parliament may enact laws giving legal effect 
to proposals. It remains noteworthy in this assessment that, where a government has a 
large majority of seats in the Commons the government has the potential to dominate and 
ensure that its proposed legislation is enacted. The judiciary, however, must be seen to be 
politically impartial. The judicial function is to interpret parliament’s intentions and to 
ensure, through judicial review, that any delegated legislation is consistent with the scope of 
power granted by parliament.192 The rule of law also requires that judges ensure the legality 
of government action; a function that could not be fulfilled if the judges’ independence was 
in doubt. 
Whilst the judiciary have the ability to interpret legislation, constitutionally they have no 
power to question the validity of legislation.193 However, Section 3 of the HRA imposes a 
duty on judges to interpret legislation ‘as far as possible’194 in a manner to make it 
compatible with Convention rights. Where this is not possible a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility’ can be issued but it cannot declare an Act of Parliament invalid.195 This 
inability to declare an Act of Parliament invalid maintains the supremacy of the elected 
chamber and leaves the opportunity to respond to the declaration of incompatibility in the 
hands of the executive and the legislature.196 The importance of the judiciary and the 
reliance on case law by parliament invites a brief examination of the scope of the interplay 
between parliament and the judiciary in this volatile debate of oversight mechanisms. 
It is accepted that executive actions must be checked and subjected to substantial oversight, 
even in times of emergency. Historic claims of ‘Executive Supremacy’, which suggest that 
the executive is the best placed branch of government to make decisions about how to 
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manage a risk that threatens security, are unsubstantiated.197 Such distrust in ‘Executive 
Supremacy’ is based on the well documented experience of counter-terrorist law and policy 
making, which suggests that the executive has a ‘security-bias’ impacting significantly on 
individual rights protection.198 De Londras and Davis, therefore, believe that unchecked 
executive action has a tendency to over-indulge the necessity of security with insufficient 
consideration to the infringements that might occur, causing ‘disproportionate and 
unnecessary rights violations’.199 This criticism is not isolated, but demonstrates that fears 
remain over executive powers.  
It was established in the House of Commons that the government needed to share more 
information ‘with parliament and with society more widely’.200 However, as well as sharing 
information, parliament ought to require more from the executive, particularly information 
on the nature and scale of the threat requiring such extensions of power required to 
derogation from the ECHR. In a speech in 2006, Gordon Brown referred to the need to ‘build 
public trust in the UK’s security regime through accountability to parliament’.201 Sincere or 
not, it reiterated the increasing need for transparency in justifications of measures. One 
concern which continued to arise through the case studies examined was the limited 
capacity for parliament to scrutinise the evidence relied upon by the executive. Parameters 
for scrutiny were often framed within the constraint that evidence was so sensitive it could 
not be shared. This, however, is not a substantive justification to disregard the scrutiny of 
executive measures. As Dyzenhaus acknowledges, there is a requirement for greater 
validation of the information that forms the basis of the government’s assessment of the 
threat. Detailed information must be made available for independent scrutiny of what is 
required in the interests of national security. Assessments of the proportionality of 
measures can only be made ‘if sufficient information is available about the precise nature of 
the threat’.202 This places greater emphasis on the remit of parliamentary scrutiny through 
                                                          
197
 For example see: Lustgarten, L. (2004); National Security, Terrorism and Constitutional Balance. 
198
 See Bonner, D. (2008); Have the Rules of the Game Changed? De Londras & Davis. (2010); Controlling the 
Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanism; Davis, F. (2012); 
Parliamentary Supremacy and the Re-Invigoration of Institutional Dialogue in the UK. 
199
 De Londras and Davis. (2010); Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on 
Effective Oversight Mechanism. Pp. 21. 
200
 HC Vol. 442, Col. 485; C. Clarke. 
201
 ‘Securing our Future’, (13/02/2006); Speech Chancellor G. Brown MP.  
202
 Dyzenhaus, D. (2007); Deference, Security and Human Rights. Pp. 146-151. 
Page 59 of 323 
 
committees, such as the JCHR.203 With the specific task of human rights scrutiny it is 
anticipated that, of the parliamentary committees, the JCHR should become the lynchpin of 
investigative debate and ultimately provide matters of debate to challenge legislation when 
necessary.  
While the judiciary have a duty to scrutinise executive rationale, it must also be established 
that moves ‘satisfy basic standards of rationality and are not inconsistent with the principles 
that underpin democracy’.204 The judiciary should also display rationality in the decisions 
they make.205 This, in some instances, may mean offering submissive deference and 
submitting to the intention of the legislation, deferring to the decision maker unless straying 
beyond the limits of statutory authority.206 Dyzenhaus notes that a number of other factors 
can also contribute to the scope of deference including  
‘the nature of the right in question; the relative expertise of the court and the 
decision maker in the subject matter in question; the relative institutional 
competence of the original decision maker to determine the type of issue in 
question; the degree of democratic accountability of the original decision maker; 
how well democratic mechanisms are working in practice; the extent to which the 
decision or measures were preceded by a thorough compatibility inquiry; and the 
opportunities afforded in the process, or through other accountability mechanisms, 
to the interests affected’.207  
It is, therefore, not necessarily a conflict of constitutional principles to defer to the executive 
and the legislator. However, to fail in a duty to justify deference and provide the scrutiny 
the oversight mechanism facilitates, could undermine long established checks and balances.  
It has been recognised that to allow ‘Executive Supremacy’ to go unchallenged is counter 
intuitive to the functions of the oversight mechanisms. As identified in the previous chapter, 
two limiting processes can be employed to provide checks; firstly, the function of parliament 
and public democracy and, secondly, the intervention of the judiciary in the protection of 
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rights. Each of these checks has its own limitations yet both offer legitimate means of 
challenging the power of the executive if, and when, necessary. This, however, is not to say 
that each process has to work independently. This review aims to examine the potential 
influence each process has in the checks and balances role it has historically performed. The 
first process to be reviewed is parliamentary scrutiny.      
2.2 Parliamentary scrutiny: 
Having established that the power of the executive must not go unchecked in the name of 
providing a legitimate balancing procedure, assessment turns to operational methods which 
can perform such a role. Davis contends that the judiciary is an ineffective means of 
controlling the executive. This claim is based on the judiciary’s historic unwillingness to 
interfere and, although recent case law may be encouraging, it is no indication of future 
performance. More importantly, by thinking that the courts will fulfil this crucial function, 
Davis argues that we anaesthetise constitutional actors who might exercise genuinely 
effective control, namely ‘the legislature and the people acting in their constitutional 
capacity’ through popular democracy.208 In the white paper ‘Rights Brought Home: The 
Human Rights Bill’ the government indicated that ‘parliament itself should play a leading 
role in protecting the rights which are at the heart of a parliamentary democracy’.209 
Identifying four conditions necessary for parliamentary scrutiny specific to rights and 
security to be useful and effective, Feldman remarks that parliament should ‘take human 
rights seriously; should recognise their own limitations; should recognise the corresponding 
strengths of other institutions; and should be prepared to read, reflect on and use the 
reports of committees when deliberating and voting’.210 As will be seen from the case 
studies examined later, regarding these points noted by Feldman for the effectiveness of 
parliamentary scrutiny, findings reflect that the majority of these criteria are not expressly 
observed by parliament.211   
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In theory parliament can legislate, scrutinise and conduct enquiries probing for answers 
from government on the rationale of positions adopted and improving the quality of policy. 
More importantly, such scrutiny commands transparency in the work of the government 
and, therefore, strengthens representative democracy. As Shephard notes, perspectives on 
how influential parliament is depend upon the lens adopted, the functions evaluated and 
the policies and associated political context.212 Evans and Evans acknowledge that 
legislatures perform several distinct functions213 including being representative bodies who 
provide the mechanism by which citizens participate in public affairs; they provide a forum 
in which governments can be held accountable; and they are considered to be deliberative 
law-making bodies.214 Scrutiny through popular oversight, whether through parliament or 
‘the people’ is, according to Davis, to be preferred to judicial oversight in times of security-
related crisis. This is based on its capacity to nudge government towards a more balanced 
counter-terrorist policy than can be achieved through the courts. This, for Davis, is because 
‘the people’ through parliament are capable of promoting a rights argument.215  
Curbing of executive measures can potentially be achieved through parliamentary rebellion 
(individual parliamentarians breaking ranks with the government).216 Shephard notes that 
this method of challenge works effectively as a policy influencing institution rather than a 
policy making process.217 Parliamentary rebellion is rare because of the cost in a system of 
political parties, although parliamentarians are more likely to rebel after the mood in the 
country has already changed. As De Londras identifies, supporting an already popular 
movement is likely to be popular with the electorate thereby increasing the chances of 
electoral success.218 This was seen in the Blair administration of 2005. Shephard argues that 
following the 2005 election, the obvious loss of public trust in Prime Minister Blair led to ‘a 
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parliamentary backlash over security policy, most notably the proposal to increase the 
number of days police would be permitted to hold terrorist suspects without charge’.219 
Feldman argues that the idea of electoral democracy in policy making is ‘seductive’. A 
number of influences prevent the notion of ‘electoral democracy’ from being a standalone 
interrogative process. For Feldman legislation (not just anti-terror), is typically framed in 
secret, pushed through parliament at speed, manipulated by the authority of the party whip 
and timetabled to streamline the business of parliament. Moreover, debate is often 
‘dominated’ by party-politics rather than the merit of the legislation.220 This is further 
complicated with the difficulty faced by parliament and associated bodies in obtaining 
useful information. The alleged sensitive nature of material can make the government and 
various agencies reluctant to disseminate information. This coyness therefore can make it 
impossible for parliament and its committees to say whether a measure affecting rights is 
justified.221  
Weaknesses in parliamentary control, however, have been documented by scholars 
specifically reviewing parliamentary procedure for the ATCSA 2001. Shepard notes that 
‘Although impossible to verify, there is a suspicion that some of the defeated clauses were 
‘carefully calibrated concessions’ that create the impression of effective parliamentary 
control while in fact being included in the draft with no expectation that they would ever 
get through scrutiny’.222 This observation by Shepard could explain why some contestable 
clauses and measures remained in the legislation with the executive having incorporated 
the ‘carefully calibrated concessions’ to both detract from the real concerns with policy; and 
further, to allow parliament to feel a sense of achievement in revoking clauses with obvious 
human rights incompatibilities. The politics of the parliamentary system as an oversight 
mechanism leave it fragile and open to manipulation. This manipulation of parliamentary 
scrutiny is further compounded by party political systems posing significant difficulties for 
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parliament, personified by the use of ‘whipping’ to ensure party unity.223 It is not, of course, 
the case that parliamentarians never vote against the government and never dissent even in 
hypersensitive areas such as security. However, such dissent is rare and tends to arise 
mostly where the popular tide has already turned from fear of terrorism to discomfort with 
counter-terrorism. Nonetheless, on the issue of 90 day pre-charge detention, despite the 
imposition of a three-line whip, MPs voted against the extension by 322 to 291. In this vote, 
49 labour members rebelled reinforcing the scope for parliament as an oversight 
mechanism to operate effectively. However, the whip, the influence of patronage and the 
associated impact of a further promotion are significant systemic disincentives to rights-
based dissent from the executive’s desired course of action. As De Londras and Davis note, 
the risk of losing electoral support cannot be easily counteracted. A panicked and concerned 
electorate might see failings to support terrorism measures as being soft on terrorism. This 
‘soft on terrorism’ approach was personified by the naming and shaming of MPs who voted 
against 90 day pre-charge detention, in The Sun newspaper. Terrorism related emergencies, 
whether real or imagined, are therefore likely to result in more compliant behaviour by the 
majority of parliamentarians.224  
The importance of the unelected chamber in the challenge that can be made to the 
executive must also be considered when assessing the catalogue of oversight mechanisms 
available for parliament. There are a number of reasons for the substantial influence which 
the unelected chamber can have in the scrutiny of legislation. Firstly, the removal of a large 
number of hereditary peers means that no single party has enjoyed a majority in the 
chamber. Secondly, the focus on ‘life peers’ has allowed for a degree of independence in the 
vigorous scrutiny process. Thirdly, with the emphasis on life peers, there is a supposed 
sense of legitimacy to the scrutiny the House of Lords provides. Fourthly, by virtue of the 
Law Lords, the Lords ‘arguably has better legal expertise than the commons and so will be 
better disposed to reveal weaknesses in government legislation.225 The influence of the 
House of Lords will be addressed in the case studies reviewed in Section II. It should be 
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noted that the powers of the House of Lords in relation to primary legislation are 
substantially restricted by the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 and, as such, some of the 
ways in which the House of Lords takes part in the supervision of the executive are through 
its work on select committees.226 This reason alone reinforces the continued importance of 
utilising committees such as the JCHR to invigorate and drive debate on the house floor.   
Parliamentary oversight is further ascertained by the use of select committees. Dyzenhaus 
reminds us that institutions, other than the courts, may well be able to contribute to a 
broader institutional attempt to limit the abuse of discretionary emergency powers and 
uphold principles of legality provided that the courts retain the ability to check abuses of 
powers.227 However, the scrutiny of measures can only be performed based on the 
information available.228 A significant development in the armour of the oversight process 
through the JCHR will now be reviewed assessing its influence to date both perceived and 
applied.  
2.2.1 JCHR: 
Scholars such as Hunt229 and Klug230 have carried out research into the influence and 
effectiveness of the JCHR which, as mentioned in the introduction, facilitates parliamentary 
provisions for oversight of executive actions. Established in 2001, the JCHR was created to 
scrutinise legislation for compliance with the HRA and human rights commitments.231 Klug 
and Wildbore express that, as the first permanent joint committee of both Houses, it was in 
effect a ‘new species’. The JCHR was a ‘standing joint committee with a broad, and largely 
undefined, remit’. More significantly, for the purposes of its review capacity, was the JCHR’s 
ability to determine ‘which human rights matters it would consider and what working 
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practices to adopt’.232 The role of the committee was defined early on as to alert both 
Houses of Parliament to the ‘risk of proceeding to legislate in a manner which will later be 
held by a court to be incompatible with the ECHR’.233 Indeed, while reviewing  proposed 
anti-terrorism legislation, the JCHR referred to its role as that of ‘parliamentary guardian’ of 
the HRA and emphasised the importance of protecting the ‘core values of a democratic 
society such as individual autonomy, the rule of law and the right to dissent’ which ‘must 
not lightly be compromised or cast away’.234 
Claims of extensions in parliamentary scrutiny through the JCHR, however, have not been 
completely encapsulated by all and as such the work and influence of the committee has 
been subject to numerous reviews. Tolley,235 in his work on the parliamentary scrutiny of 
rights in the UK, drew on a number of studies to ascertain the extent to which the JCHR has 
been successful in fulfilling its purpose and, further, the effect its reporting has on the 
legislative process. Tolley notes that, whilst the enactment of the HRA necessitated some 
form of oversight mechanism, it was parliament who created the JCHR so that independent 
review could take place unadulterated by the executive or courts.236 Too much emphasis on 
the functionality of the JCHR, however, may misplace the actual impact the committee has. 
As Feldman notes, ‘it does not adjudicate on human rights matters: it only advises. It has no 
power, but it has some influence’.237 From the outset of the committee there were various 
views on the purpose and functions of the JCHR.238 However, Klug and Wildbore identify 
that a common theme is for the committee to assist parliament in providing ‘independent 
scrutiny of executive policy and legislation’.239 This observation by Klug and Wildbore is 
substantiated by the findings of Hiebert240 who recognises that the process of scrutiny 
serves several functions. The first of these is to ‘alert parliament’ about the implications of 
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rights on the Bill reviewed. Secondly, the very fact that the JCHR provides ‘systematic 
scrutiny’ prompts the creators of the Bill to ‘ensure that they are attentive to the 
consequences’. Thirdly, the JCHR can perform the function of assessing government 
responses to judicial declarations of incompatibility. Fourthly according to Hiebert, is that 
the JCHR provides legal advice to parliament with respect to questions of compatibility.241 In 
the same vein as Hiebert, Lord Lester of Herne Hill confirms this function suggesting that the 
JCHR has effectively become Parliament’s ‘legal advisor on human rights’.242 Whilst these 
observations may be presented, the flexibility of the role of the JCHR leaves its core and 
fundamental responsibilities open to debate based on its wide remit and self-direction. 
In light of the intended aim to use parliament as a check on the executive and helping to 
create better laws and challenge potential executive abuse of power by passing legislation 
with ingrained and identifiable rights problems, the question remains over the effectiveness 
of the JCHR. In 2006 Smookler established that the influence of the JCHR varied from Bill to 
Bill. Testing this Klug confirms that, although the work of the JCHR was known to both 
Houses of Parliament, the actual impact of the JCHR on the ‘outcome of legislation is 
another matter’. Indeed Klug’s findings unearthed that the JCHR’s impact could only be 
detected in 3%243 of Bills reported on.244 This, as Tolley notes, casts some doubt on the 
effectiveness of pre-legislative scrutiny. Using the ATCSA 2001 as an example Powell 
confirms that there were no amendments to the government’s proposal following sixteen 
hours of debate. More importantly Powell recognises that ‘If parliamentary debate is unable 
to affect changes to potential legislation that breaches human rights standards, its 
effectiveness must be questioned’.245 As Hiebert246 identifies, following sustained pressure 
and parliamentary reports through the JCHR both prior to the ATCSA being enacted and 
following, the compelling factor for the government to reassess its legislation was the ruling 
in A v Secretary of State (Re A).247  
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As a new and developing committee with a wide remit and significant expectations on the 
delivery of reports, Klug and Wildbore suggest seven success criteria for the JCHR. Although 
this is not explicitly identified anywhere these criteria, according to Klug and Wildbore, can 
be located from the work of the committee itself and suggestions by members. The criteria 
are firstly to provide advice on human rights compatibility of proposed legislation in a timely 
manner to influence parliamentary debates.248 Secondly, the criteria are to increase 
awareness within government departments that every Bill will be examined, enhancing 
parliament’s influence on legislative outcomes.249 Thirdly, they are to provide an incentive 
to government to carry out rigorous compatibility scrutiny of policy proposals at 
department level. Fourthly, the criteria are to act as a check on the executive. Fifthly, they 
are to ‘infuse’ human rights into the policy process and sixthly, to gather and monitor 
evidence from all areas of law creation and implementation to assess for compatibility. 
Finally, the criteria are to influence debate both inside and outside of parliament.250 If these 
criteria can be embedded into the everyday understanding of the role of the committee, the 
expectations of delivery and the beneficial nature of their specific scrutiny capabilities, the 
role of the JCHR could become a fundamental asset to the wider oversight machinery.  
Raising awareness and actually influencing legislative outcomes are two different matters. 
Whilst the intentions of the JCHR are well founded, the empirical evidence suggests that, in 
fact, its direct influence on preventing government passing dubious legislation has not been 
as significant as anticipated. In her review of the JCHR, Klug identifies the difficulty in 
ascertaining the impact of the JCHR’s reports on debate in parliament. After analysing all 
references to the JCHR from both Houses of Parliament for a 10-month period of the 2005-
2006 session, it was established that ‘there were only 59 references to the JCHR in the 
House of Commons and 118 in the House of Lords’.251 Nicol comments that the JCHR ‘tends 
to restrict itself to making predictions as to whether legislative provisions breach the ECHR. 
It does not initiate debate about what the rights in the ECHR ought to mean’.252 This can 
have the effect that ‘legislatures argue like judges whilst courts assume a legislative role the 
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boundaries between law and politics disintegrate and the separation of powers ceases to be 
a worthwhile concept’.253 As a result of the wide scope and self-defining examinations 
undertaken by the committee, it is less structured than at first considered and as such may 
not have fitted adequately within the constitutional framework as it may have first 
appeared.  
Scepticism remains over the realistic accomplishments of the JCHR, particularly within a 
Westminster parliamentary system. Indeed Hiebert documents that the idea of the JCHR 
was initially considered ‘at odds with traditional expectations that rights are protected by 
parliament’.254 Having reviewed the historic notion of parliamentary checks on executive 
power and a brief insight into the influence of the JCHR it is evident that, although 
parliamentary oversight in theory should occur, the chances of dissent against executive 
extension of powers unadulterated by the influence of a political agenda remain slim when 
assessing the checks available to parliamentary review, particularly when reviewing rights 
and security debate.  
2.3 Judicial review and the influence of case law: 
Heightened fear of international terrorism, and the threat it presents has led a number of 
states to adopt coercive responses to terrorism. With influences from European and 
international legislation255 the executive and the judiciary have found themselves 
inadvertently conflicting, most notably on issues of rights and security. Emergent case law, 
both pre and post 9/11, has generated discussion between the functions of the judiciary and 
the executive. This discussion has viewed the judiciary, both from an historic perspective 
where courts were often seen to defer power to the executive and, more recently, in the 
protection offered to rights through the judicial use of declarations of incompatibility.256 The 
actions on both sides of the debate however identify that the role of the judiciary cannot be 
overlooked in the balance debate either conceptually or pragmatically.  
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2.3.1 Change in the role of the judiciary in a post HRA era: 
In his article ‘Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 120 Years of the UK’s Legal 
Response to Terrorism’,257 Brandon notes that Britain has tremendous experience in dealing 
with the impact and threat that terrorism can have on a society. Anti-terror legislation and 
security issues are, therefore, not alien to either the judiciary or the executive. However, the 
framework in which the executive and the judiciary now work has changed in recent years. 
As Shephard notes, whilst the introduction of the HRA has not ‘trumped’ parliamentary 
sovereignty, human rights transgressions highlighted by court rulings ‘undermine the 
legitimacy of parliamentary legislation’; a contributory factor in the repeated revisit to anti-
terror legislation.258    
In a mature democracy it is important that judges are independent both of parliament and 
government and not merely a rubber stamp for the executive. The HRA brought to the UK 
courts a need to consider the separation of powers and to reinforce values that are central 
to rights protected by the ECHR.259 Historically, decisions about national security or 
deportation and detention on security grounds were considered political, grounded in 
sensitive information and therefore not justiciable or amenable to judicial review.260 
For Phillips261 and Mr Mallins, the rise of judicial activism and rights culture stemmed from 
developments that changed the way judges saw themselves. For example, moves 
undertaken by the Labour Government in 1997 encouraged judicial activism by integrating 
the ECHR into English law.262 Defence of individual rights by the judiciary has led to MPs 
questioning the UK’s involvement with the ECtHR, particularly the power the HRA places in 
the hand of the courts at the expense of the elected representatives. Teddy Taylor claims;  
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‘While the Government have heard many learned arguments about the merits of 
the ECtHR, I hope that they will ask themselves whether we could better safeguard 
our liberty and freedom if Parliament took back the powers. All the powers seem to 
be going to courts, institutions and organisations over which the people have no 
control. We must determine where the limits between the Courts and Parliament 
should be drawn’.263 
Despite acknowledging the ultimate supremacy of parliament integrating the ECHR 
effectively transferred considerable political power from parliament to the courts.264 As Bigo 
and Guild note: 
‘legislation at the national and European levels has already granted governments 
the possibility of derogating in specific cases, but in interpreting those law and 
conventions, judges have continually refuted the idea that governments can use 
such occasions to reframe the boundaries of laws. The exceptions must occur inside 
the rule of law; they cannot frame the rule of law’.265  
This reaffirms that the judiciary arguably hold the reins on the direction of legislative moves, 
if not the power.  
De Londras266 sees recent court decisions as indicative of a shift in judicial reasoning to the 
creation of a rights enforcing, muscular body capable of supporting liberty. De Londras does 
not deny the importance of the democratic actors but rather accepts that democratic actors 
can put in place legislative codes and structures for the protection of security that do not 
necessarily undermine individual rights. The difficulty for de Londras, however is that, for 
various reasons, including institutional design and populism, elected lawmakers rarely do so 
unless either such action has become the politically expedient route or these 
parliamentarians have been firmly ‘nudged’ towards such law-making by the courts. As a 
result of this it seems likely that the way in which executive action will be subjected to the 
most effective form of oversight is through a legislative judicial dialogue focused on 
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achieving a sustainable, proportionate balance between the exigencies of a security crisis 
and the fundamentality of rights’.267 Speaking on the identified unaccountability of the 
judiciary, President Aharon Barak notes that is precisely because of the unaccountability of 
the judiciary that it strengthens: 
 ‘against the fluctuations of public opinion. The real test of this independence and 
impartiality comes in situations of war and terrorism. The significance of our 
unaccountability becomes clear in these situations, when public opinion is more 
likely to be unanimous. Precisely in these times, we judges must hold fast to 
fundamental principles and values; we must embrace our supreme responsibility to 
protect democracy and the constitution’.268  
Utilising the independence of the judiciary, Barak reaffirms the importance of having such a 
body which can extract itself from political influences and provide oversight based, in 
theory, on the facts surrounding the decision. 
However, as mentioned earlier, whilst tides may have changed in a post HRA era old habits 
die hard. As Davis notes, a number of historical examples of judicial failure to protect 
individuals remain in debate; Zadig in which Lord Finlay LC stated that ‘it may be necessary 
in a time of great public danger to entrust great powers to His Majesty in Council’269 
ultimately the House of Lords upheld the detention without trial of a naturalized citizen. In 
Lawless,270 the ECtHR upheld the use of internment without trial on the basis that the IRA 
border campaign posed a threat to the life of the nation.271 This historic reluctance of the 
courts to limit executive power may stem from a belief that the executive is in possession of 
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peculiarly sensitive information regarding the current crisis. The courts might surmise that, 
while the action appears disproportionate, the executive should be trusted since they are 
likely to be in possession of more accurate intelligence than any other branch of 
government.272  
The decision in Re A273 directed a change in terror legislation post 9/11. As will be seen from 
the cases presented later, reliance by the executive on judgements has continued to leave 
open the on-going discussion over roles and boundaries. Even though the executive utilise 
case law to their advantage in obtaining support for their decision to make moves, the 
influence of case law in parliamentary debate appears to remain limited. Three cases 
referenced in Re A274 will be discussed briefly to provide a backdrop to the on-going dispute 
between the competing functions of the executive and the judiciary regarding the balance 
of rights and security.275 Each of the cases reviewed were relied upon in Re A.276 The 
decision in Re A277 gave rise to major changes in terrorism legislation during the period 
examined within this thesis and further became a mile stone in the constitutional inferences 
previously held between the powers which extend to the executive and those held by the 
courts. As such, the case law which underpins the decision in Re A278 will be important in the 
understanding of how the decision came about, as well as where the balance in oversight 
powers between the courts and the executive might lie. 
Having briefly established that it is widely accepted that the role of the judiciary has 
changed in the twenty-first century since the incorporation of the HRA, there still remains 
concerns over their ability to provide the necessary checks on executive power instead of 
offering deference to the executive grounded in some deeply held belief that the executive 
have secret evidence to support the moves made. One arm which remains significantly 
greyer than most in this debate is the use of the term ‘war’. It is long established that the 
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term ‘war’ allows for greater auspices of power. As such, following 9/11, the ‘War on Terror’ 
became used as an associated collective term. Such phrases uses of ‘war’ have previously 
engaged special deference from the judiciary and will be briefly established here.  
2.3.2 The paradigm of war and the influence on judicial scrutiny: 
This research has briefly demonstrated that with notions of risk, the rhetorical nature of 
threat, attack and devastation, guidance from the SRC and the previous precedent set 
within case law, there is mileage in the construction of and use of ‘war’ as an emotive factor 
for generating support. It incorporates an extension of powers, interpretation of legislation 
in war time, reliance on case law and the mobilisation of public support. Hoffman argues 
that, with such grave constriction on rights, it should be questioned whether the war on 
terrorism is a war and if so what sort of war it is. If the UK does see itself at war, this allows 
not only for the extension of powers but for the justified use and reliance on international 
instruments.279 Hoffman further suggests that due to the unclassified nature of threat the 
substantive, temporal and geographic scope of the war on terror is unbounded and 
unknown. This, as mentioned previously, allows for a manipulation of the threat through 
risk and vulnerability which, in turn, allows the executive to push boundaries of their power; 
some which have infringed on or eroded rights by failing to accept that the rule of law 
governs the conduct of the war on terrorism. The severity of the threat in times of ‘war’ has 
led to rights protections being overridden when they conflict with the imperatives of the 
‘war on terrorism’.280 Accordingly, and as previously identified, with much of the legislative 
movement which takes place within this framework there is no problem with the rhetorical 
use of the ‘war’ metaphor, but there is a problem with the rhetoric unjustifiably becoming 
policy and altering international legal regime.  
Giroux stresses that the rhetoric of terrorism, and its associated phraseology, is important 
not only because it operates on many registers to both inflict human misery and call into 
question the delicate balance of freedom and security crucial to any democratic society, but 
also because it carries with it an enormous sense of urgency that often redefines a 
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community against its most democratic possibilities.281 This, compounded by the emergence 
of a war paradigm, also has the historic support of judicial deference at its disposal. 
It is impossible to deny that there has been a change in the security threat to the UK since 
9/11. The asymmetrical and clandestine nature of the enemy has brought with it new types 
of conflict and risk.282 This risk and threat from asymmetrical warfare create a nation in 
crisis. As Ramraj notes, ‘in times of crisis, ordinary legal principles stressing the importance 
of fundamental rights, due process and judicial supervision of legislative and executive 
power come under strain’.283 However, what does this mean for rights and security? It is this 
emphasis on strain, risk, conflict, warfare and security which has been rhetorically 
manipulated, justly or unjustly, to warrant an extension of provisions beyond what might be 
deemed necessary or proportionate. The case studies examined discuss balance between 
security and rights as a tool in justification for moves.284  
Concluding remarks: 
Having established a number of themes within rights and security discussion; the impact of 
risk, the use of pre-emptive measures and the impact of oversight mechanisms on managing 
current security pressures, Bigo and Guild note, ‘the balance metaphor does not rely on 
myths or theory but on the need for rigorous scrutiny of the conditions under which security 
claims warrant the suspension of liberties and freedoms’.285 When extensions to powers are 
required beyond those reasonably expected, ‘parliament should be required to earn judicial 
deference from the courts. This is to be achieved by demonstrating the quality of its 
reasoned judgements on compatibility, not entitled to expect it by virtue of its sovereign 
position in the constitution’.286 Feldman identifies that the constitutional role of the 
judiciary in relation to policy making is subordinate to that of parliament, which is itself 
subordinate to that of the executive. Further, 
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‘based on historic notions of constitutional principles, judicial deference to the 
constitutionally legitimate policy making of the executive may have a place for 
legitimate discussion. Such deference does not absolve parliament or indeed the 
executive of its duty to make a legitimate balance between security and rights. 
However, whilst deference may be constitutionally embedded, courts can review 
the legitimacy of legislation in action through the practical application of the law. 
Ultimately it means that the assessment of the executive and parliament is not the 
final one’.287  
Even in this clear delineation of powers identified, the legislature can appear beholden to 
the executive; measures such as the influence of the whip and future careers see to this.288 
Ultimately, the amalgamated strength of the legislature and executive combined results in 
executive control of parliament, although it should be noted that parliament has acted in 
recent times to curb unnecessary extensions of power requested by the government. As de 
Londras notes, ‘while the separation of powers might assume a legislature vigilant to ‘power 
grabs’ by the executive, the reality appears to be a more submissive beast’.289 With limited 
accountability based on the notion that intelligence is too precious to disseminate, it is 
unsurprising that recent judicial decisions appear reluctant to offer deference.  
Without consistent analytical rigour, the rhetoric of a ‘right to security’ will undermine the 
hard won, carefully reasoned, yet fragile consensus around fundamental rights. Lazarus 
argues that the rhetorical and political appeal of security has ‘the ability to erode the 
protections of competing rights such as liberty, as well as undermine accepted 
understandings of the foundations of fundamental rights reasoning’.290 This leaves 
politicians to justify what is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ or whether one person’s 
right should give way to another person’s conflicting right.291 
Whilst logically the perceived electoral benefit will outweigh the cost of opposing one’s own 
party, this can arguably be fostered where parliamentarians believe that another institution, 
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such as the courts, will perform the balance and prevent executive abuses.292 Indeed the 
influence of judicial scrutiny ensures that justice is being seen to be done293 but this, 
however, does not mean that the judiciary alone can offer effective control of the 
executive.294  
This relationship gives rise to a series of counter-arguments demanding a need to strike a 
new balance between the constitutional roles of the executive and the judiciary. According 
to Tsoukala,295 this new balance implies the exclusion of the judiciary from the political 
scene in the name of an effective fight against terrorism. Therefore, while the judiciary is to 
protect not only the majority from the minority, but also the minority from the majority, 
Tsoukala argues it is presumed that justice is not an absolute value but, ‘a protection 
offered to some politically selected social groups’.296 This is because it is no longer 
considered a primary condition of democracy. As such, justice has to be taken into 
consideration over other priorities, including the protection of public safety. As David 
Blunkett noted;   
In seeking justice, not just the justice for the small few who use our democracy to 
hide in but the justice that comes from ensuring protection for all, we need to 
remember this – it is justice we seek, not just the primacy of jurisprudence.297 
Tsoukala argues that there is a presumption that this perception of justice cannot call into 
question the democratic character of the executive. The simple reason for this is that, 
historically speaking, ‘it is the executive that established democracy while, politically 
speaking, it is the executive that is mandated by the electorate to create and implement the 
law’.298 Whilst the belief that the executive and legislature can instigate restrictions and 
legislation is true during times of national emergency, there is no doubt, that trusting in the 
separation of powers doctrine, the oversight mechanisms need to operate in their true role.   
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As noted previously, there are very few rights which are absolute;299 those which are not 
can therefore be curbed when necessary. Simply because a right has changed, been 
infringed on or removed does not necessarily deem it to be violated. As Waldron identifies, 
‘a right is violated when it is unjustifiably infringed, a right is overridden when it is 
justifiably infringed so that there is sufficient justification for not carrying out the 
correlative duty and the required action is justifiably not performed or the 
prohibited action is justifiably performed’.300  
This reaffirms the importance of demonstrating why a right is ‘justifiably’ infringed and 
reinforces the executive’s need for greater openness to evidence. In this context, the 
argument for supporting rights depends on ‘what the general background justification for 
political decisions, the right in question proposes to trump’.301 Having established that 
violations of individual rights may be required, the oversight mechanism is fundamental to 
ensuring that policies are confined to the necessary.302 Therefore, control of the executive is 
arguably best achieved not only by a balance of the concepts themselves and the external 
factors influencing such discussion, but also by a balance of the competing interests in the 
separation of powers as ‘neither parliament nor the judiciary can achieve effective oversight 
of the executive on their own’.303 Throughout this research the aim remains to ascertain 
whether any of the positions presented here emerge from within the legislative discussions 
examined. Feldman notes that whilst the need to interfere with liberty in order to protect 
life may be necessary, the need remains for those who determine such measures to uphold 
a number of principles if democratic values are to survive. For Feldman;  
‘First there must be a clear necessity for any restrictive measures. Secondly, the 
restrictions must go no further than is required. Thirdly, the measures must be 
controlled by law. Fourthly, the law must be cast in such a way as to make sure that 
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any interference with liberty is clearly and rationally related to the aim of 
protecting security’.304  
These principles offered by Feldman are simple questions which could be methodically 
worked through within a politically charged debate. Whilst each question may raise further 
questions which may blur the boundaries of rights and security, this viewpoint may help 
validate how decisions are made. Section II will aim to identify whether such principles are 
considered or actively engaged in when examining legislation.  
It is important to note that the findings of the JCHR will not be subjected to the systematic 
and rigorous coding process that was undertaken within the debates from the Houses of 
Parliament. This research is designed to examine the role of parliament in the use of balance 
debate with the aim to identify if systematic examinations of issues arise or whether a lack 
of continuity, expertise and other shortfalls confirm that in fact the twenty-first century law 
making process in the UK remains constitutionally weak. Whilst significant in their expertise, 
they remain influential in the parliamentary process as opposed to fundamental to it. As 
such, to embed them in the quantitative data would skew the data in favour of looking at 
weaknesses within the legislation either proposed or enacted. Within the quantitative 
process, reference to the JCHR was coded, however, they remain absent from quantitative 
findings as standalone issues.   
The following chapter will present the quantitative findings from the investigation of the 
House of Commons examination of UK anti-terror legislation as identified in the 
introduction to this thesis. A chronological format is applied to aid a review of any transition 
between the review processes which may emerge as a result of the findings. The 
quantitative data presented in the following chapter is subject to the same limitations as 
those outlined in the methodology.   
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Chapter Three 
Quantitative Results and Findings: 
 
The aim of this thesis is to try and establish if, during the legislative processes, a balancing 
debate is entered into between security and rights. The time frame to be examined, as 
mentioned in previous chapters is from 14th September 2001 (Volume 372) to the 30th 
March 2006 (Volume 443). These dates have been selected for review as they coincide with 
the events of 9/11 in the US and the Royal Assent of the TA on the 30th March 2006. 
Consideration was given to starting the review from the outset of the TA 2000 as this would 
have provided discussion outside of the ‘war on terror’ framework and may have provided 
results for a comparative study between the two periods.305 However, due to the focus of 
this thesis on security and rights, it was considered more apt to start from the trigger of 
what has been considered the era of ‘new threat’. The period of review further 
encompassed the events of 7/7. This was so that a thorough review could be carried out to 
ascertain whether political opinions shifted within the timeframe examined.306  
This chapter looks to guide the reader through the debate undertaken in both legislative 
and political discussions held within the House of Commons.307 The reader will be taken 
chronologically through emerging terrorism legislation within the period of study identified 
above.308 This will then be broken down further explicitly addressing terrorism legislation in 
detail. A thorough examination and coding process of Hansard volumes 375-443 was 
undertaken. It became apparent that to focus on terrorism legislation alone would not 
reflect the emphasis or awareness displayed by parliament in the debates throughout the 
period of study. To understand the full political picture, any debate raised which reviewed 
or discussed national security or human rights was coded in line with the legislation 
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reviewed. These debates were then organised into nine political debate headings and two 
legislative debates for the purpose of this research.309 Political debate included ‘Acts of 
International Terrorism’, ‘Middle East Peace Process’, ‘Northern Ireland’, ‘Afghanistan War’, 
‘Defence Policy’, ‘International responses to terrorism’, ‘Coalition against terrorism’, ‘Iraq 
War’, ‘International Terrorism – generic discussion’, and ‘other debate’.310 The two 
legislative areas of review considered, aside from anti-terrorism legislation, were ID Cards 
and Immigration and Asylum legislation. 
In this chapter raw data will used to establish the frequency of specific debate within the 
wider legislation as points of discussion.311 In this initial stage the data will receive a very 
narrow assessment of the content limiting the quality of the information. The findings 
presented in this chapter are provided to support the information documented in the 
following chapters. The initial research, without the quantitative findings, failed to offer 
substantiated evidence leaving the findings too subjective to be reliable. The intention of 
using the statistical data presented here is to provide objective findings in the raw data to 
validate the subjective selection of information in the preceding chapters. It is important to 
note that this raw data does not acknowledge how long discussion lasted but simply the 
number of times the issue was substantively raised as detailed in Section II. It is hoped that 
this dual method of displaying the findings will allow for greater objectivity and accuracy in 
the results. Personal bias can be minimised by using the statistical data to substantiate the 
quantitative data presented later in this thesis. This multi-stage process became 
incorporated in the findings after the identification of weaknesses in the first assessment. 
The qualitative and quantitative method came about to support the decisions reported on 
and to help reduce the subjectivity in the selection of political debate represented.  
The data was initially broken down into subject of debate then into categories preceding 
this. Discussion was then logged on a basis of frequency within discussion. The data has 
been compared and contrasted to establish similarities and differences and the inter-
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relationships between the groups. The coding process started with a summary of the text 
being examined, which in this case was the data documented in Hansard. This initial stage 
was performed through a process of ‘descriptive coding’ because it essentially formed a 
summary description of what was in the transcript. This was then broken down further 
through the coding process by ‘analytic or theoretical’ coding. The codes here were based 
on themes, topics, ideas, concepts, terms, phrases and keywords in line with the 
methodology outlined in the introduction. The coding system in this particular research is 
considered to be ‘flat’; that is, the coding is non-hierarchical and takes the form of a list with 
no sub-code levels.  
When analysing debate, a number of unsubstantiated individual points were raised. These 
areas which received only one point of discussion throughout the debate were then 
captured together and considered under the title ‘Miscellaneous’. When presenting the 
data the first percentage provided is calculated with the removal of the miscellaneous 
category and the data provided within the brackets is the percentile of discussion points 
raised including the miscellaneous category. During the review process of the data every 
discussion point raised was reviewed to see if it fitted appropriately with any other group. 
Any points which could not be suitably allocated remained within the miscellaneous 
category.  
The results presented in this chapter are demonstrated through statistics, tables and graphs. 
These results will offer limited interpretation so further examination will follow in Section II. 
This research is not designed to be a statistical assessment of parliamentary debate but uses 
quantitative measures to support the qualitative findings. The first Act to be examined is the 
ATCSA 2001. 
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3.1 ATCSA 2001: 
12th November 2001 – Bill introduced to Commons floor 
19th November 2001 – Second reading to the house 
26th November 2001 – Conclusion of consideration in committee stages and remaining ATCS 
Bill discussion 
12th December 2001 – Consideration of the Lords’ amendments to the ATCS Bill 
14th December 2001 – Bill receives Royal Assent 
In the period leading up to the introduction of the ATCSA 2001 to the parliamentary floor, 
the UK witnessed a shift in rhetoric towards terrorism. Having suffered for decades at the 
hands of terrorism from the IRA, the UK became a leading nation in the ‘War on Terror’. In a 
televised address President George W. Bush Jr. informed the world that ‘Our War on Terror 
begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated’.312 The world had witnessed the 
devastating terror attacks of 9/11 on the USA and a new era of threat to security was 
identified. This identification led to academic discussion as to whether a new era of threat 
or a new era of control had emerged. Huysmans, in 2008, claims that ‘insecurity is a 
politically and socially constructed phenomenon’.313 In line with Huysmans’ theory, the 
events of 9/11 may have facilitated the executive in using 9/11 to signify a threat, danger, or 
risk to the nation. An awareness of this potential for framing may reiterate the possibility of 
an era of control.314  
Explanatory notes identified that the purpose of the Bill was to ‘strengthen legislation in a 
number of areas to ensure that the government, in light of the new situation arising from 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC, have the necessary powers to 
counter the increased threat to the UK’.315 The ATCSA went from its first reading to Royal 
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Assent within 33 days. The speed with which the ATCSA went through parliament was a 
substantive issue raised throughout discussion. Its speed raised more discussion points than 
the debate over security and rights at every stage identifying that such speed was a key 
concern. Particular concern was raised that such speed would inhibit parliament from 
performing its review functions efficiently and effectively.  
At its introduction, Douglas Hogg requested a statement to be made by the Home Secretary 
explaining the executive’s rationale behind the legislation. Mr Hogg perceived the legislation 
to be a ‘serious derogation from human rights’.316 This was based on the claim that a public 
emergency existed in the UK and that the provision for derogation from the ECHR to allow 
for detention without trial needed clarification. This concern for further explanation of the 
proposals outlined within the Bill was later seconded by Mark Fisher. Mr Fisher reiterated 
the need for the Home Secretary to present to the House for questioning the basis of the 
proposals that, if passed, would make substantial changes to the UK’s human rights 
legislation.317 This demonstrated that immediate concern was raised about the impact on 
rights thus identifying that MPs were actively aware of the responsibilities parliament has to 
protect rights from unnecessary restrictions. Further to this it illustrates that the checks and 
balances system was in operation.  
Three debates were scheduled for the ATCSA.318 Following the initial coding process, three 
substantive headings were created. Firstly, balance between security and rights; secondly, 
discussion brought up specifically on security; and thirdly, discussion raised on rights 
issues.319 A number of areas were coded however, with the focus of this thesis centred on 
security and rights these particular themes will be demonstrated here. Accrual of all 
discussion points raised on security and rights for each of the debates has provided the 
following findings; 19th November 2001 accrued 30% (27.9%) of the debate, 26th November 
2001 accrued 5.5% (5%) of the debate and the 12th / 13th December 2001320 accrued 3% 
(2.7%) of the debate. The chart below (Fig 1) demonstrates how security and rights 
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discussion was weighted across the three debates. It indicates clearly how the weighting on 
rights and security were far greater at the start of the process compared to that of the final 
debate. 
 
Figure 1 
As can be seen from these results there was a distinct decrease in the emphasis placed on 
security and rights as the legislation passed through the necessary stages. It is clear from the 
data captured that the debate on the 19th November 2001 raised the greatest number of 
discussion points and was substantially higher in its emphasis on security and rights. This is 
possibly the result of the debate following the considerations from committee stages. The 
decrease in discussion may be reflective of the lack of time on the house floor.321 The 
limited time available may have meant that wider debate on the political implications and 
social consequences became prioritised. It may also reflect that amendments had been 
made at the initial stages. Nonetheless, further analysis goes beyond the scope of this 
research. 
Breaking the results down further, discussion held on the 19th November 2001, where 30% 
of discussion points focused on rights and security, the theme of security v rights accounted 
for 6.4%, security accrued 10.3%, and rights 13.2%.322 The clearest example of discussion 
within the house between a balance of security and rights emerged via discussion on Article 
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3 ECHR; namely, the right to remain free from ‘inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.323  
Both rights and security raised discussion issues on the impact of Part 4 of the ATCSA. It 
could be argued that these discussion points should fall under the heading security v rights, 
however, there was no explicit balance or justification made between the two sides of the 
debate. In these cases, the discussion has been aligned with the theme it represents. Explicit 
support for Part 4 was discussed only six times compared to the discussion points raised on 
the concerns over it, which raised nearly triple that with 16 discussion points. Individual 
case studies will be explored in later chapters and will identify a number of issues which will 
help substantiate these findings.  
Debates from the 26th November 2001 and the 12th / 13th December 2001 generated a large 
number of miscellaneous discussion points. This figure will dilute the impact of the overall 
values found within the findings (as a percentage) as the high number of ‘miscellaneous’ will 
accrue a higher overall value. These have not been included in the examination of the 
debate although they have been coded and logged to maintain a consistent approach to 
examination of the discussion. As demonstrated earlier, a very small percentage of the 
debate examined here addressed issues on security and rights. This is particularly 
interesting as the House of Lords had raised concerns about aspects of the legislation, in 
particular the legality of Part 4, therefore it was expected that a greater number of points 
would have been raised. Having acknowledged this, however, it is known that a number of 
concerns were raised by the JCHR yet these observations appear not to have been discussed 
or relied upon in debate. 
In both of these debates324 there was a greater focus on the constitutional aspect of the 
legislation particularly the requirement of checks and balances325 meaning that emphasis 
was on the process rather than the impact of the legislation. By identifying the impact that a 
lack of judicial review would have on proceedings, there appears to be an implied 
connection to the rights of the individual. This may suggest that MPs believed that 
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constitutional principles could protect individuals rather than reliance on the European 
framework. The initial concerns of security and rights may have become so political that 
reliance on constitutional principles avoided the politics of decision making by removing the 
emotive element of the decision.  By moving rhetoric away from the charged concepts of 
security and rights to constitutional principles, MPs avoided being branded as ‘soft on 
terrorism’ yet still represented protection to the individual. This line of discussion still 
played a significant role in the debate on the 19th November 2001, although it was less so 
compared to security and rights evaluation. 
 
Figure 2 
Just as important as the discussion that took place is the number of MPs involved in 
discussions. If all debate in favour of security provisions came from just one MP this would 
obviously dilute the strength of the claim. The ATCSA appears to have been substantive in 
speakers at each debate. Unsurprisingly, there were three key speakers in every debate; 
David Blunkett from the Labour party, Oliver Letwin from the Conservative party and Simon 
Hughes from the Liberal Democrats.  
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Conclusion: 
From what has been examined here, it is evident from the data that there is an awareness 
of the importance that rights and security play in validating legislation. Based purely on the 
statistical evidence it is possible to confirm that, although security and rights together 
played a significant role in the early stages of debate this decreased dramatically following 
the second reading with a shift in parliamentary focus onto the protections demanded by 
constitutional principles.  
3.2 The PTA 2005: 
22nd February 2005 – Bill introduced to commons floor 
23rd February 2005 – Second reading of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 
28th February 2005 – Committee and Remaining Stages of Prevention of Terrorism Bill 
09th March 2005 – Consideration of Lords’ Amendments 
10th March 2005 – Consideration of Lords’ Amendments 
11th March 2005 – Receives Royal Assent 
The PTA 2005 was introduced in response to the Law Lords ruling in the case of A and others 
v Secretary of State (Re A).326 Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 was declared unlawful and 
incompatible with the ECHR. The central clause within the PTA 2005 allowed the Home 
Secretary to impose control orders on individuals suspected of terrorism. This introduction 
of control orders aimed to satisfy the gap in legislation which had been left by the decision 
in Re A.327 
One observation from the outset of the Bill was its speed through parliament. Unlike the 33 
days of the ATCSA, the PTA took nearly three and a half months to receive Royal Assent. 
Even with a longer gestation period, concerns were still raised over its speed. Debate held 
on 28th February 2005 raised more discussion points over the speed of the Bill than any 
other factor, although this was still less than the collective security and rights analysis.   
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As with the findings on the ATCSA 2001, the same coding remained for the PTA. An accrual 
of discussion points raised on security and rights are as follows; 22nd February 2005 26.8% 
(18.6%), 23rd February 2005 16.4% (14.9%), 28th February 2005 16.1% (14.4%), 9th March 
2005 12.1% (10.8%), 10th March 2005 7.5% (6.9%).  The chart below (Fig 3) demonstrates 
how security and rights discussion was weighted across the debates.  
 
Figure 3 
It is possible to identify from this chart that over two thirds of the discussion points raised 
on security and rights issues took place during the second reading and the review of the 
committee stages. Less than a quarter of the points raised were as the result of the 
amendments presented by the House of Lords. This may indicate that either the House of 
Lords did not choose to address the issues surrounding rights and security or that the House 
of Commons chose not to address suggested amendments. A greater number of debates 
took place compared to the ATCSA which may distort how some of the percentages fair if 
compared against one another. Unlike the second reading of the ATCSA it was discussion 
following the committee stages which generated the largest number of rights and security 
discussion points.  
As can be seen from the data below (Fig 4), there is a clear peak in the middle of discussion. 
A peak such as this would be expected at this point where debate on concerns was still fluid 
and less isolated to resolving the finer details of legislative wording. The dip following the 
amendments stage would likely fill the void and focus more specifically on the legality 
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issues. This dip also reflects a similar pattern to that observed in the analysis of the ATCSA. 
This also follows the understanding by Tolley regarding the lack of legal expertise in the 
Houses of Parliament which arguably places limitations on legislative review.328  
 
Figure 4 
Unlike the first reading of the ATCSA, there is evidence that debate took place on the 1st 
reading of the PTA (22nd February 2005). This immediately raised concerns regarding its 
content. 82 (118) discussion points were raised of which 26.8% (18.6%) were of a clear 
rights and security composition. Broken down further both security and rights and rights 
alone claimed 6.0% (4.2%) of the overall discussion points raised, leaving discussion on 
security accruing 14.6% (10.1%). This emphasis on security may be the result of the 
executive’s introduction having a greater focus on necessity.329 As this was the first reading, 
it would be expected to see a strong case presented by the executive to justify the need for 
the legislation, particularly in light of the fact that there had yet to be an attack on the UK. 
Without direct attacks on the UK it may have been harder for the executive to justify its 
derogation claims. 
Discussion on the 23rd February 2005 raised 328 (362) discussion points. 16.3% (14.8%) of 
the overall debate looked at rights and security. When analysed further security issues, as 
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with the previous debate, was the most substantive of the three themes claiming 7.6% 
(6.9%). This left rights accruing 5.1% (4.6%) and security v rights 3.6% (3.3%). As with the 
previous discussion the focus of the security agenda, as presented, was on the ‘new and 
continued threat’ the UK faced and this equated to over half of the discussion points raised 
within security. At a time when mainland UK had not faced attack, and four years after the 
events of 9/11, it may be considered unsubstantiated to continue to rely on this 
justification. This, however, is not the place to examine these findings and they will be 
addressed in the forthcoming chapters.  
Discussion on the 28th February 2005 raised the largest number of discussion points across 
all debates on the PTA 2005. Of 359 (401), 17.1% (15.2%) of the discussion points centred 
around security and rights discussion collectively. Interestingly, this particular debate was 
the only debate in the period of examination where security v rights emerged as the highest 
discussion points raised. 7.7% (6.9%) of the discussion points addressed security v rights. 
Alongside discussion actively balancing rights and security, emphasis was on the differences 
between restrictions and deprivations of liberty in times of national emergency. 5.0% (4.4%) 
addressed security issues focussing on the ‘security’ of the people in the UK and the 
emergence of control orders as a preventative measure. The use of the ‘new threat’ 
argument also presented itself in this debate. This was substantially less than seen in 
previous debates with just two discussion points. Finally, 4.4% (3.9%) addressed rights. This 
was limited to the impact of control orders on liberties and the role of the HRA in protecting 
individuals.  
Following this debate was discussion on the Lords’ amendments. At this stage there was a 
substantial decrease in the discussion points raised in the debate focused on security and 
rights. Whilst the two debates were analysed separately they were both timetabled for 
reviewing amendments and as such will be reviewed simultaneously here. Debate on the 9th 
March 2005 accrued 12% (10.6%) compared to the 10th March 2005 which accrued 7.4% 
(6.8%). As a result of the reduction in focus on security and rights issues, discussion on the 
introduction of sunset clauses emerged with the greatest number of discussion points 
raised.330  
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The emphasis of this research is to ascertain the balance, if any, that is undertaken within 
the legislative process between security and rights. Whilst trying to extract those findings, 
gaps in the analysis surfaced. Examined previously in the assessment of the ATCSA, it is 
apparent that the largest theme to emerge was debate on constitutional principles. The 
impact of the discussion points is best demonstrated through the graph below (Fig 5). 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
As demonstrated, constitutional principles were dominant throughout the debates but held 
significant prominence in the debates following the House of Lords review. Even though the 
debate on the 10th March 2005 showed the largest gap between discussion points 
collectively, it was the first reading where emphasis on constitutional principles dominated 
gaining a higher percentage of debate than security and rights. These findings would suggest 
that the significance of constitutional principles remained particularly high on the agenda 
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for MPs during discussion and a concept to be further discussed. In a presentation of overall 
percentage of debate accrued, the results provided demonstrate the following (Fig 6): 
 
 
Figure 6 
It is imperative to remember that in all the statistical data found here, each debate has 
different thresholds for length and type of debate. With this in mind, comparisons cannot 
necessarily be drawn or inferences made about the nature of the debate. What can be 
identified are trends and patterns which may be evident from the data presented here. 
Having reviewed the ATCSA 2001 and the PTA 2005 the next move is to examine the TA 
2006.  
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3.3 TA 2006 
13th October 2005 – 1st Reading of Terrorism Bill 
26th October 2005 – 2nd Reading of Terrorism Bill 
02/03 November 2005 – Consideration in Committee of Terrorism Bill 
09th November 2005 – Report stage on Terrorism Bill 
10th November 2005 – Third Reading of Terrorism Bill 
15th February 2006 – Consideration of Lords’ Amendments 
16th March 2006 – Consideration of Lords’ Amendments 
30th March 2006 – Bill received Royal Assent 
The TA 2006 was brought to the house following the London bombings in July 2005 (7/7). 
Some of the conditions incorporated were considered a necessary response to the 
unprecedented threat faced by the UK in recent times, although not necessarily as a result 
of 7/7. Shortly after 7/7 Tony Blair, in a monthly news conference, explained;  
‘There will be new anti-terrorism legislation in autumn. This will include an offence 
of condoning or glorifying terrorism. The sort of remarks made in recent days 
should be covered by such laws. But this will also be applied to justifying glorifying 
terrorism anywhere, not just in the UK’.331  
As with all previous discussions the same coding process was applied. Debates on the TA 
2006 ranged substantially in length and discussion raised. The largest debate hosting 542 
(2/3 November 2005) discussion points compared to the smallest raising of 43 points (16th 
March 2006). This makes comparative study between the groups significantly harder and 
reiterates the need to view each debate separately, examining the role of security and rights 
independently. An accrual of discussion points raised on security and rights was as follows. 
26th October 2005 28.1% (22.8%), 02/03 November 2005 5.4%(5%), 09th November 2005 
9.5% (8.2%), 10th November 2005 15.5% (13.7%), 15th February 2006 15.4% (11.2%), 16th 
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February 2006 18.4% (16.2%). The chart below (Fig 7) demonstrates how security and rights 
discussion was weighted across the debates. 
 
Figure 7  
The TA 2006 received a greater number of debates than the previous legislation examined 
and extended across a longer gestation period.332 From the chart above it can be seen that 
over a third of the discussion points raised on rights and security were discussed in the 
second reading of the debate.333 This is in line with the percentage equated in the first 
stages of the previous legislation reviewed in this chapter. In line with the other terrorism 
legislation examined in this chapter, less than a quarter of the discussion points on security 
and rights were raised as the result of the amendments recommended by the House of 
Lords.  
The findings from this examination run contrary to expectations. Having been introduced 
post 7/7 it was anticipated that emphasis would be placed on the security agenda in 
response to public demands. These public demands had been identified by the ‘YouGov’ poll 
which demonstrated a 72% support for the 90 day detention but the outcome of this 
legislation runs counter-intuitively to this. In line with our focus on rights and security the 
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graph below (Fig 8) demonstrates the number of discussion points raised on security and 
rights across the debates. This graph has been incorporated to demonstrate the number of 
discussion points raised, hopefully giving the reader a clear image of the spread on the 
discussion.  
 
Figure 8 
From this graph it can be seen that the discussion points raised at the second reading 
proved the most fruitful regarding points on rights and security, with a similar percentage to 
that experienced in the examinations. Discussion focused on the question of 90 days pre-
charge detention, the reduction to 28 days detention and the introduction of a sunset 
clause. One of the problems encountered in this debate was under which theme certain 
discussions stood as documented in the examination of the PTA 2005. This was particularly 
problematic when analysing where the discussion on sunset clauses stood. Depending on 
the interpreter of the discussion, sunset clauses are pigeon-holed differently. On one hand 
they favour security by agreeing to the legislation for one year yet on the other hand they 
protect rights and liberties by ensuring that these constraints are reviewed. Another school 
of thought is that they best represent the workings of the constitutional framework by 
placing the executive under parliamentary scrutiny. Due to the complexities in allocating a 
theme, sunset clauses were identified as a standalone issue.  
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Discussion on the 26th October 2005 raised the most discussion points in the rights and 
security assessment. This was due to the substantial concern raised over the impact of 90 
days pre-charge detention of individuals. Of the 73 discussion points raised 38  (52%) of 
them were on rights related concerns with 34.2% of the overall discussion points on the 26th 
October 2005 focusing on concern for the 90 pre-charge detention clause. Security 
discussion points collected 17 (23.2%) and security and rights collected 18 (24.6%). With this 
in mind, a reduction in this is likely to be inevitable following the reduction in the pre-charge 
detention clause from 90 days to 28 days. As mentioned earlier, it was anticipated that in a 
post 7/7 environment greater focus on security and the protection of the individual may be 
apparent. This lack of emphasis on security, even with the YouGov figures demonstrating 
public support, raises questions over the rationale for the moves undertaken by MPs to 
resist 90 day pre-charge detention. More interestingly was the decision to vote against party 
lines and the party whip, a position which will be considered further in Section II. 
Following this debate, the house discussed the committee stages of the Bill on the 2nd/3rd 
November 2005. Similar to the rest of the debate, there was limited focus on rights and 
security and emphasis focused on the glorification of terrorism and the lack of justification 
for the 90 day pre-charge detention. Particular focus was placed on the unnecessary nature 
of the legislation and the catchall clauses found within it.334 Of the 451 discussion points 
raised across the two days only 28 (6.2%) fell under the security and rights theme. Rights 
received the biggest percentage of this with 3.5% (2.9%) identifying the problem on 90 days 
detention in line with the ECHR. Security received 1.9% (1.6%) referencing primarily the new 
and continued threat including the events of 7/7. The remainder of the discussion points 
raised 0.6% (0.5%) and belonged to the balance between the infringements of 90 day 
detention on rights compared to the impact on security.   
The 9th November articulated the report stage with 416 points raised. 34 (8.1%) points were 
raised under security and rights. Broken down further; security v rights collected 8 (1.9%), 
rights 11 (2.6%), and security 21 (5.0%). Security collected the largest amount based on the 
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emphasis placed on the events of 7/7 and the need to protect the UK. However, in the 
scheme of debate this percentage of discussion was minute.  
By the third reading, it could be seen that discussion focused on the construction of the 
content as opposed to the wider socio-political implications. Discussion points raised in this 
particular debate were less than half of those found in the previous two stages and as a 
result present higher looking percentages of discussion. Discussion on the 10th November 
2005 saw only 34 (16.3%) discussion points raised as security or rights issues. Particular 
emphasis in this reading returned discussion to the nature of threat and the new threat 
faced by the UK, with security collecting 6.7% (5.7%) of the discussion points. Rights again 
focused on the protections of the individual and the parliamentary duty to protect these 
claiming 4.8% (4.0%). In the balance between security v rights this debate interestingly 
balanced the rights of the suspect against the rights of the victim. This only raised two 
discussion points but nonetheless forced the House to consider pre-emptive action which, 
as identified in the previous chapter, is a well-established principle available to be utilised by 
a state. Overall the security v rights, debate raised 4.8% (4.0%) of the overall discussion 
points raised.       
The following two debates took place over three months after the introduction of the 
legislation to the House. As could be seen from the graph above there was a continuing 
reduction in the number of discussion points for these two debates which both considered 
the Lords’ amendments. The 15th February 2005 raised only 12 discussion points within the 
security and rights agenda. This reduced further on the 16th March 2006 to just seven 
discussion points raised. As both of these debates focused discussion on the Lords’ 
amendments, it may be that the reduction in discussion on rights and security was the result 
of a pre-determined agenda to work through. The substance of both debates centred on the 
implications of the glorification clause and the similarities already identified with the 
incitement laws. If this decrease in attention of security and rights discussion is compared 
with the previous two acts reviewed then the trends are similar, reflecting a normal course 
of events; it may also be the result of amendments having already been implemented in the 
earlier stages. 
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What is interesting about this discussion is the difference it presents to the findings of the 
previous legislation examined. In previous examinations, constitutional principles played a 
prominent role in the discussion points raised. This was not the case in this debate. As the 
contextual analysis in the next chapter will demonstrate there was, in this debate, a greater 
emphasis on the requirement for justification than seen previously. The following graph (Fig 
9) demonstrates the difference between security and rights discussion points compared to 
those on the constitutional principles for the TA 2006. Each column identifies the 
percentage of discussion points accrued within each debate. 
 
 
Figure 9  
Even though independently constitutional principles appear to have demonstrated lesser 
impact on the previous graph, as can be seen overall, the constitutional principles system 
raised the greatest number of discussion points. This is based on the group of ‘National 
Security and Human Rights’ being broken down into the three subject headings that were 
collaborated to form it. As is evident from the graphs, collectively rights and security have 
accumulated a larger percentage of discussion points.  
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Figure 10 
As mentioned previously, it is vital to remember that the statistical analysis from each 
debate has a different threshold for length and type of debate. With this in mind, findings 
from the discussion on the TA 2006 cannot necessarily be equated with those of previous 
debates. It is, however, possible to identify trends and patterns that may exist from the data 
available.  
Outside of the influence of constitutional principles and rights and security, debate engaged 
a wider socio-political dimension. The focus of this thesis, therefore, was not a standalone 
issue and as such, may have been influenced by external political discussions and other 
areas of legislative debate. To ground some of the wider political, global and social 
influences a number of external discussion points will now be reviewed. Each of the debates 
was coded in line with the information presented above.   
3.4 Other Legislative Themes: 
A further two legislative areas and nine political discussion topics have been included in this 
analysis.335 These have been included to see if outside of terrorism legislation there is a 
consideration for a security and rights agenda. In line with media framing and public opinion 
on terrorism and the ‘new threat’ the UK faced, it was anticipated that justification based on 
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security may have played a greater role than it did. The areas discussed are only provided to 
offer a supporting framework to the examination of terrorism legislation.336  
The two legislative areas to be examined further are immigration and asylum legislation and 
debate on ID cards. A brief background to these will be provided in line with the discussion 
on terrorism legislation. However, as mentioned earlier, the examination of these areas will 
be less detailed than presented previously. These areas may be referred to in later chapters 
but emphasis for this research continues to lie in the balance between security and rights in 
anti-terror legislation. Each collaborated area of political discussion (as identified in the 
introduction to this chapter) will be presented identifying the four themes examined in the 
findings of terrorism legislation and namely; security v rights, security, rights, and 
constitutional principles. The statistics and figures identified in these assessments have 
been subject to the same rigorous coding system as the preceding assessments. The first of 
the two legislative areas to be reviewed will be ID cards.  
3.4.1 ID cards: 
In July 2002, the Government launched a consultation on ‘Entitlement Cards and Identity 
Fraud’. The consultation period lasted until 31st January 2003. A summary of findings from 
the consultation exercise was published on 11th November 2003. At the same time as the 
publication of the findings, the government announced its decision to build a base for a 
compulsory national identity cards scheme. A draft Identity Cards Bill was published on 26th 
April 2004. Consultation on the draft legislation ended on 20th July 2004 and in November 
2004 the Identity Cards Bill was introduced into the House of Commons. The Bill had 
reached its second reading in the House of Lords when parliament was dissolved on 11th 
April 2005 for the general election and the Bill fell. There is currently no legislation providing 
for UK identity cards.  
The debate on ID cards is included in this research due to the anticipated emphasis on the 
rights v security debate. There have been a number of discussions which have been 
examined that were not necessarily centred on the legislation but were in the pre legislation 
debates. This helps format some of the opinions which may emerge throughout the 
discussion. 
                                                          
336
 The areas of discussion emerged following the initial coding process as identified in the methodology. 
Page 101 of 323 
 
In line with the other examinations undertaken, 18 debates and 889 (992) discussion points 
were identified. The single biggest issue to emerge out of the debates throughout the 
period examined was discussion over cost. This does not feature as a theme of this thesis to 
review further but has been acknowledged here to alert the reader of the substantive issue 
discussed. All areas of review were addressed in the discussion on ID cards. Security v rights 
collected 1.5% (1.4%) of the overall discussion points and security collected 2.1% (1.9%) 
with particular emphasis on the cards being used to prevent terrorism, whilst constitutional 
principles received the lowest number of discussion points with 1.3% (1.2%) looking at the 
lack of parliamentary scrutiny. Rights emerged top in this field establishing 3.7% (3.3%) of 
the discussion points raised. Discussion focused on the infringements such measures would 
have on the lives of individuals living in the UK.  
ID cards raised discussion on balance between the individual and the state and particularly 
the balance of power and control between the state and the individual (a position not 
explicitly identified in the other debates reviewed). On the 20th December 2004, this 
particular discussion claimed 4.0% (3.6%) of the total discussion points raised. This balance 
is important as it demonstrates that, when considering the subversion of rights, the elected 
body explicitly represented the principle of balance of power and concessionary rights of 
the individual, challenging the notion of ‘how far is too far’. As outlined previously, whilst 
this legislation was not anti-terrorism legislation, any response made to any situation must 
be proportionate to the need; this proportionality falling in the balance of power between 
the state and the individual.   
Discussion on ID cards seemed to raise a number of shorter discussions than the other 
legislative areas. This may be a result of the Bill failing to pass successfully through the 
House. None of the issues raised in these smaller debates were new concepts and their 
limited discussion may therefore be simply the result of reaffirming debate. A full 
examination of this legislation was not undertaken as debate fell outside of the timeframe 
examined for this thesis. 
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3.4.2 Immigration and Asylum legislation: 
The Minister of State for Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism announced 
proposals for asylum reform in October 2003. In the outline for reform the legislation aimed 
to streamline the immigration and asylum appeals process and deal with undocumented 
arrivals. It further aimed to deal with situations where it was deemed that a country other 
than the UK was best placed to consider someone’s asylum or rights claims substantively. It 
also aimed to enhance the powers of the OISC. By 2006, in a post 7/7 UK, the Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Act built upon two published government proposals; ‘Controlling 
our borders: making migration work for Britain’ and ‘Confident communities in a secure 
Britain’. The government maintained that the key provision of this strategy was primary 
legislation and these Bills were both considered in providing transparency to the 
immigration system.  
The debates examined are not simply focused on the legislative debates but on any debates 
or questions to the executive that discussed immigration or asylum.337 Three pieces of 
immigration legislation received Royal Assent during the period of examination; these were 
the Immigration Act 2002, Asylum and Immigration Treatment of (Claimants) Act 2004 and 
the Immigration and Asylum Act 2006.338 It was anticipated that a number of issues would 
be raised around security and rights as the result of media hype.339   
Of the 26 discussions analysed, 23 of the debates raised no issues associated with rights or 
security.340 This is particularly interesting as academics, such as Huysman, have claimed that 
in a post 9/11 world the government had placed fear and insecurity on the links between 
terrorism and asylum.341 If this is so then it would be expected that a significant number of 
debates analysed would have associated the moves with security measures. As mentioned 
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earlier, not all of the discussions examined were substantial in content and in some cases 
have been simply a question put to a minister. Rather than the fear or threat to security that 
immigrants and asylum seekers present, the emphasis focused considerably on the drain on 
the state and resources. This included pressure on local communities, education, GP 
facilities, the location of removal and detention centres, and most substantially, the cost of 
the process. This theme ran throughout all discussion on immigration and asylum. Overall 
there were 8 substantive debates on Immigration and Asylum legislation with 1120 (1275) 
discussion points raised. A very small percentage of these discussions attracted attention 
from the themes assessed on security and rights or the constitutional principles. Security v 
rights accrued 0.5% (0.4%), security 1.1% (1.0%), rights 0.2% (0.2%), and the constitutional 
principles 2.8% (2.5%). The primary focus within constitutional principles was the need for 
judicial review in deportation and removal. The link to judicial review was also connected 
with the ability to provide a check and balance on the executive.  
3.5 Areas of Political Discussion: 
Whilst the focus of this research falls on security and rights within anti-terrorism legislation, 
following extensive coding of all related debate throughout the six year period it was felt a 
wider examination of socio-political debates may help identify influences outside of the 
anti-terrorism debate. Each of the following paragraphs will explore an area of socio-
political influence in brief outlining the same themes as earlier but will be more concise in 
its representation.342  
3.5.1: Terrorist attacks: 
Throughout the period examined there were a number of terrorist attacks which received 
examination through the commons.343 Eight debates were reviewed and 586 (676) points 
raised. No issues were raised solely on rights but 0.3% (0.2%) of the debate did examine the 
conflicts between the HRA and security provisions. It may be expected that in the aftermath 
of terrorist attacks focus may be placed on security, based on the emotive nature of the 
discussion. 2.9% (2.5%) of the discussion points focused on constitutional principles and the 
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need to preserve democracy in times of perceived or potential threat, whilst bringing justice 
to the people of the nations who had been affected but also to those committing the acts of 
terror. 5.8% (5%) focused on the protection of nationals and the continued threat the UK is 
under; the threat raised as a result of the terrorists’ attacks overseas. Outside of the key 
themes, considerable emphasis was placed on the ‘War on Terror’ and the links with 
intelligence agencies in the UK.  
3.5.2: Defence of the World: 
In a separate category, defence of the world was reviewed. This was on the premise that 
threat assessments may have emerged in this debate which could influence later decisions. 
Across five debates 672 (807) discussion points were raised. Emphasis centred mainly on the 
rationale for war, examining both Iraq and Afghanistan. Both these wars, however, were 
reviewed separately and presented to the house under those headings. Neither security v 
rights, nor rights were discussed in these debates. Constitutional principles examined the 
need for justice, democracy and diplomacy in dealing with the legality of war accumulating 
2.2% (1.8%). As with the other debates briefly examined here security secured the largest 
number of discussion points. Emphasis continued to focus on the new threat and the new 
challenges that face the UK accruing 2.8% (2.3%) of total discussion points. 
3.5.3: War in Afghanistan: 
Discussion on Afghanistan crossed 41 discussions.344 752 (918) discussion points were raised 
across all debates. Continuing with the same themes, findings identified that security and 
rights accrued 2.1% (1.7%) with focus on the balance of A3. Security focusing on the threat 
to the UK from terrorism accrued 2.6% (2.1%). Rights as a concept did not accrue any 
discussion points, with constitutional principles accumulating just 1.3% (1%) of the 
discussion points raised focusing on the checks and balances of the house. Afghanistan was 
reviewed and included based on its association with the ‘War on Terror’. It was anticipated 
that in the political discussion there would be a significant emphasis on the rationale for 
war, in particular the need to go to war as part of the on-going war on terror, thus engaging 
security discussion. As evidenced from the statistics, this was not as transparent as 
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expected. Emphasis in the debates examined centred on the drugs trade through 
Afghanistan including poppy cultivation, humanitarian aid, and the capabilities of British 
Forces and the role of ISAF. Very few of these debates reviewed the impact on and 
association of the war in Afghanistan with the UK and particularly the impact of security.    
3.5.4: Iraq: 
The war in Iraq received significant attention in debate throughout the period of study.345 41 
debates and questions to the house were reviewed with 2482 (2980) discussion points 
raised. Neither rights nor rights v security was addressed.346 Particular emphasis was placed 
on the nature of war itself addressing issues of cost, armed forces’ responses and 
humanitarian aid. Security did, however, accumulate 2.5% (2.1%) of the discussion points. 
This was mainly the result of the links between Iraq and terrorism, the threat that the Iraqi 
regime presented to international security and the threat to the UK from WMD. Even 
though issues were raised under the security agenda, many of the propositions presented 
appeared to be counteracted by positions immersed in constitutional principles. 7.6% (6.4%) 
of the discussion points addressed the legality of war, the nature of pre-emptive attack for 
dealing with the threat of terrorism and the government’s interpretation of UN Resolution 
1441. Whilst the war in Iraq was discussed substantially throughout the period examined, 
and even though it raised a number of discussion points, analysis remains limited as the 
result of the focus for this piece.  
3.5.5: The Middle East: 
In the examination of the debates in the House of Commons, there were a considerable 
number of debates and questions raised over the situation in the Middle East.347 48 
separate debates were conducted with 1259 (1525) discussion points raised. The Middle 
East has been included because of the role the UK has played in the Middle East process and 
the associated links with terrorism. Of all the themes examined only security raised relevant 
discussion points. This focused on the threat which the Middle East could present to the UK, 
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however only accruing 0.2% (0.1%) of the discussion points. Interestingly it is the debate on 
the Middle East which raised questions over the double standards of the UK towards 
international terrorism. Particular emphasis on this debate reviewed the UK’s position 
towards the terrorist organisation Hamas and its work alongside them. It also examined the 
illegality of the wall constructed by the Israelis and the failure of the road map. 
Observations by MPs noted that, as a result of these two discussions, the UK’s 
condemnation of terror was so limited that it created double standards, undermining its 
decision to embark on a ‘War on Terror’, a similar theme to that seen in the discussion on 
Northern Ireland. The issue resulting from perceived double standards, however, falls 
outside the scope of review for this thesis.   
3.5.6: Northern Ireland: 
The UK has suffered for decades at the hands of terrorism, in particular from the IRA.348 Due 
to the close relationship between Northern Ireland and the UK, an examination of the 
discussions on Northern Ireland was undertaken. 48 debates were reviewed and 1095 
(1316) discussion points raised. Discussion points raised on the strands of the thesis were 
limited to national security 0.2% (0.2%) and constitutional principles 0.6% (0.5%). Particular 
emphasis was placed on the need for decommissioning and the failings of both the Good 
Friday and the Belfast Agreement. Questions were raised over the rationale for negotiation 
with known terrorists whilst embarking on war against those known terrorists in 
Afghanistan. Emphasis was placed by the members of the house to be tough on terrorists 
and certainly not to be allowing them to enter the democratic process of Stormont. Both 
the debates raised on Northern Ireland and the Middle East identify weaknesses in the 
positions put forward by some MPs regarding threat assessment and rationale for the war 
on terror. By operating double standards (as they are seen by some commenters in the 
House) the substantive debate on security is certainly weakened, and in turn, may or should 
increase the discussion on rights standards as a result. 
3.5.7: The coalition on terrorism: 
Debates on the coalition against terrorism were pulled together and analysed. This 
selection, in a post 9/11 era, was thought to incorporate debates on security and rights. Six 
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debates were analysed and 843 (886) discussion points were made. Security v rights and 
rights each secured 0.8% (0.7%) of the discussion points. Security accrued 4.3% (4.1%) of the 
discussion points with particular emphasis on the need to protect citizens and the continued 
threat faced by the UK. The substance of the theme of constitutional principles centred on 
the continued need to reinforce democracy and for the necessary legitimate channels to 
bring about justice to those involved in any terrorist incident. With 7.1% (6.7%) of the 
discussion points accrued, it is evident that tradition was important in decision making.  
3.5.8: Defence of the UK: 
Defence of the UK raised 2031 (2437) discussion points across 23 debates.349 Due to the 
large number of total points, the percentage of the discussion looks disproportionate but 
this particular issue raised a substantial number of points comparative to the other 
discussions in the themes examined in this thesis.  Security v rights accrued 1.2% (1%). In 
line with other debates a number of the discussion points looked at MOUs as a result of 
Article 3. Rights accrued the smallest number of discussion points of the themes with just 
0.2%. This focused on the work of the JCHR and discussion on the grounds that no other 
nation had derogated from the Article 5. Constitutional principles raised 2.8% (2.3%) of the 
total discussion points introducing a variety of issues, many on the need for review of the 
executive and the checks and balances required of a democracy. There was also emphasis 
on the role of the judiciary and the balance between the executive and the courts. The 
largest haul of discussion points raised in debate on the defence of the UK was security. 
Emphasis centred on the threat to the UK and the need to be able to deal with the threat. 
This threat, as purported in the discussions, comes from extremists, WMD and a-symmetric 
warfare. 110 discussion points were raised accruing 5.4% (4.5%). Three other areas of 
discussion were addressed in the defence of the UK. Particular focus was given to the armed 
forces including resources and deployment, measures for dealing with terrorism and the 
developing of counter terrorism strategy required within the house. It was not unexpected 
to see a high percentage of comments associated with security, based on the nature of this 
debate. The issue of defence would naturally induce such emotive discussion and produce 
findings like those presented in this brief analysis.      
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3.5.9: Terrorism: 
A number of debates were held entitled ‘Terrorism’; these were pulled together with the 
debates on extremism to constitute one category for review. There were 15 debates raised 
with 327 (405) discussion points made. Security v rights and rights failed to attract any 
discussion points in these debates. The debates in general examined the impact of war 
overseas with particular emphasis on intelligence. Discussion on security raised 9.7% (7.9%) 
of discussion points with emphasis on the threat the UK was facing following terrorist 
attacks on other nations. Constitutional principles maintained a foothold in the analysis with 
5.8% (4.6%) of the discussion. In line with other debates, the focus under this thread was on 
the need to use the democracy the UK has to defeat terrorism and to maintain that the rule 
of law is upheld. A deeper examination of this will be reviewed in the following chapter on 
the contextual findings.  
Conclusion: 
There appear to be no substantive trends or patterns emerging within these findings. This 
may demonstrate that there is limited focus on the issues or that concerns are raised 
elsewhere. The results demonstrate that whilst security v rights exist, it may be considered 
relatively limited to that expected. This raises the question of how challenges were made to 
the executive over issues which clearly fell within a security and rights context. Such limited 
consistency across the assessments, however, may have been the result of executive control 
over timetabling of events to reduce/limit the ability of parliament to scrutinise the 
legislation before them.350 This, as can be seen in Section II, was certainly a concern to be 
raised with both the ATCSA 2001 and the PTA 2005.  
As identified from the data, there was significant emphasis on constitutional principles, 
which may account for challenges made to the executive not being demonstrated 
necessarily through a rights/security nexus. Nonetheless, in such a highly emotive and public 
area of policy, it was anticipated that higher representations would emerge. As will be seen, 
the influence of the public also dominates and influences a significant quota of debate, 
particularly when challenges made to executive moves begin to circulate. When looking 
specifically at a post 7/7 environment, a YouGov poll was commissioned to determine the 
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public’s view on an increased period of detention. The poll purported to show a 72% 
support of the 90 days with 22% opposed.351 It is outcomes such as these discussed which 
were initially considered to dictate the direction of debate. Following the failing of the 90 
day detention in favour of 28 days, Tony Blair was found to criticise parliament identifying a 
‘worrying gap between parts of parliament and the reality of the terrorist threat and public 
opinion’.352   
What is surprising is that it was anticipated that the reports from the committee stages of 
the Bill may generate a peak in discussion on the draft legislation. This was anticipated 
based on the specific nature of the committees to identify weaknesses or potential 
incompatibilities within the draft legislation.  From the findings, however, this did not 
appear to emerge. This may be the result of changes made prior to scrutiny at the 
recommendations of committee reports although it may also be the result of the wider 
expectations of the role committees fulfil and the influence which they carry. This is 
particularly so in the review of the ATCSA where the JCHR had only been operational for a 
matter of months.  
The influence of the political discussions reviewed cannot be overlooked here. The 
incorporation of this data was provided to demonstrate that significant debate took place 
outside of the legislative scrutiny stage. This further supports the work of Tolley353 who 
suggested that the lack of legal expertise in parliament hinders the real ability to challenge 
policy. Indeed, in most of the cases presented there were more discussion points accrued 
than compared with its legislative counterparts although this maybe the result of the 
culmination of five years of debate. This is a similar story to that told through the 
presentation of examination of ID cards and immigration and asylum legislation.  
Drawing on the statistical findings it is possible to see that, when excluding the category of 
miscellaneous from the overall figures, the ATSCA 2001 accrued 15.1% for the rights and 
security theme and 15% exactly for constitutional principles; The PTA 2005 accrued 15.1% 
for rights and security and 22.6% for constitutional principles; The TA 2006 accrued 12.40% 
for rights and security and 7.90% for constitutional principles. None of these findings 
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identify substantive discussion in the theme of security and rights. Even with the two 
themes combined, this still fails to attain a third of the overall discussion points. This, as 
previously pointed out, may be based on the limited time available for discussion which 
affected the overall number of discussion points raised, potentially distorting the real 
significance of the debates. It must also be noted that this statistical representation does 
not account for the duration of discussion on issues of rights, security or constitutional 
principles. Thus, the substance of discussion is omitted. This is believed to have been a 
contributory factor in the relatively low reflections on the themes being reviewed.  
With the data established, the following section will look at a case-specific assessment with 
the aim of identifying debate in line with the figures presented here. With the limited 
findings of the quantitative data, it is important to ascertain the issues raised within the 
debate to gain a real picture of the balance debate, if indeed one exists.   
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Introduction to Section II: 
Section I reviewed a variety of legal and theoretical concepts underpinning rights, security 
and oversight mechanisms prevalent to this study. Following this, a quantitative assessment 
of parliamentary debate was presented.354 These findings identified the ‘frequency’ of 
rights, security and constitutional principles raised within the debates examined through the 
coding process applied. Whilst the quantitative data provides an overview of the larger 
picture in the assessment of terrorism, security and rights, the information does not provide 
the quality of data required to consider the level of debate at a detailed and illuminating 
level. Section II will provide a detailed examination of particular aspects of three anti-
terrorism Bills.   
Unlike the quantitative chapter, which provided a wider review of debate associated with 
discussion on rights and security,355 the close content analysis of rights and security 
discussion within parliament has been confined to the ATCSA 2001, PTA 2005, and the TA 
2006. One case study from each of these acts has been selected to represent a snapshot of 
discussion. As identified in the introduction, selection of the case studies relied on satisfying 
two criteria. The first criterion was that the case study had to have been raised as a concern 
within the JCHR. This ensured that the case study raised clear concern over human rights 
issues. The second criterion was that each case study had to reference security by the 
executive as a justification to warrant the measure discussed.  
From the quantitative data, it was established that discussion on rights and security was, in 
many instances, not the aspect of discussion which was most frequently debated; case 
studies were not chosen on the basis of the frequency of coding to emerge from Chapter 
Three. Having already established that rights and security discussion is limited within the 
debates examined from within the House of Commons, this more detailed content analysis 
identifies the quality of discussion concerning these issues in relation to the parliamentary 
review process.  To achieve this, analysis incorporates debates from the House of Commons, 
House of Lords and the JCHR.  
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The first case study to be reviewed will be the ATCSA 2001. The focus of this case study is on 
the necessity of derogation from the ECHR as the result of Part 4 clause 21-23 ATCSB 2001 
legislating for potential indefinite detention of non-nationals suspected of terrorism. It was 
argued that such measures were essential based on the constraints placed on the UK by 
Article 3 ECHR.  
The second of the case studies focuses on the introduction of control orders within the PTB 
2005. The PTB 2005 emerged following the decision in the case of A v. Secretary of State (Re 
A)356 where the House of Lords held Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001, which provided for detention 
without trial of foreign nationals only, to be incompatible with the ECHR. Presented as an 
alternative to detention without trial under section 23 of the ATCSA 2001, individuals could 
be placed under control orders irrespective of nationality.  
The final case study looks at clause 23 of the TB 2005. This reviews discussion over the 
inclusion of 90 day pre-charge detention for terror suspects in the Bill stages and its 
subsequent reduction to 28 days following debate. 
The chapters found within this section adopt a thematic rather than chronological approach 
to this examination. This approach aims to offer as clear an analysis as possible. The 
thematic approach aims to strengthen this analysis based on the consideration that the lack 
of structure identified within the debate appears to be a fundamental hindrance in the 
interrogation of executive measures by parliament. It is hoped that by adopting this 
thematic approach, a clear and concise examination can be provided.  
The aim of this section is to identify patterns and examine any trends, relationships, 
generalisations and omissions. Due to the volume of discussion assessed, it is impossible to 
recount the individual stance of every MP, Lord or committee presented within debate.357 
This assessment, therefore, draws out themes and trends which emerged and identifies 
whether others are omitted from debate. In all three case studies, responses by the Home 
Secretary and the Secretary of State are considered to represent the views of the executive. 
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Before moving on to the examination of the case studies, there are a few overarching issues 
which need to be discussed. From Chapters One and Two, it is evident that there remain a 
number of uncertainties within the understanding of concepts such as rights, security and 
the practicalities of oversight mechanisms in the law-making process. One observation, 
particularly from within the House of Commons, is the assumption of the ‘right’ of security 
often used to justify ‘collective’ security.358 While security of the individual is explicitly 
protected, ‘collective security’ is not a ‘right’ in the pure legal, sense. It is, however, one of 
the ‘interests’ which states can use to contain some rights.359 As examination into 
parliamentary debate unravelled, there is the appearance of an amorphous acceptance of 
collective security as a right seemingly given the same, if not superior, status to individual 
rights. This apparent misinterpretation may underpin the problem that, as non-lawyers, MPs 
may fail to grasp the complex legal issues and orchestrate discussion from a socio-political 
perspective. Thus, it is not validated at this stage that whilst challenging the Bill the critic 
avoids engaging in its complex legal considerations which could unravel the legislation at a 
later date. In adopting this position, by supporting ‘collective rights’ through security 
measures, individual rights protections may suffer. This is further advanced by the 
proposition of Cotler and Ruddock who advocate a notion of ‘human security’ to bridge the 
gap between the individual rights protection as already afforded and the wider political 
influence of protecting the ‘majority’ or the minority by establishing the collective security 
principle.  
As mentioned in chapter one of this thesis, a major omission from the debate in parliament 
and therefore from this thesis is any discussion, or even a mention of committees and 
materials other than the JCHR, and, in particular, the findings of the Home Affairs 
Committee. The Home Affairs Committee published a number of important and 
intellectually rigorous reports addressing the advancement of Anti-terror legislation making 
recommendations based on the quality of the legislation presented, the need for continuous 
independent review of Anti-terror legislation and the scrutiny legislation receives as a result 
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of the speed through which legislation can be passed through parliament.360 With this 
backdrop, it was expected to see reference to these reports within the debate, shockingly, 
this was not so. As this is a contextual analysis of political discourse of law making in Anti-
terror legislation, the remarkable absence of explicit discussion of the findings of the Home 
Affairs Committee omits them from the case studies, but will be returned to in the 
conclusion.  
A further consideration, which needs briefly to be raised, is the influence of previous case 
law as a guiding principle in the law-making process. Chapter Two identified the potential 
disparity between oversight mechanisms in the UK. Although it has been suggested that 
parliament initially establishes necessity and proportionality of measures, previous case law 
indicates that the judiciary then transfer the acceptance of this necessity and 
proportionality into a balance between rights and security, providing another layer to the 
assessment of measures ingrained within anti-terror legislation. Whilst historically it has 
been documented that the executive have access to intelligence which may best place them 
to decide the grounds, the incorporation of the HRA has widened the scope of the judiciary, 
substantiated by the decision in Re A. As noted earlier, the case of Re A was a trigger for the 
PTA 2005. In Re A the AG, on behalf of the Executive, relied on a number of cases to warrant 
their decision in creating Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001. As such, a brief synopsis of each of the 
cases relied on in Re A will be presented to provide a backdrop to the review carried out on 
the ATCSA 2001.361  
The first of the cases was Soering v. UK.362 This involved the extradition of a German 
national from the UK. Soering fought extradition proceedings to the United States on the 
grounds of Article 3 because he feared he would be sentenced to death (he was accused of 
murder and the death penalty was a possibility). The UK contended that Article 3 should not 
apply to extradition cases because it would mean the community would harbour a possible 
criminal leaving them ‘untried, at large and unpunished’.363 The ECtHR held that there 
                                                          
360
 19
th
 November 2001, The Home Affair Committee, The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill 2001. Para 
68(b) 
361
 Whilst it is acknowledged that the cases presented here are from different courts, they have been used to 
demonstrate influences in how controversial decisions may have been arrived at rather than their direct 
influence in construction of legislation and used as precedent. 
362
 ECHR (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
363
 Ibid. Para 86. 
Page 116 of 323 
 
would be a breach of Article 3 if the extradition of Soering took place. The considerations 
presented by the UK could not absolve the contracting parties from responsibility under 
Article 3. The ECtHR also stressed that any interpretation of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed had to be consistent with the ‘... general spirit of the convention, an instrument 
designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of democratic society’.364 The 
ECtHR has further expressed that ‘inherent in the whole convention is a search for a fair 
balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights’.365 This judgement 
created a number of barriers for the UK, particularly in how it dealt with the prevention of 
extradition on grounds of Article 3.366 Although this case does not focus on national security, 
later courts relied upon it when dealing with the removal of individuals from the UK.  
The second case was Chahal v. UK.367 Chahal entered the UK illegally in 1971 but in 1974 
was awarded indefinite leave. Following his arrest in 1984, 1985 and 1986, Chahal was 
refused British citizenship based on his links with events in the Punjab; events which had led 
to many Sikhs engaging in a political campaign in India. In 1990 the Home Secretary decided 
that Chahal ought to be deported because his continued presence in the UK was not 
conducive to the public good for reasons of national security and the international fight 
against terrorism.368 Chahal made an application of judicial review and was refused on 12th 
February 1993, followed by a dismissal by the Court of Appeal and a refusal by the House of 
Lords. On arrival at the ECtHR, it was noted that where national security issues are involved 
the courts retain the power of review but it is a limited one because, as held in the Council 
of Civil Service v. Minister for the Civil Service:369  
‘The decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty 
of fairness in a particular case is a matter for the Government to decide, not for the 
Courts.’370    
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Whilst the government argued that the guarantees afforded by Article 3 were not absolute 
in cases where a contracting state proposed to remove an individual from its territory, the 
ECtHR was explicit in identifying that the prohibition on torture provided for in Article 3 is 
absolute.371 
The final case to be noted here is the case of Secretary of State for Home Department v. 
Rehman.372 Rehman was a Pakistani national given entry clearance to enable him to work as 
a minister of religion in 1993. He applied for indefinite leave to remain in the UK but was 
refused in 1998. Rehman appealed to the SIAC under section 2(1)(c) of the SIAC 1997. In his 
opening statement to the SIAC the Secretary of State said, ‘the security service is concerned 
that the presence of returned jihad trainees in the UK may encourage the radicalisation of 
the British Muslim community.’373 The SIAC held that the expression 'national security' 
should be construed narrowly, rather than in the wider sense proposed by the Secretary of 
State. However, they recognised that there was no statutory definition of the term or legal 
authority directly on the point. The court decided that, in the circumstances and for the 
purposes of the case, they would adopt the position that a person may be said to offend 
against national security if he engages in, promotes, or encourages violent activity which is 
targeted at the UK, its system of government or its people. This included activities directed 
against the overthrow or destabilisation of a foreign government if that foreign government 
was likely to take reprisals against the UK that would affect the security of the UK or its 
nationals.374 
The Court of Appeal considered that the Commission had taken too narrow a view of what 
could constitute a threat to national security. Rehman continued to argue that the SIAC had 
used too narrow an interpretation of the term ‘national security’. Lord Slynn, in the House 
of Lords, concurred with the Court of Appeal arguing that he did not accept that this risk had 
to be the result of "a direct threat" to the UK.375 To require the matters in question to be 
capable of resulting "directly" in a threat to national security limits too tightly the discretion 
of the Executive in deciding how the interests, including not merely military defence but 
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democracy, and the legal and constitutional systems of the state need to be protected.376 In 
conclusion, Lord Slynn argued that the Secretary of State was entitled to have regard to the 
precautionary and preventative principles rather than to wait until directly harmful activities 
have taken place.377 
Lord Hoffman also provided a judgement to the House. In his summation he reiterated three 
errors of law noted by the Court of Appeal on behalf of the Commission. Firstly, that the 
Commission had given too narrow an interpretation of the concept of national security. 
Secondly, that the Commission should not have treated national security, international 
relations and other political reasons as separate compartments. Thirdly, that it was wrong 
to treat the Home Secretary's reasons as counts in an indictment and to ask whether each 
had been established to an appropriate standard of proof. The question was not simply 
what the appellant had done but whether the Home Secretary was entitled to consider, on 
the basis of the case against him as a whole, that his presence in the UK was a danger to 
national security.378 It may, however, be worth noting that this case never progressed to the 
ECtHR and, therefore, this is an internal interpretation only and might not hold up in an 
international rights based court. 
Against this backdrop of case law and the awareness and consideration of the misconstrued 
notion of ‘right to security’, a review of these case studies can be undertaken with these 
overarching influences in mind. This examination is further underpinned by the earlier 
considerations, conceptual and practical, established in Chapters One and Two of this thesis. 
As noted earlier, the first case study looks at discussion on derogation as a result of clause 
23 contained within the ATCS Bill 2001. As previously stated, this examination is not 
intended as a definitive assessment of human rights adjudication but rather an exploratory 
investigation into if and how, rights and security emerge with the use of balance as a 
conduit between these two concepts. 
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Chapter Four:  
ATCSA 2001 – The need for derogation 
 
12th November 2001 – ATCSB introduced to Commons floor 
19th November 2001 – Second reading to the house 
26th November 2001 – Conclusion of consideration in committee stages and remaining 
ATCSB discussion 
12th December 2001 – Consideration of the Lords’ amendments to the ATCSB 
14th December 2001 – ATCSB receives Royal Assent 
The following chapter will review discussion undertaken in the Houses of Parliament and the 
JCHR on the Anti-Terror Crime and Security Bill (ATCSB) 2001. A socio-political background 
will be discussed identifying the climate which fostered the Bill. Following this, origins of the 
ATCSB 2001 will be briefly discussed focusing on Part 4 clause 21-23.379 Due to the 
draconian nature of clause 21-23, presentation of the backdrop against which the ATCSB 
2001 emerged is considered necessary to contextualise parliamentary subscription to the 
measures contained within the Bill. 
A further overview of key themes to emerge from the quantitative analysis will also be 
presented. The aim here is to demonstrate some intrinsic themes within the overall body of 
debate which, due to the use of a specific case study, have been omitted from discussion. 
These themes are integral in aiding an understanding of the debate to emerge from the 
chapters focusing on derogation. To omit such observations may weaken later analysis. 
Following this, discussion will focus specifically on derogation. The findings of the JCHR 
identify a number of incompatibilities of the ATCSB 2001. This chapter will address the 
derogation debate found within Parliament and the JCHR so as to offer as clear an analysis 
as possible; this assessment follows a thematic not chronological pathway. This aims to 
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strengthen analysis based on the lack of structure found within the debate. This lack of 
structure appears to be a fundamental hindrance in the limited interrogation of executive 
proposals found within parliamentary debate.  
Only debates and discussions within the Houses of Parliament entitled ‘ATCS Bill’380 will be 
considered in this examination unless otherwise stated. Although this mantra was placed on 
examination specific to the case study, debate was held on the 19th November 2001 entitled 
‘Human Rights’. On review, this debate centred heavily on derogation and the ATCSB 2001. 
The discussion located in this debate was deemed too influential to omit and, therefore, a 
brief analysis of the debate will be presented following the case study.381   
4.1 Background to the ATCSB 2001: 
Post 9/11, terrorist threat rhetoric appears to have shifted focus from a domestic to an 
international threat.382 Following the claim by George W. Bush Jr. that the world had now 
entered a ‘War on Terror’,383 response to terrorism by the UK appears to have adopted a 
new ‘political’ interpretation with discussion arising politically, academically and socially as 
to whether a new era of threat had emerged.384 Whilst the question of ‘new’ threat is not 
examined here, parliamentary debate identified the existence of a new threat as a 
justification for the extension of powers found within the ATCSB 2001.385 Threat, and 
specifically ‘new’ threat, therefore, plays an integral role in the evolution of security 
measures.386 
The ATCSB 2001 was introduced into the House of Commons on 12th November 2001. In the 
explanatory notes, its purpose was to: ‘strengthen legislation in a number of areas to ensure 
that the government, in the light of the new situation arising from the September 11 
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terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, have the necessary powers to counter the 
increased threat to the UK’.387 The ATCSB 2001 went from its first reading in the House of 
Commons to Royal Assent within 33 days. This speed raised concerns throughout the 
duration of debate on the ATCSB 2001.  
Amendments had been tabled by the government prior to the first debate in the House of 
Commons. This, the Home Secretary stated, was as the result of listening and responding to 
the JCHR deliberation.388 Such amendments may be indicative of the need for the legislation 
to respect the safeguarding of the individual. These amendments may further indicate that a 
number of issues inconsistent with rights may have been resolved before the Bill arrived at 
Parliament. As such, this may have proved detrimental to the raising of issues with 
parliamentary debate.  
4.2 Origins of Part 4. What it said and why it was necessary:  
The impact of Article 3 ECHR on the UK’s ability to deport was the primary reason cited by 
the executive for the inclusion of Part 4 and, in particular, clause 21 and 23. The inability of 
the UK to return non-nationals to countries where they may be subject to inhumane or 
degrading treatment forced the executive to deliver alternative measures. Whilst it was 
maintained that, where possible, prosecution would take place, it was also acknowledged 
that this was not always practical due to the nature of terrorism.389 Reviewing concerns over 
the use of the SIAC in dealing with the repercussion of Article 3 interpretations, the Home 
Secretary identified that the issue was:  
‘whether it is right that we should hold people in circumstances where we cannot 
transfer them to a third safe country, where the country to which we originally 
sought to transfer them does not have extradition agreements and therefore 
where their lives would be at risk, or whether we should release them into the 
community. At issue is an enhanced risk, post-11 September, which we believe 
warrants our taking that difficult but balanced and proportionate step’.390  
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The Home Secretary identified that a choice had to be made as a result of the absolute 
nature of Article 3 ECHR; circumstances had, therefore, forced this move. This choice 
contained within clause 23 ATCSB 2001 was balanced with the risk and threat posed; a 
balance for the executive to make.391  
Discussion on the ATCSB 2001 was further clouded by the intention of it, namely, whether 
the legislation was designed to respond to the threat of terrorism or whether it was 
designed as an immigration tool. Commenting on the rationale behind the compilation of 
Part 4, the Home Secretary insisted that;  
‘This is our home – It is our Country. We have a right to say if people abuse rights of 
asylum to be able to hide in this country and organise terrorist acts, we must take 
steps to deal with them. The underlying question is whether this measure is 
necessary’.392  
This statement reiterates the consideration of a balance between the nation and the 
individual; the right to protect the country against individuals who, whilst acting illegally, are 
afforded the highest protection by the non-derogable right of Article 3. No further 
consideration of the use of terrorism legislation as an immigration tool will be 
undertaken.393  
With Article 3 as the key rationale for the inclusion of Part 4, the Home Secretary noted the 
law as being less the problem than the interpretation of it.  
‘We are relating them (powers) to the issue of someone who has voluntarily come 
into our country, was hosted by this country, but whom we wish to remove on the 
grounds that they are a risk to our national security or that their presence is not 
conducive to the public good. We are challenged on that, not in terms of the fact 
that, historically, we can do that, because under the Immigration Act 1971—in 
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schedule 3… The serious point is that under those immigration powers, we had the 
ability to deport someone from this country. What has got in our way was the 
judgment that we were unable to ask a person to leave because their life was at 
risk. I rest my case’.394  
This interpretation, according to the Home Secretary had therefore created a situation 
whereby action must be taken to overcome the constraints of Article 3. There is evidence 
that a number of MPs reviewed this balance between security and rights within Part 4 
through the lens of Article 3 constraints.395 Whilst some observed the absurdities of the 
impact which Article 3 had on the UK, others were just as unconvinced that Part 4 was the 
most appropriate response. Gary Streeter noted: 
‘It is absurd that this country cannot deal with people who are a threat to national 
security by sending them back to their home country or onwards for trial to 
countries such as India or the USA. However, in response to that genuine problem, 
the Home Secretary has come up with a strange and dangerous solution—to intern 
or confine people without trial for an indefinite period, which must undermine 
many precious and long-regarded freedoms. He is making a very serious 
mistake’.396  
This position demonstrates that parliament housed the belief not only of the ‘absurd’ nature 
of Article 3 but also, the ‘strange and dangerous’ solution, with emphasis on the ‘long 
regarded freedoms’, summating that alternatives were available.397  
The fundamental concerns between security and rights were identified by Lord Beaumont in 
his assessment of the situation. He identified how best to achieve a balance when 
considering Part 4 of the ATCSB 2001 and its subsequent derogation.  
‘It offends the sentiment of anybody who believes in human rights to have a 
concept in a Bill which involves detention without trial, but sometimes that is 
unavoidable. Here we have the situation where those suspected of serious 
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international terrorist crimes cannot be deported back to the relevant country… To 
me as a citizen, not as a lawyer, it is an absurd proposition to suggest that such a 
terrorist can remain at large in this country because of that risk or because he can 
find no other country to go to. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord 
Mayhew, that in the public mind that state of affairs would require the type of 
action the Government are undertaking because there is no alternative. However, I 
further agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, that in designing a 
system to counter that risk such a system must involve adequate legal protection 
and, at the least, the provision of judicial review. If that is introduced, the balance is 
preserved… Even if Part 4 of the Bill passes and there is derogation, the law of the 
European Convention will prevail in the sense that the Government may have to 
answer for the provisions if they are not reasonably balanced’.398  
This assessment by Lord Beaumont echoed the crux of fundamental concerns about 
derogation. It reiterated that derogation is less the problem than is the rationale for moves. 
The extremity of measures continued within the ATCSB 2001 required justification. As such 
derogation was seen as the result of the protection offered within Article 3 values; the 
incorporation of SIAC to respect Article 3 ECHR, therefore, requiring derogation.  
4.3 Key themes to emerge out of ATSCB debate: 
A brief overview of three themes to emerge from the quantitative assessment will now be 
presented. These have been provided to support analysis later in this chapter which may be 
engaged. Each of the themes examined here raised a greater number of discussion points 
than rights, security or constitutional principles. Although this was not the sole rationale for 
their inclusion, it was deemed sufficient to warrant their embedding as a backdrop to 
further examination.   
4.3.1 Speed of the process: As noted from the quantitative findings, the speed with which 
the ATCSB 2001 passed through parliament was a major point of discussion.399 The issue 
itself did not raise direct concerns over security and rights; however, it was identified that 
the speed of the ATSCB 2001 placed limitations on discussion. As Simon Hughes noted:  
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‘One of the terrible consequences of this procedure is that we have an hour in total 
for this debate. With the best will in the world, it is impossible in an hour for the 
House to do justice to the arguments about the fundamental issue of keeping 
judicial review, or to consider the alternative before us in the form of a 
Government amendment whose genesis lies in a proposal by a former Lord of 
Appeal and Master of the Rolls. One of our complaints is that, because of the speed 
of the process, this legislation has needed to come back so that this issue can be 
revisited—as the Government now accept—and many other interrelated issues as 
well’.400  
This reference was made in a review of the amendments made by the House of Lords and 
which required substantive discussion in the opinion of Mr Hughes and the Liberal 
Democratic Party. Complaints about the speed of the process were evident from the outset 
of debate within both Houses of Parliament.401 Concern with the speed of the ATCSB 2001 
was also acknowledged by the JCHR in its November 2001 report.402   
Whilst the speed of the Bill was particularly contentious within debate, further investigation 
into the rationale for speed is not directly relevant to this particular examination. As such, 
this will not be considered any further as a standalone issue.  
4.3.2 The influence of public opinion: Following the events of 9/11 it was apparent that the 
executive felt it vital to be ‘seen’ to be taking action. As David Blunkett403 noted:  
‘Circumstances and public opinion demanded urgent and appropriate action after 
the 11 September attacks on the world trade centre and the Pentagon. Many 
parliamentarians understandably demanded caution, proportionality and a 
response that would last for the future…it was the Government’s task to appraise 
the measures that would be necessary to close loopholes and set aside anomalies 
that had developed over many years in existing legislation’.404  
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Whilst a demonstration of a ‘need’ to respond was presented, the need for caution in the 
use of this as a legitimate justification was also identified. Mark Fisher noted:  
‘I am sure that there is pressure, in that the country wants the Government to do 
something; but, as I have said, that is a bad basis on which to legislate and to find 
the correct balance between the powers we have—or should have—to deal with 
international terrorism, and not just the protection of human rights but the 
maintenance of the fundamental principles of our legal system, which I consider 
even more important than specific human rights’.405  
This response by Mark Fisher identified that, although a response was required, 
fundamental constitutional principles and values still required protection.  
Political justification for moves made as a result of what constituents demand was also 
presented. As MPs:  
‘We should be asking ourselves a critical question: what do members of the public 
– our constituents – expect us to do? That is the critical test, but it was not 
advanced by a single opposition member in our debate’.406  
This position argued that qualification for moves was the result of the democratic process 
through elected representatives. Whilst important to reflect the position of the electorate 
and to protect the lives of individuals, this position cannot go unchallenged. Moves have to 
be balanced, proof of necessity and proportionality must still be demanded to warrant 
measures. Extension of measures presented through demands of protection made by the 
electorate must be substantiated rather than relying simply on the presentation of a 
populist agenda.  
The final point to be addressed will look briefly at the inclusion of a sunset clause. The early 
acceptance of the clause appears to be a factor in addressing the potential weakness in Part 
4. 
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4.3.3 Introduction of a Sunset Clause:407 The first discussion point considered on the 21st 
November 2001 was the introduction of a new clause. Clause 6408 addressed the request in 
the earlier debate for the implementation of a sunset clause.409 This clause allowed for a 
review period of the legislation which was seen by many as the compromise to responding 
to the ‘national emergency’. Clause 6(5) declared that Part 4 of the ATCSB, would cease to 
have effect at the end of a one year period.410 The provisions would provide ‘exceptional 
rigour’ in forcing the executive to bring back sections for fundamental renewal.411 As the 
Shadow Home Secretary identified, the renewals would be more frequent, the more 
controversial the provisions. The implementation of clause 6 would create a ‘sufficient lever 
for parliament against the executive’.412 The implementation of this clause allowed the 
executive the emergency powers they claimed they needed whilst allowing parliament the 
review powers they required to maintain a constitutional hand over the Bill.  
In pressing for a sunset clause, the ATCSB 2001 became operational for both factions of the 
debate. It met the needs of the Home Secretary (and executive) in being seen to protect 
national security while allowing parliament to review the legislation as protected by the 
sunset clause. This measure may appear as parliamentary procedure succumbing to the 
claims of the protection of national security. However, it may also be seen as a victory for 
parliamentary procedure providing for a return to examine the legislation at a later date as 
noted by Oliver Letwin.413 By embedding the sunset clause, the House could be seen to be 
working to protect security, yet having the opportunity to return to the clauses of concern 
and challenge when greater evidence or support was available.  
These three themes to emerge were substantive discussions within quantitative 
assessment. Whilst not directly associated with the balance between rights and security, 
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each influenced the direction of debate at various junctures of the Bill. The speed of the Bill 
through parliament may have prevented proper scrutiny, including the opportunity to 
discuss the findings contained within JCHR reports. Speed and the consequential reduction 
in opportunity to scrutinise could also have resulted in the limited exposure rights and 
security debate received in the review process. The influence of public opinion is well 
documented within political decision-making, and as noted in Chapter Two, has been held 
to compromise decision-making with the consideration of re-election prospects.414 As such, 
this influence of public opinion may prevent challenges from arising but, arguably 
compounded with the lack of legal expertise, facilitate the misconstrued belief in the ‘right 
to security’.415 The final influence discussed was the introduction of a sunset clause. As 
noted, the implementation of clause 6 created a lever for parliament against the executive 
providing imminent emergency powers whilst allowing parliament the power to review. The 
introduction of this clause early in the proceedings may have signalled the end of rights and 
security debate based on the secured notion of a review of powers after the Act was 
operational. Although none of these influences are quantifiable in the direct impact they 
had on influencing the rights and security debate either negatively or positively, the debate 
to emerge from each theme cannot be isolated from the case studies contained within this 
exploratory investigation.     
4.4 JCHR  
The JCHR received the ATCSB 2001 prior to its presentation before the House of Parliament. 
The Committee was explicit in noting that; 
‘When assessing the necessity for any new measure which may interfere with 
human rights, it will be important to establish what, if anything, it usefully adds to 
the powers already available to the state, and duties already applying to individuals 
and organisations, to protect and enhance the security of the state and its 
citizens’.416  
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This guidance laid the foundations of examination and allowed the reviewer to understand 
the pretext for recommendations made by the Committee. Legislation is not to be taken as 
a standalone piece, but viewed in line with other available legislative tools. Such a 
combination of tools, however, was not clear from examination of the debate found within 
the Houses of Parliament. The Committee also indicated that the legislation would not be 
supported if it aimed to introduce wider-ranging powers than those necessary to deal with 
the ‘novel’ threat. The Committee’s indicator for this was identified by its refusal to accept 
parts of the Bill which ‘would not have received parliamentary support but for current 
concerns about terrorism and fear of attack’.417 A main concern of the Committee was the 
rapid creation of the legislation: 
‘We are conscious that it is precisely in such circumstances as the aftermath of the 
attacks of 11 September that the protection of human rights will come under the 
greatest pressure from the demands of the state (and of public opinion) for greater 
security, and the demands placed upon Government agencies to be seen to be 
‘doing something’.418 
This is interesting because it reaffirms the influence of ‘public opinion’ on the government - 
a point demonstrated earlier. The Committee’s job, however, was to identify when ‘doing 
something’ oversteps the boundaries identified by current legislation and policy.419 
The Committee identified a number of clauses which it considered to raise rights issues. 
These included; 
- The decision to give notice of a derogation from the right to liberty under Article 5 of 
the ECHR; 
- The proposals in Part 4 to detain certain suspected terrorists without trial and to 
restrict their rights to legal due process; 
- The re-introduction in Part 3 of the Bill of provisions on information gateways which 
was criticised by this Committee in the last session of Parliament; 
- The implications of the creation of Part 5 of an offence to incite religious hatred; and 
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- The introduction in clause 76 and Parts 10, 11 and 13 of powers (particularly for the 
police) which are not directed wholly or mainly towards any threat to security from 
terrorism.420 
The Committee raised these concerns in particular and addressed them accordingly with the 
government. Part 3 was discussed briefly by the Committee but oral evidence provided by 
the Home Secretary had already been examined. Redrafting of clauses had taken place and 
the Committee welcomed the evidence of willingness to take into account the views 
presented by the Committee in the re-drafting of the clause.421 
Turning to the remit of Part 5, the Committee outlined that: 
‘Part 5 of the Bill deals with incitement to religious and racial hatred. It would 
extend the existing offence of incitement to racial hatred to cover the incitement of 
racial hatred against people outside the United Kingdom. It seems likely that this 
extension of an existing interference with the right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10 of the ECHR would be held to be capable of being justifiable…The Bill 
would also create a new offence of incitement to religious hatred against people or 
groups within or outside the United Kingdom, and extend the aggravated penalties 
for certain racially-motivated offences to those who commit those offences with 
religious motivation’.422 
Addressing this issue, the Committee highlighted that:  
‘as long as the legislation is applied in a way that focuses closely on the prohibited 
purpose and outcome of speech, that it is the incitement of hatred on religious 
grounds, it is therefore likely to be possible to justify it as a necessary and 
proportionate measure to protect the rights of others under ECHR Article 10(2)’.423  
With this concern, it was confirmed that the Bill would not restrict freedom to express 
opinions and beliefs, including those which are critical of some or all religion, whether 
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expressed seriously or satirically. The Committee felt that this confirmation helped resolve 
the potential issues which arose from the initial wording in Part 5.  
Part 10, 11 and 13 of the ATCSB 2001 raised concerns specifically over police powers. In 
particular, the extension of powers in clauses 93-97: requiring anyone to remove any item 
which the constable reasonably believed as being worn wholly or mainly to conceal identity. 
The Committee highlighted that the removal of face coverings ‘maybe a matter of sensitivity 
to certain people’.424 Maintaining their concern with this measure and identifying that the 
provision risked being ‘seen as authorizing an unreasonable and disproportionate 
interference with their dignity’, the Committee indicated that removal of face coverings 
‘should be subjected to the most careful scrutiny on human rights grounds’.425 Key to this 
was the potential breach of Article 8 ECHR with respect for private life and a potential 
breech of Article 9 which awards individuals the right to manifest their religion. Part 11 of 
the Bill dealt with the retention of communications data which was identified as falling 
outside of the protections offered by Chapter 2, Part 1 of the RIPA 2000. The Committee 
considered that measures should be put in place to ensure that the Code of Practice and any 
directions compatible with the right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence under Article 8 ECHR, and that those measures should be specified, so far 
as practicable, on the face of legislation.426 Part 13 was also covered by this 
recommendation by the Committee. 
The most contentious issue identified by the committee was the derogation from Article 5 
ECHR, the result of Part 4 ATCSB 2001. The basis for derogation related to the treatment of 
certain foreign nationals whose presence in the UK was deemed, by the Home Secretary, as 
being a threat to security. To derogate from Article 5 ECHR, the UK had to action Article 15 
ECHR. Article 15 provides that;  
‘In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
high contracting party may take measure derogating from its obligations under this 
convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
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provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law…’427 
The Committee further acknowledged the problems the government faced by being unable 
to derogate from Article 3 without ‘denouncing’ the Convention as a whole.428 Whilst this 
option required derogation from Article 5, this move was permissible under Article 15 
allowing the UK to remain within the constraints of the ECHR. Derogation had been 
necessitated because Part 4 provided for the indefinite detention of suspected international 
terrorists who were not brought to trial in the UK, and who the UK would wish to deport or 
remove. These individuals, however, could not be removed because of Article 3 ECHR. The 
committee also acknowledged that Part 4 limited the availability of judicial review and 
habeas corpus. A restricted appeal process was, however, provided through the SIAC.429 
Although the Committee held no definitive view on the government’s need to adopt the 
precautionary derogation it believed that clause 23 of Part 4, ‘does not in itself make it clear 
that the purpose of detaining the suspect is solely to find a safe country to which to remove 
him or her’.430 This concern arose from the government’s willingness to allow an individual 
to be removed to a country where the individual in question would be able to resume 
terrorist activity. Having addressed this issue, however, if the government were not willing 
to allow the move then the restriction found in Part 4 allowed for the detention to appear 
as indefinite internment rather than detention pending removal. This would be more likely 
to violate Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.  
The request for derogation argued that public emergency existed within the meaning of 
Article 15(1) of the Convention. The UK also relied on the recourse that the UN Security 
Council had recognised the attacks of 11 September 2001 as a threat to international peace 
and security. UN resolution 1373 required all states to take measures to prevent the 
commission of terrorist attacks including denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, 
support or commit them. The schedule identifies that the UK believed that threat existed in 
the UK, particularly from foreign nationals residing in the UK. These suspected terrorists 
threatened security and Part 4, therefore, was strictly required by the exigencies of the 
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situation.431 The Committee also indicated that by derogating from Article 5 ECHR, the UK 
would also need to derogate from Article 9 of the ICCPR which is the right to liberty. In this 
situation the Committee believed that the state bore the burden of proving, to the 
Committee’s satisfaction, that there was a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, and that any interference with rights was only as extensive as was strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation.432 The Committee identified that the request for 
derogation caused concern because of the ‘lack or specificity in the reasons given…for the 
asserting that there is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation’.433 In assessing 
the Home Secretary’s evidence it was identified that his justification was grounded in that 
the threat, though variable, was generally greater now than presented by the IRA in the 
1970s with access to WMD434 as just one example. In summating the Home Secretary’s 
evidence the Committee felt that, whilst some of the judgments may depend heavily on 
assessing information derived from sources which must properly be kept secret, there was 
also a lack of evidence shown to support the position attained. The Committee summated 
its position on the derogation suggesting that:  
‘No court in this country will be able to decide whether the derogation is justified 
against the criteria of Article 15 of the ECHR, it is especially important for each 
House to decide whether they are satisfied of the existence of a public emergency, 
the lack of safeguards built into the Bill, particularly in relation to detention 
powers, causes us to doubt whether the measure in the Bill can be said to be 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.435 
The final assessment made by the Committee reviewed the integration of Part 4 and the 
legality of the clauses found within it. Some issues were raised by the Committee in 
alternative sections such as the discussion on derogation; nonetheless, Part 4 received 
considerable assessment. It was raised by the committee that the wide definition afforded 
to international terrorists, as defined in clause 21(2), could prove problematic. The 
Committee indicated that the key issue in this particular assessment was whether the 
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definition of ‘international terrorist’ in the act was sufficiently clear and non-discriminatory 
to avoid arbitrariness. The Committee held that such a wide definition was not acceptable 
and considered it important that the: 
 ‘class of people liable to be regarded as international terrorists should be 
sufficiently and clearly defined, because a certificate under clause 21 would have 
significant effects on the person’s rights to liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR’.436  
In examining Part 4, it was found that some of the phraseology used in the Bill was open to 
abuse and potentially over-inclusive.437  
The next point on this issue raised by the Committee was the risk in discriminating between 
those who could not be removed subject to immigration control and those with the 
unconditional right to remain in the UK. The Committee was concerned that the measure 
‘might lead to discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to liberty on the grounds of 
nationality’,438 noting further that ‘we are not persuaded that the risk of discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality in the provisions of Part 4 of the Bill has been sufficiently taken 
on board’.439 This assessment was an explicit indicator to both Houses of Parliament to 
reassess the severity and repercussions of the inclusion of Part 4. It is, therefore, surprising 
that there was not greater debate of this issue in parliament. Even though the executive and 
the legislature were aware of these potential discrepancies the incompatible features 
remained. 
In an examination of the rights of due process, the Committee believed that there was 
reasonable protection for appellants’ rights on three grounds. Firstly, because the SIAC 
offered a full hearing on the merits of the case; secondly, the use of nominated 
representatives to represent the interests of applicants when national security evidence 
needed to be examined adequately balanced the needs of the state and the interests of the 
applicant; and finally, there was the opportunity to appeal on points of law.440 Whilst the 
Committee accepted the use of the nominated representative for the SIAC process, they 
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were concerned that this might not be adequately protected in higher courts. The 
Committee, therefore, recommended that the role of the nominated representative should 
be extended to include participating in appeals from the SIAC in appropriate cases, including 
cases arising under the ATSCB 2001.441 
The report presented by the Committee was particularly thorough and identified many of 
the problems which would be seen later in declarations of incompatibility. What is not clear 
is how this report was used by the government to reconfigure parts of the Bill open to 
challenge. Ultimately, government and parliament had a duty to use the findings of this 
report to fool-proof the legislation prior to Royal Assent. Lack of reliance on these findings 
suggests that the influence that committees such as this have is purely hypothetical rather 
than deeply entrenched in the process of decision-making. Experts with the ability to 
examine material closely, and outside of a political firing line, may be expected to be a 
source utilised in the legitimacy of legislation before parliament. Further government use of 
such recommendations and findings could help warrant decisions made if brought in line 
with the Committee’s provisions.       
The JCHR followed up their initial report on the ATCSB 2001 with a further report in 
December 2001. It was instantly flagged up as with the previous report, that the time 
frames within which parliament were expected to examine such an important piece of 
legislation were insufficient. As the Committee pointed out, the House of Commons 
received only 16 hours to deal with 126 clauses and eight schedules. Agreeing with the 
views projected by the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, the 
Committee upheld that: 
 ‘The inclusion of many non-emergency measures was inappropriate in emergency 
legislation which was required to be considered at such speed’.442 
During this 5th report by the Committee it was reiterated that, even though the HRA 1998 
(Designated Derogation) Order was now in force, the case for the conditions of derogation 
had still not been met. The reason this issue was as contentious as highlighted by the 
Committee was because:  
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‘assuming that the order is valid, it will not be a violation of the right to liberty to 
detain a suspected terrorist suspect, covered by a certificate issued under clause 
21, against whom a deportation order has been made, but who cannot be deported 
because it has not so far been possible to find a country which is prepared to take 
the person and in which he or she would not be at risk of death, torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment’.443 
The Committee found a key failing in the lack of explicit explanation of what was covered by 
the wording found within the legislation. The Committee summated its position on 
derogation expressing that: 
 ‘it is essential for the Bill to be clarified to ensure that the object and purpose of 
the exceptional power to detain is confined only to cases where the government 
has concluded that it would be impossible or inappropriate to prosecute the 
person, and is seeking diligently for a safe country’.444 
Ultimately, the Committee strongly advised both houses to seek to ensure that the terms 
proposed were narrowly drawn. The ability to provide definitive narrow definitions became 
redundant following the limited time allotted for review. This report identified that 
derogation may be sustainable providing it could prove and validate its reasoning for 
derogating.  
The Committee moved on to re-examine Part 4 of the Bill. It was welcomed that clause 21(1) 
had been amended which introduced a legal requirement for reasonableness relating to the 
certification of suspected international terrorists. The Committee, however, was still 
concerned about the implications of clauses 25(2)(a) and 26(4)(a) relating to the SIAC. After 
discussing the rationale behind the introduction of the SIAC based on Article 5(4) it was 
stipulated that: 
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‘Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful’.445  
It was established that the SIAC was created after the ECtHR held in the case of Chahal446 
that judicial review did not provide sufficient safeguards for liberty to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 5(4) in cases of deportation involving national security. This decision 
was reached on two accounts. Firstly, the courts in judicial review did not undertake a full 
review of the merits of the Home Secretary’s decision in such cases, but only quashed a 
decision if they considered that it was so unreasonable that no reasonable Home Secretary 
could have made it. Secondly; most of the information on the basis of which the Home 
Secretary made such decisions would be likely to be withheld from the court and from the 
applicant on public-interest grounds, making review by the courts too exiguous to offer real 
protection for the right to liberty.447 
Clause 25 dealt with the appeal of a suspected international terrorist against his certification 
whilst clause 26 dealt with the automatic, periodic reviews by the SIAC of the continuing 
detention of people certified under clause 21. The concern for the Committee here was that 
this clause prevented the SIAC from being able to act on evidence which showed at a later 
date that the suspicion or belief, while reasonable, was mistaken. Therefore, clause 26(4), in 
the opinion of the Committee, did not satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4). The reviews 
must be frequent enough and rigorous enough to ensure that people did not remain in 
detention for longer than necessary. The Committee identified that a resolution to this 
problem would be for clause 26(4) to be amended so as to identify clear grounds which the 
SIAC would be able to consider on a review equivalent to those identified by clause 25(2). 
This amendment would avoid the risk of incompatibility under Article 5(4) ECHR.448 
These two areas were the main discussion of the fifth paper released by the JCHR in 
2001/02. The Committee concluded that:  
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‘the Bill contains a disparate collection of measures which are likely to have a major 
impact on a wide range of rights…We acknowledge the seriousness with which the 
Government has engaged in a dialogue with those who seek to uphold the core 
values of democratic society in difficult times…There are a number of aspects of the 
Bill which we are concerned may continue to compromise the protection of human 
rights in ways which have not so far been fully justified’.449  
What these reports by the Committee have identified is that moves were not vetoed on the 
grounds that they were wrong, but that the Government had failed to effectively justify the 
necessity of clauses. The JCHR provided extensive review and drew out a significant number 
of concerns of various degrees regarding the potential incompatibility and legality of the 
ATCSB 2001. The Committee was methodical and structured in its approach, allowing for 
focused and rigorous review time constraints, a weakness identified within the review 
process of the Houses of Parliament, aside. Focusing on Part 4 in particular, the JCHR were 
explicit in recognising that Part 4 had potential to breach Article 14 ECHR; a key issue which 
received limited attention in the Houses of Parliament. As noted earlier, parliament has a 
duty to utilise these findings to fool-proof the legislation prior to Royal Assent. A lack of 
reliance on these findings confirms that the influence of committees such as JCHR remains 
hypothetical in influential capability rather than deeply entrenched in the process of 
decision-making.    
Having now reviewed a number of external influences and other discussions aligned with 
the ATCSB 2001, analysis will focus on the influence of derogation.   
4.5: The trigger for derogation: 
A fundamental issue of concern with the ATCSB 2001, as confirmed by the JCHR, was the 
necessity of ‘derogation’. Raising a number of other discussions with associated concerns 
over security, rights and constitutional boundaries, this review will aim to articulate them 
within this assessment. 
Whilst reduction of the ATCSB 2001 to one case study may appear to undermine the depth 
of provisions, the purpose of this focus is to provide a contextual analysis to extract, develop 
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and support information previously established. The emphasis on this case study is to 
provide as focused an assessment as possible to help the understanding of the type of 
‘debate’ engaged in by parliament. This case study was selected by satisfying JCHR concerns 
of rights compatibility, alongside government claims that the threat faced by the UK and the 
constraints of Article 3 ECHR, required such extension of power in the name of security.  
Whilst members of the House of Lords identified from the outset that the ATCSB 2001 
contained ‘specific and targeted measures’, which struck a balance between ‘respecting 
fundamental liberties and ensuring that they are not exploited’,450 others disagreed.451  
To derogate from Article 5 ECHR, the UK had to action Article 15 ECHR which provides that:  
‘In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
high contracting party may take measures derogating from its obligations under 
this convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law(…)’.452 
Derogation had been necessitated because as established, Part 4 provided for the indefinite 
detention of suspected international terrorists who were not brought to trial in the UK and 
who the UK would wish to deport or remove.453 These individuals, however, could not be 
removed because of Article 3 constraints. Those detained under Part 4 could make appeals 
to the SIAC to overrule the decision of detention. The role, function and legitimacy of the 
SIAC are not being reviewed here based on two assertions. Firstly, that however viewed, the 
SIAC was a well-established principle within the legislative framework provided for by the 
SIAC Act 1997. Secondly, the SIAC was considered by the JCHR to offer reasonable 
protection for appellants’ rights on three grounds.454 As such, only discussion on derogation 
will be reviewed for the ATCSB 2001.455 
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The detention of foreign nationals under clause 23 ATCSB 2001 was seen to be incompatible 
with Article 5 ECHR which guarantees the right to liberty and security. However, the ECHR 
allows deprivation of liberty if the measures are ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law’.456 Emphasis falls on Article 5(1)(f), which allows for ‘lawful arrest or detention of a 
person to prevent his affecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against 
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition’.457 The purpose of 
clause 23 ATCSB 2001 was to detain suspected international terrorists who could not be 
removed from the UK due to the constraints of Article 3 ECHR. This was evidenced earlier in 
Chahal.458 A fundamental problem, however, emerges because, those detained under clause 
23 ATCSB 2001 would not be undergoing deportation proceedings because Article 3 
prevents it. As such, clause 23 of the ATCSB 2001 was in breach of Article 5(1) ECHR and did 
not fall under the exception of Article 5(1)(f). This led to the UK formally derogating from 
Article 5(1) ECHR issuing an order in accordance with Article 15(3) ECHR.459 Before opening 
up the debate on derogation it is necessary to discuss the grounds for the validity of 
derogation which is a concern that, itself, was a matter of debate in parliament. 
The validity of derogation depends on the fulfilment of several legal requirements. Firstly, 
the derogating government must establish the existence of a ‘public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation’. Secondly, the ‘public emergency’ must be officially proclaimed. 
Thirdly, the measures must only be to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation. Finally, these measures must neither be inconsistent with other obligations under 
international law nor discriminatory.460 Each requirement provides a legitimate opportunity 
for challenge in parliamentary debate to the executives proposed measures. However, as 
will be seen, these challenges appear limited in depth and sporadic in nature. 
Whilst the requirement of ‘The existence of a public emergency’ lacks a specific definition of 
what is meant by ‘time of public emergency threatening the life of the nation’, case law has 
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provided some guidelines. The first substantive interpretation of Article 15 ECHR was made 
in Lawless v. Ireland461 and was further developed and clarified in the Greek case.462 In order 
to constitute an Article 15 emergency the Commission held that a ‘public emergency’ must 
have the following four characteristics:463  
1. It must be actual or imminent. 
2. Its effects must involve the whole nation. 
3. The continuance of the organized life of the community must be threatened 
4. The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions 
permitted by convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly 
inadequate. 
Ultimately it is the state which bears the burden of proof to establish the existence of a 
‘public emergency’. However, as identified in Ireland v UK,464 the concept of ‘margin of 
appreciation does exist’.465 Michaelsen argues that the existence of such doctrine identified 
from this case, ‘illustrates the general approach of the international organs to the difficult 
task of balancing the sovereignty of contracting parties with their obligations under the 
convention’.466 In the context of derogation in times of ‘public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation’, the margin of appreciation represents the discretion left to a state in 
ascertaining the necessity and scope of measures of derogation from protected rights in the 
circumstances prevailing within its jurisdiction. In Ireland v. UK, the ECtHR held that:  
‘it falls in the first place to each contracting state, with its responsibility for ‘‘the life 
of [its] nation’’, to determine whether that life is threatened by a ‘‘public 
emergency’’ and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the 
emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing 
needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position 
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than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency 
and on the scope of derogations necessary to avert it. States however, do not enjoy 
an unlimited margin of appreciation’.467 
The proportionality of measures must only be to the extent strictly required.468 Derogation 
measures therefore must be strictly proportionate. Pulling on the experiences of court 
judgments and the interpretation of Article 15(1)ECHR, Michaelsen identifies that 
derogation measures must therefore fulfil five basic requirements: 
1. The measures must be necessary, i.e., actions taken under ordinary laws and in 
conformity with international human rights obligations are not sufficient to meet the 
threat. 
2. The measures must be connected to the emergency, i.e., they must prima facie be 
suitable to reduce the threat or crisis. 
3. The measures must be used only as long as they are necessary, i.e., there must be 
a temporal limit. 
4. The degree to which the measures deviate from international human rights 
standards must be in proportion to the severity of the threat, i.e., the more 
important and fundamental the right which is being compromised, the closer and 
stricter the scrutiny. 
5. Effective safeguards must be implemented to avoid the abuse of emergency 
powers. Where measures involve administrative detention, safeguards may include 
regular review by independent national organs, in particular by the legislative and 
judicial branches.469 
The doctrine of margin of appreciation is applicable not only in the process of assessing the 
existence of a ‘public emergency’ but also in the context of proportionality. The ECtHR held 
in Ireland v. UK that it falls to the contracting party to determine ‘how far it is necessary to 
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go in attempting to overcome the emergency’.470 As such, if it could be proven that both 
public emergency and measures of proportionality were met, and that the margin of error 
for potential incompatibilities could be justified. There are two clear themes available to 
parliament for challenge of the legislation471 and two which remain absent from 
parliamentary debate.  
4.6 Derogation:  
The necessity of derogation as the result of detention without trial of non-national terror 
suspects was examined as a key discussion in line with a review of Part 4.472 As 
demonstrated earlier,473 the measures contained within the ATCSB 2001 may have been 
better received if evidence could substantiate the claims of necessity. However, aside from 
a lack of unambiguous evidence to support executive measures, it was widely accepted that 
international terrorism against western civilisation was active.  
As already established,474 the structure of Article 15 ECHR requires a derogating state to 
satisfy two discrete tests: firstly, that an exceptional circumstance such as a war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation exists, and secondly, that measures 
restricting fundamental rights are ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.475 
Chapter one identified the malleable definition which the term security carries with it. It is 
so subjective that to attribute actual meaning to it is almost impossible. It appears a concept 
moderated by a Home Secretary and, therefore, can be easily manipulated through risk 
communication and rhetoric and in the calculated siphoning of intelligence and evidence. 
Claims of ‘security’ and ‘national emergency’ were used to underpin the need for Part 4 and 
consequently, derogation.476 It is important to note that whilst these references of ‘security’ 
and ‘national emergency’ were relied upon throughout the debate there appears little, if 
any, reference to or explanation of what these concepts meant in order to ‘justify’ the 
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measures contained within the ATCSB 2001. Loose reference was made to legislation which 
confirmed that extensions of powers were possible when a state was faced with a ‘national 
emergency’, however, the evidence to substantiate the claim that the UK was facing a 
‘national emergency’ appears to never have been fully dissected within parliamentary 
debate.  
Discussion on derogation lacked clarity, consistency and direction however, by accepting the 
necessity of Part 4, discussion arose assessing the necessity of derogation. It did not go 
unrecognised that to permit derogation could lead to future consequences:  
‘The effect of the derogation takes away from the accused the right to a fair trial 
and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance, and the right to 
examine or have examined witnesses against him, and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf, under the same conditions as the 
witnesses against him’.477  
Therefore the parameters identified here drew on the constitutional boundaries which in 
turn, according to Mr McNamara, impacted on legally protected rights such as right to a fair 
trial.  
In balancing security and rights, the ECHR, as interpreted by Judge Wildhaber, was 
‘protecting democracy by recognising the state's right to counter terrorism.’478 It is from this 
that Baroness Whitaker identified the ability to derogate from Article 5 ECHR but not from 
Article 3 which absolutely prohibits despatching anyone to torture or to other inhuman or 
degrading treatment. The purpose of the article enabling derogation, according to Judge 
Wildhaber, was to:  
‘Balance the vital needs of the state with the strongest protection of human 
rights’.479 
Baroness Whitaker stressed that to counter terrorism under the Convention, rights may be 
curtailed to the extent necessary; a position that is well established in theory and practice. 
The issue, therefore, assuming that there was an emergency, was not that rights of suspects 
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were curtailed but whether the extent of the curtailment was necessary.480 This, however, 
does not establish how to obtain this balance. Further to this, the requirement of proof that 
such curtailments are necessary was not a new concept to expose the executive to as 
established earlier by Dyzenhaus.481 The question of balance, however, continues to 
emerge; not just what requires balance but also how to balance. 
Derogation from Article 5 and Part 4 ATCSB 2001 were reliant on one another. Throughout 
discussion on derogation within the House of Commons, security and emergency appear to 
be used interchangeably, particularly when looking at derogation issues. As a result of this, 
the two concepts, whilst coded independently of one another, have been used 
interchangeably within this brief analysis. From the outset of discussion the Home Secretary 
emphasised that derogation from Article 5 under Article 15 would only be necessary if 
clauses 21, 23 and their associated provisions were accepted by parliament. This placed the 
responsibility of derogation on parliament with the provision for derogation automatically 
falling if parliament rejected the clauses mentioned.482  
This emphasis on parliament’s responsibility was further compounded when the Home 
Secretary expressed that the executive were ‘seeking the consent of the house on 
derogation’,483 offering the house the opportunity to challenge provisions. By requesting 
‘consent’ rather than ‘support’ authorisation again sat with parliament. Parliament, rather 
than the executive, would as a result be responsible for derogating.484 
When presenting the ATCSB 2001, the Home Secretary was asked to provide a definition of 
what the executive deemed a ‘national emergency’485 to warrant derogation. No definition 
of what the executive deemed to be a national emergency was presented by the Home 
Secretary. Derogation, according to the Home Secretary, was available through domestic 
legislation (TA 2000), Article 15 ECHR 1953, and the European Convention on Refugees 
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1951.486 This response failed in answering the question asked but rather identified 
legislation which acknowledges the ability to derogate. Relying on this legislative framework 
to support the ability to derogate was, according to the Home Secretary, the result of their 
creators who ‘foresaw circumstances in which it would be necessary to take action to 
derogate—to suspend temporarily—a particular article or clause, in order to be able to act 
in a particular way to respond to what was happening’.487 This response failed to explain 
how the executive justified, and more importantly, satisfied, the criteria for the extension of 
powers found within the ATCSB 2001.  
Substantive proof that ‘national emergency’ existed was later requested by Edward Garnier. 
By challenging the executive to prove necessity to derogate, Mr Garnier discharged 
responsibility from those asked to support moves back onto the executive.488 As Mr Garnier 
noted, while the burden of proof is heavy, the standard of proof to be expected ‘must be 
sufficient at least to stir in our minds a feeling that this is policy that has been thought 
through and is evidence based’.489 Request of ‘proof’ for measures is a central theme in 
limited challenge of the proposed legislation. The government were not forthcoming in their 
display of substantive evidence to support claims that derogation, as a result of Part 4, was 
necessary. Without having evidence to scrutinise, the opportunity for MPs to uncover 
deeper issues with the Bill was also limited. Until parliament was satisfied that the measures 
contained were necessary, questions of proportionality were arguably redundant. 
When reviewing the necessity to derogate, although challenges existed requesting proof, 
the challenge to the lack of proof appeared limited. As such the Shadow Home Secretary 
was:  
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‘willing to take on trust and for the first time being the judgement made by the 
Home Secretary, as he is in a position – whereas I am not – to understand what is 
urgent and where the loopholes are’.490  
This position adopted by the main opposition party arguably fuelled the executive with a 
sense of belief that the measures contained within the ATCSB 2001 could remain and do so 
without the need to provide proof; particularly dangerous with such invasive measures 
requiring derogation. By adopting this position, Mr Letwin failed to provide necessary 
checks on the executive, undermining his duty and obligation to challenge executive action 
by substantiating his position on the ATCSB 2001 based on ‘trust’.  
Trust without evidence was demonstrated on more than one occasion by the Shadow Home 
Secretary, emphasising the decision to protect public security.  
‘The Home Secretary believes he needs powers to protect us against appalling 
attack on our fellow citizens. I am unwilling on behalf of my party to put my country 
at the risk of the Home Secretary being proved right’.491  
A brief interrogation of the need for the legislation containing non-emergency provisions 
was presented here492 however, challenge to the issue of trust was specifically raised by Mr 
Menzies Campbell.493 This particular interjection moved debate away from the rationale for 
derogation based on evidence or truth and refocused debate on the constitutional principle 
of parliamentary checks and balances responsibilities.494 The caveat to ‘trust’ lay in the 
presupposition of the ‘urgent threat’ - a threat which had still yet to be substantially proven 
against the UK. Nonetheless, irrespective of the threat, checks and balances should have 
been upheld through oversight mechanisms. Without checks and balances a blurring of 
procedure can occur and processes, such as the separation of powers, become 
contaminated resulting in potentially damaging legislation.  
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‘Threat’ became the paramount justification for derogation. With no formula available for 
either house to assess the nature of the threat or emergency, parliament was forced to 
analyse with limited substance. Focusing on the boundaries for derogation, Mark Fisher 
confirmed that derogation was permitted ‘in times of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation’.495 In his opinion, the fact that people were ‘queuing to 
see the new Harry Potter film and carrying out their Christmas shopping’ demonstrated that 
the UK was not currently facing a threat to the ‘life of the nation’ – the prerequisite for 
justifying derogation.496 Adopting a literal meaning to the interpretation of public 
emergency was a notion which the Home Secretary later identified as not performing a 
practical analysis. Although this visual assessment by Mr Fisher was evident, Stephen 
McCabe identified a theoretical threat framework questioning how many attacks like that 
witnessed on the US could the UK sustain before the claim that the nation was being 
threatened was accepted.497 With a lack of substantive evidence other than the events of 
9/11, the search for proof became blurred by ‘national emergency’, threat, and the new 
situation inclusive of the war paradigm explored by Hoffman.498  
Faced with continued problems of the fluidity of ‘security’, the Home Secretary noted the:   
‘Life of the nation was not immediately disrupted by a change in people's 
behaviour, it should not be assumed that people did not believe that there is and 
remains a threat to the life of the nation…I believe that the threat has not 
diminished. I take the same view now as I took the day after 11 September. The 
question that must be answered is whether people think that what we are seeking 
to do under part 4 is justified if a substantial attack took place now. I suggest that 
they would. Taking action to preclude that threat to the life of the nation has to be 
the right thing to do, rather than taking the action after the life of the nation has 
demonstrably been threatened’.499  
The Home Secretary incorporated a number of factors into this extension of power, namely, 
his position and assessment as Home Secretary, the public opinion and view of the situation 
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currently underway, and the need for pre-emptive action to avoid risk to the nation. To be 
seen responding to public needs was crucial in the political game. The importance of 
political duty made objective assessments of the legislation difficult.500 As such, the 
importance of the second chamber in performing checks, balances and scrutinising 
legislation emerges. This is most notable by their comparatively more structured approach 
to reviewing legislation than observed in the examination of the House of Commons.   
Concerns and expert opinions were also being compiled outside of parliament and 
introduced at various junctures throughout debate, inclusive of the implications that 
derogation could have in future assessments. Interpretations of the impact of moves filtered 
into debate were used to challenge the executive:  
‘Has the Home Secretary read the comments of David Pannick QC, one of the 
country's leading barristers, that the derogation from Article 5 is unlawful because, 
first, the ECtHR is unlikely to accept that we face a public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation and, secondly, even if it did accept that, the Government will 
not be able to establish to the Court's satisfaction that detention without trial is 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation? Can the Home Secretary assure 
us that David Pannick is wrong in his interpretation of the law’.501   
The identification of two potential problems demanded proof of a ‘national emergency’ to 
be demonstrated. As with all other concerns raised, the response from the executive 
remained that following consultations with international lawyers and discussions with the 
AG, the threat remained, therefore, validating the clauses within the ATCSB 2001. Hence, in 
the opinion of the Home Secretary, Mr Pannick’s assessment was not relevant to the 
situation faced by the executive.502 Again, the Home Secretary had failed to answer the 
question laid before him in explicit terms implying and relying on the events of 9/11 to 
‘prove’ that a state of emergency existed and, further, apparently asking parliament to 
consider how the UK could possibly ‘not’ be in a state of emergency following such events.  
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Following the general (and notably sporadic) debate over necessity for derogation which 
remained unsubstantiated, two clear challenges emerged regarding derogation by the UK. 
Firstly, the presentation of alternatives to derogation and secondly, the challenge as to why 
the UK was the only country pursuing derogation. 
Alternatives to derogation were presented by both major opposition parties. Presenting an 
alternative which would avoid derogation altogether and bring the UK in line with moves 
made by France, George Osborne suggested that:   
‘We have already gone through the steps of derogating from Article 5 of the ECHR, 
and I have yet to hear a convincing explanation from a Minister of why we cannot 
go through the process suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset 
(Mr. Letwin), which is to withdraw from the European Convention for a split second 
and rejoin with reservations, which are exactly what France has. By doing so, we 
would be dealing with the root cause of all the problems that we have been 
discussing today and on Monday—the conventions that we have signed up to and 
the way in which they are interpreted by lawyers—and we would have no need to 
twist our domestic laws and liberties’.503 
Reservations about the necessity to derogate continued. Simon Hughes noted:  
‘We would be wrong to derogate from the ECHR and from the HRA 1998. Nothing 
that the Home Secretary has said about the issues on which we agree—for 
example, that there remains an international threat, which I accept without 
qualification—persuades me that that takes us into the criteria for qualifying for 
derogation. The two tests have been set out: there has to be a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, and the resultant action has to be action strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. Like David Pannick, whom we all respect 
as an authority, the Liberal Democrats' view is that those tests are not met’.504  
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This position reinforces that derogation would be applied with or without substantial 
evidence to support the necessity of moves.505 
A position was presented earlier by Bob Spink who noted that a better way to deal with the 
problems outlined within Part 4 would be for the Government to use Articles 57 and 58 of 
the ECHR to gain ‘reservation against Article 3, so that those threatening national security 
could be deported to countries such as the USA or India’.506 This alternative was also 
considered by the Shadow Home Secretary. According to Oliver Letwin, this alternative 
would allow the UK to engage in an ‘inelegant manoeuvre to remove ourselves for a 
millisecond and re-enter with a reservation’507 similar to that entertained by the French. 
Avoiding this alternative in favour of derogation, Mr. Letwin suggested that the Home 
Secretary was creating a situation in which he was willing to put at some risk our ‘civil liberty 
precedents and our safety as far as appraisals are concerned simply to avoid that 
inelegance’.508 The Home Secretary’s public refusal to remove the UK from the ECHR 
received support from the Liberal Democrat benches.509 The position reiterated by Mr 
Osborne removed the UK from Article 3 restrictions. With this removal, the return of non-
nationals would no longer be dependent on subjective interpretation and would allow the 
UK to protect her borders as seen fit.510 Although rejected, this position displays that 
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alternatives to derogation were presented to the house yet, rationalisation in favour of 
derogation remained.511 As identified by Lord Goodhart: 
‘the idea that the ECHR is something which we can leave and return to at will, as 
suggested by the noble Lords, Lord Dixon-Smith and Lord Waddington, is 
completely unacceptable and unrealistic. That is especially so if the purpose is to 
allow suspects to be sent back to death or torture. That would be far worse than 
keeping people here in detention’.512  
This response was made in light of the concerns raised by the Lord Dixon-Smith that the 
reason the UK had found herself in this situation, unlike other European nations, was the 
result of the UK’s failure to enter reservations before signing up to the ECHR.513  
This raised the concern as to why the UK would derogate whilst other nations did not 
require such moves. Mr Corbyn asked: 
‘Will the Home Secretary explain why this country, almost alone in Europe, is 
proposing such draconian measures and derogation from human rights conventions 
when other countries believe that their criminal law is sufficient to deal with the 
threat’?514  
The defence of moves immediately turned to the ‘threat’ which the UK faced, heightened by 
the alliance the UK had with the U.S. In response to this threat the Home Secretary 
indicated that: 
‘We need to update our preparedness, our legislation and our actions against 
terrorism—even in a way that has been denounced by other countries, including 
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those to which my hon. Friend refers—and to reflect the nature and the response 
to the threat to the United States and elsewhere’.515  
Threat is underpinned by the apparent risk assessment. ‘Risk’ is a generic indicator for a 
number of reactions and moves, but risk in real terms was not presented anywhere. Due to 
the fact that the Home Secretary believed risk existed as the result of the alliance which the 
UK had with the US, the UK was forced to respond in a different way to other nations 
constrained within the same supra-national framework. As with other justifications by the 
Home Secretary for extension of measures, evidence in support of these request were 
absent.  
Debate on the decision and necessity to derogate from the ECHR transcended a variety of 
considerations to the overall issue. This appeared to be underpinned by members 
unconvinced by the need for clauses 21 and 23 ATCSB 2001. The inability to substantiate 
necessity for these clauses had the effect of undermining the necessity for derogation. A 
lack of clarity in the structure of debate allowed for regurgitation of weak justification to be 
applied to a number of questions raised, most notably the generic use of the ‘threat’ which 
existed. As acknowledged earlier,516 this lack of challenge to dismantle the underlying 
composition of threat substantiated by the notion of ‘trust’ in the Home Secretary allowed 
the executive to craft a position whereby significant challenge would, in the timeframe 
available and the circumstances documented, seem unlikely to occur. Most notably, rights 
and security balance, whether conceptually or physically, did not appear to emerge on this 
specific area of debate.    
As noted earlier, separate debate took place in the House of Commons entitled ‘Human 
Rights’. Although this falls outside of the initial scope of this examination, failure to provide 
a brief review could lead to incorrect assertions made in the final analysis of this thesis. On 
review of this debate it emerged that the focus was on the ‘necessity’ for derogation. 
Although this theme emerged within the debate examined above, it is interesting to note 
how a debate not exclusive on the legislation raises a number of points to address a 
fundamental concern in the legislation reviewed in this chapter. On behalf of the executive, 
Beverley Hughes informed the House of Commons of their interpretation of the ECHR 
                                                          
515
 HC Vol. 376, Col. 916, D. Blunkett. 
516
 Pp. 143 
Page 154 of 323 
 
provisions. Dialogue in this particular debate was limited to a few speakers and, whilst the 
length of debate was brief, the issues raised remain pertinent to the overall aim of 
identifying if a balance was made within parliamentary debate. This debate will now be 
briefly examined. 
4.7 Human Rights discussion. 19th November 2001: 
Beverley Hughes was explicit in indicating that the UK faced a public emergency within the 
meaning of the Convention ruling out a reduction in threat following the events in 
Afghanistan.517 Confirmation of ‘risk’ was challenged by Mr Fisher who expressed that the 
test for national emergency which threatens the ‘life of this country’ had to be far more 
substantial than a simple recognition of ‘risk’.518 Failing to present clear evidence that the 
nation was under sufficient threat to warrant derogation, Ms Hughes indicated that in the 
view of the executive the threat of life to the nation existed, reaffirmed as it was identified 
by the JCHR that there could be specific information which judgements were based on that 
could not be shared.519  
Necessity of derogation based on the powers of detention was considered limited, as 
powers of detention already existed under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. Nonetheless, Ms Hughes 
indicated that the executive;  
‘believe that the powers available already under Article 5(1) to detain somebody, 
pending effecting their removal, would not be sufficient for the periods that may be 
involved when there is no third country to which we can deport that person. That is 
why we propose derogation, so that we do not risk falling foul of Article 5(1) in 
those circumstances’.520  
This particular observation raises concern, not only of ‘risk’ from terrorism, but also the 
‘risk’ of breaching the ECHR. It is unsurprising that, when interpreted in this manner, justice 
has to find a balance which in this instance fell on the necessity of derogation.  
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For Ms Hughes, threat to the nation existed as evidenced by attacks on the USA. This 
satisfied the second test for derogation under Article 15 ECHR, qualifying that the response 
(detention) was necessary and proportionate. Ms Hughes claimed these to be so because;  
‘We must do something to protect the public against individuals who contribute to 
the terrorist threat. If it is not possible to present sufficient admissible evidence to 
bring a successful criminal charge, and if legal or practical considerations prevent 
removal from the UK, another option needs to be found’.521  
It was also confirmed that the move was proportionate based on the small group of 
individuals the powers would be used on and where prosecution was an option it would be 
pursued.  
Safeguards to measures contained within the ATCSB 2001 were presented by the executive. 
One safeguard was the opportunity for detainees to leave the UK at any point. Unlike 
previous discussions, challenges were explicitly made on the prospect of terror suspects 
roaming free.522 The safeguard of judicial scrutiny was also presented via the SIAC 
supplements by the obligations of the sunset clause allowing for review of powers with a 
five year expiry order.523 
One discussion which ran throughout debate524 was on extension of powers beyond those 
of other European nations, in this instance the need to derogate. Ms Hughes noted:  
‘Different sets of legislation in other European countries mean that the contexts are 
different. Each country must evaluate the risk that it perceives and make a 
judgment about the measures that are necessary, which is what we are doing 
here’.525  
As established in Chapter Two there are various connotations to the influence of risk, 
including proximity of threat, type of threat, awareness of the uncertain and indiscriminate 
threat and the perceived risk inclusive of its international dimension and the 
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acknowledgement of quantifiable risk.526 Whatever position is ascertained from this array of 
influences, proof and justification for decisions must be identified. As noted by Suskind, ‘if 
we wait for threats to fully materialise, we will have waited too long’.527 
The request for proof continued to dominate concerns. James Paice identified that there 
were materials and evidence not accessible to the House upon which decisions had been 
made by the executive. Whilst supporting the need to prosecute where possible, the 
question still remained how to respond in situations where ‘evidence’ was unavailable. 
Identifying the existence of a balance, Mr Paice noted:  
‘We accept that there are cases in which the evidence is strong but may not be 
strong enough for a conviction or in which no offence under current British law has 
been committed. The question therefore is how we deal with such cases. Can any 
responsible politician say that, despite strong evidence, the liberty of an individual 
is more important than the security of the vast majority of the people? That is the 
invidious balance that we have to strike, but it is one that a Home Secretary in any 
Government always has to strike in a number of ways’.528 
As previously mentioned, the influence of case law penetrated debate. Focusing on the 
judgements in Soering and Chahal, Mr Paice noted:  
‘Judges have interpreted Article 3 in a way that was not intended. We agree. In 
fact, the Home Secretary has for months been making speeches and writing articles 
bemoaning the power of judges, rather than Parliament, to make law. Although I 
do not in any way accept all his strictures, we will nevertheless offer him the 
opportunity to reassert the will of Parliament over the judges' interpretation of 
Article 3’.529  
The restrictions on deportation and extradition rules were further pushing the UK to act in a 
cataclysmic way. As Mr Gummer noted; 
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‘We now have a ludicrous situation in which we are busy trying to kill bin Laden 
directly, but if he were to arrive in this country we would not be able to send him to 
the US in case he was killed after the due process of law’.530  
This does not justify moves, nor identify risk or establish threat but, when assessing 
proportionality of moves, this influence may strike a legitimate chord in the balance.  
There is a clear indication that this debate addressed rights and security.  
‘The Government are using their muscle today to force the House to extinguish for 
certain people a fundamental liberty. The House should have been enabled to do 
everything it could to satisfy itself that the measure is necessary for the prevention 
of greater evil. Although the penalties are to be applied to foreign nationals, we 
owe them the same duty to scrutinise and question the measure as we owe our 
own citizens and constituents’.531 
Norman Baker drew a number of the issues identified already through the debate and 
consolidated them into one dissenting argument against the moves. Mr Baker condemned 
the impact these moves would have on the rights and lives of individuals indefinitely 
detained, even if only a handful. He raised concerns about the lack of proof of an emergency 
protected by the façade of secret evidence summating that ‘We may be at risk from 
terrorists, but the civil liberties of this country are more at risk from the Home Secretary’.532 
Conclusion: 
As noted by Walker,533 the 2001 legislation can be explained by three motives. The first was 
the growing awareness that the threat of terrorism was changing. This position was clearly 
evidenced by the claims of the Executive following the events of 9/11. Secondly was the 
awareness of the external threat. This awareness led to the apprehension that al Qaeda 
related activities had been occurring within the UK for a number of years, although this was 
considered to be an infiltration from non-nationals. The third motivation identified by 
Walker was a more generalised concern to increase security and to reassure the public. The 
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‘need to be seen’ to be acting was documented by a number of MPs within the debate; it 
also, as Walker noted, represented a ‘fundamental switch away from reactive policing of 
incidents to proactive policing and management of risk’.534 
Each of these influences identified by Walker fed into the wider picture of the ATCSB 2001 
which consequently fostered the need for derogation to be entered in to. A number of 
issues were raised by the need for derogation. Some concerns received limited disclosure 
for their incorporation in the Bill. Whilst concerns were raised, lack of measurable 
justification remained evident. As noted:   
‘At time and debate of derogation the House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee found that "there remains no intelligence of any specific threat to the 
UK at present", but it accepted that there is a continuing threat’.535 
Threat assessments by the UK were made in line with the U.S. The questions raised in 
debate focused not on the existence of threat or risk but on proof of its substantive nature 
to warrant moves:  
‘Members on both sides of the House agree that we are under threat from 
terrorism—the whole world is under threat from terrorism, this country perhaps 
more than most others apart from the United States. We were under threat from 
terrorism before 11 September, and that threat may have increased since, but that 
is not the test for derogation. Mr Pannick and others who support him say that the 
test is not whether we are under threat from terrorism, but whether the threat is 
so severe that it threatens the life of the nation. Nothing the Home Secretary has 
said on Second Reading, in Committee or tonight takes that necessary step to 
extend the threat of terrorism, which obviously exists, to a threat that threatens 
the life of this nation’.536  
In an attempt to provide some depth for the executive position, the Home Secretary 
provided a crude assessment of the impact which the events of 9/11 had, not only on the 
US, but also the world. The context of a ‘national emergency’ was framed, not in the act of 
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terrorism alone, but in the repercussions it perpetuated. The Home Secretary also 
documented that he could not guarantee whether an attack would happen, nor could he 
guarantee that one would not, placing the onus of balance back into the hands of 
parliament.537  
In discussion on the protection of rights the JCHR were more rigorous, structured and 
substantive in analysis than either Houses of Parliament.538 However, as the JCHR pointed 
out, the House of Commons received only 16 hours to deal with 126 clauses and eight 
schedules, which may have hampered the ability to examine debate.539 The JCHR had 
recognised in its conclusions that the Government had made a sincere effort to safeguard 
rights while addressing the threat’.540 Nonetheless, ‘sincere effort’ demonstrated by the 
executive failed to prevent continued concern by MPs and academics regarding the impact 
Part 4 may have on rights; the result of the remaining lack in clarity to demonstrate that the 
derogation was strictly necessary to meet the exigencies of the situation. As noted earlier541 
this appeared to be underpinned by members unconvinced by the need for clause 21, 23 
and their associated provisions. The inability to substantiate necessity for these clauses had 
the effect of undermining the necessity for derogation compounded further by the lack of 
proof. As Lord Lester of Herne Hill identified:  
‘The JCHR said in both its reports that it was not persuaded that the conditions for 
derogation had been sufficiently explained to parliament’.542  
This inability to prove moves were ‘necessary’ remained a constant feature throughout 
examination. 
In justifying the executives’ decision to create Part 4 with the consequence of derogation, it 
was identified that a government had ‘no greater obligation than to defend the nation state 
against armed aggression’.543 Whilst interpretation might be digested by members of 
parliament morally or theoretically, this obligation must still be necessary and proportional 
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to the threat from the armed aggression of which Lord Marlesford spoke. This is where this 
thesis aims to address the balance between rights and security and examine emergent 
themes used to warrant, justify, support or reject positions based on intelligent and rigorous 
review. Such rigorous review, however, appeared to be insufficient comparative to the 
infringements and compromises placed on rights. This is not to say that the outcome of 
decisions would have been any different had greater assessment of evidence, legality and 
expert advice been given, but this exploratory investigation suggests that the evident lack of 
rigour and assessment undermined the true balance necessary to justify infringements on 
rights instigated as the result of the ATCSA 2001.  
Whilst other measures may have been presented, the executive:  
‘Believed that they had struck the right balance between individual liberties and 
the necessary protection of the people of and in this country, and a proportionate 
and appropriate response’.544  
However, even this need to protect the state against threat still required balance and 
legitimacy. Lord McNally expressed to the House that: 
‘no one on these Benches underestimates the threat to our society posed by 
international terrorism…The Minister rightly reminded us of the events of 11th 
September and of the new rule book which terrorists wrote on that day… Given 
what the American security services call “a clear and present danger”, it would be 
totally irresponsible for the Government not to tighten our defences. They have our 
full support in so doing. But they need proportionality’.545  
This reaffirmed that the moves were not considered inappropriate providing they could be 
justified and were proportionate. It may be argued that this was an underlying issue with 
concern not for moves but the unjustified extension of power.  
Debate on security and rights appeared throughout discussion. Balance, compromise and 
proportionality all rely on individual interpretation of the evidence. The greater the 
evidence to support a position, the more democratic and legitimate the concept becomes, 
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fitting within the liberal constitutional framework as identified by Barry.546 However, as has 
been seen in this examination, evidence from both sides of debate was weak, limited and 
often repetitive.  
More obvious in the House of Lords than from the analysis on the House of Commons, is the 
requirement for the executives to ‘prove’ the need for the moves.  Lord Hylton notes:  
‘I believe that the burden is on the Government to justify the acts miscellaneous 
contents. The first question that comes to my mind is whether a genuine public 
emergency, threatening the life of the nation, actually exists here now. I simply say 
that qualified opinions differ very much on that subject’.547  
This point of proving that moves were necessary was a factor advocated throughout the 
gestation of this analysis. It was later presented that parliament existed ‘not to trust but to 
scrutinise’, however, in the event of an urgent threat, responsibility to the people would be 
paramount.548  
Two tests were set out: there had to be a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, and the resultant action had to be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 
As Simon Hughes noted ‘like David Pannick, whom we all respect as an authority, the Liberal 
Democrats' view is that those tests are not met’.549 Nonetheless, derogation remained part 
of the ATCSA 2001 receiving Royal Assent with the inclusion of the sunset clause.  
In proving the UK was facing a public emergency the claim of the existence of an Article 15 
ECHR emergency was not based on the actual existence of a ‘public emergency’, but rather 
the imminent threats from international terrorism. As the ‘public emergency’ was being 
claimed in relation to a threat, the UK bore a heavy burden to establish that it was facing 
the risk of an immediate execution of this threat. Yet, Home Secretary David Blunkett and 
several other government officials stated repeatedly on a number of occasions that there 
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was ‘no immediate intelligence pointing to a specific threat to the UK’.550 If the threat was 
neither immediate nor specific, then how could there be a ‘public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation’?551 
In demonstrating the proportionality of the measures found in ATCSB 2001 to satisfy that 
they were strictly required, the principle of proportionality required the government to 
demonstrate that the measures impaired the right at issue, in this case, the right to liberty 
and security, as little as reasonably possible in order to achieve the legislative objective. 
Proportionality may also be challenged based on the claim that, rather than the actual 
existence of a public emergency, in fact the alleged imminent threat required the 
government to prove the continuing operational effectiveness of the terrorist 
organisation.552 
The legal validity of the decision to derogate remained problematic. As established, there 
was limited evidence to suggest that the UK faced a ‘public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation’ within the meaning of Article 15(1) ECHR. As discussed earlier,553 justification 
for moves was calculated on the notion of imminent threat; a calculation however that 
remained unsubstantiated by evidence. This, in turn, undermined the claims that the UK 
faced a public emergency. The introduction of detention without trial as a result of the 
public emergency claim may have been considered as undermining long held principles 
upon which the UK had previously prided herself. This was further complicated by the 
potential for incompatibility with the ECHR Article 14 discrimination as only non-nationals 
were subjected to detention without trial; an issue which manifested itself later in the case 
of Re A.554 
Outside of the debate on derogation two influences may be considered to have 
degenerated debate on Part 4 and the subsequent needs for derogation. First of these was 
the consideration that changes made to the Bill prior to the first reading may have 
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accounted for the limited parliamentary challenge to rights infringements. The changes 
made came with the backdrop of recommendations from the JCHR report. The second 
influence considered substantial in the limited review of rights and security to emerge from 
within this case study was the speed of the ATCSB 2001 through the Houses of Parliament. 
These two influences may not necessarily be independent of one another. Having made 
amendments based on the recommendations of the JCHR, the speed of the Bill may have 
led to a prioritisation to consider other issues which may not have been accounted for by 
the JCHR report. The timescale may have prevented scrutiny of the legislation and in 
particular the recommendations which had not been addressed by the Executive prior to 
the Bill’s arrival in the Houses of Parliament. Specific to the issue of derogation Simon 
Hughes expressed: 
‘We will consider a motion, which has an hour and a half for debate, on whether to 
support and agree to this country's derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR’.555 
With such a limit on discussion, it is unsurprising that this examination has failed to 
extrapolate significant data from the case study.   
This case study demonstrates challenges to complex legal interpretations, justifications and 
implementations but fails to evidence any explicit balance between the impact of rights and 
security compromised by the introduction of the measures. Further than this, challenges 
that were made appear not to be qualified within a rights or security framework, either 
theoretically or legally. The challenge within this particular case study appeared limp. This 
particular case study underpins the notion of De Londras556 that parliament is perhaps not 
the best mechanism to adjudicate on issues of human rights.   
A brief review of the case of A v Secretary of State (Re A)557 will be undertaken. The decision 
in this case triggered the PTB 2005 following its declaration of incompatibility of Part 4 
section 23 of the ATCSA 2001 rendering derogation unnecessary. The case is explored in 
some depth to examine the procedure applied by the court in arriving at their decision. This 
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will identify if the concerns raised by the courts were acknowledged within parliamentary 
debate.558 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
558
 This will only be possible to assess based on the case study. It is accepted that a number of wider issues will 
be raised which cannot be addressed in this thesis.  
Page 165 of 323 
 
Prelude to Chapter Five: 
A v Secretary of State [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68: 
Case law provides us with an opportunity to see legislation working in practice. It is here 
that we turn to the discussion in A v Secretary of State (Re A).559 Following this decision a 
clear position on the balance between rights and security has been laid down by the Courts. 
The purpose of this examination is to identify firstly how the Lords arrived at the decision it 
made in Re A560 and secondly to review the current position of the separation of powers on 
the issue of security and rights through case law. This will then lead us to the debate on the 
PTA 2005 which emerged as a result of this judgement.  
The ATCSA 2001, included a sunset clause for ss 21–23. Although the introduction of Part 4 
of the Act was the centre of considerable focus at the time of its introduction, its first 
renewal passed without the need for any vote in the House of Commons.561 
Re A562 provides a vivid demonstration of how if draft legislation fails to be scrutinised 
effectively, that the relationship between the executive, parliament and the judiciary can 
become strained. Ultimately the case of Re A 563 defines where the balance between rights 
(the individual) and security (the state) lay in the eyes of the law. The decision in the case 
was a majority of 8:1 declaring Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 incompatible with the ECHR. Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill provided the majority judgment with Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe 
providing the dissenting judgment in favour of the Governments access to specialist 
knowledge. 
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Re A: 
The Appeal: 
On arrival at the House of Lords the appellants were challenging a decision made by the 
Court of Appeal on 25th October 2002.564 The Court of Appeal allowed the Home Secretary’s 
appeal against the decision of the SIAC dated July 30th (2002) and dismissed the appellants 
cross-appeals against that decision. There were a number of common characteristics central 
to the appellants appeal. Firstly was that all of the appellants in question were foreign 
nationals; none of them had been the subject of a criminal charge nor any prospect of 
criminal charge existed; all were challenging the lawfulness of their detention and argued 
that the statutory provisions under which they had been detained were incompatible with 
the ECHR. 
The main argument contended by all the appellants was that;  
‘such detention was inconsistent with obligations binding on the United Kingdom 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, given domestic effect by the 
Human Rights Act 1998; that the United Kingdom was not legally entitled to 
derogate from those obligations; that, if it was, its derogation was nonetheless 
inconsistent with the European Convention and so ineffectual to justify the 
detention; and that the statutory provisions under which they have been detained 
are incompatible with the Convention’.565 
Background to the Case: 
Terrorism legislation had witnessed changes under the TA 2000 which was intended to 
overhaul, modernise and strengthen the law relating to the growing problem of terrorism. 
Following the attacks of 9/11, the Government reacted in two ways directly ‘relevant to the 
appeals’.566 First there was the enactment of the ATCSA 2001 including Part 4; and secondly, 
the Government introduced the HRA 1998 (designated derogation) order 2001. The 
Secretary of State identified that first it was provided by para 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the 
Immigration Act 1971 that the Secretary of State might detain a non-British national 
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pending the making of a deportation order again him. Para 2(3) of the same schedule 
authorised the Secretary of State to detain a person against whom a deportation order had 
been made ‘pending his removal or departure from the UK’. In Ex parte Hardial Singh,567 it 
was held that such detention was permissible only for such time as was reasonably 
necessary from the process of deportation to be carried out.  
Ultimately under the Immigration Act 1971, there was no warrant for the long-term or 
indefinite detention of a non-national whom the Home Secretary wished to remove. 
Decisions made were consistent with obligations undertaken by the UK under the ECHR. 
Among these is Article 5(1) which guaranteed the fundamental human right of personal 
freedom.568 This right of personal freedom however is not absolute and as such derogation 
under article 5(1)(f) is available although detention must only last during the deportation 
process and is not a warrant for ‘long-term or indefinite detention’.569  
Relying on the case of Chahal v. UK,570 reference was made to Article 3 which identified that 
‘no one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, as 
such where detention proceedings were precluded by Article 3, Article 5(1)(f) would not 
sanction detention because the non-national would not be ‘a person whom action is being 
taken with a view to deportation’.571 
Majority Judgement: 
Derogation Article 5(1): 
The UK is able to derogate from a number of articles within the ECHR. The governing 
provision for this is found in Article 15 of the ECHR ‘derogation in times of emergency’. The 
UK enacted this power to derogate from Article 5(1)(f) of the Convention in the 2001 Act. 
The House of Lords in Re A examined this point in depth referring to a number of tests 
applied in cases including Lawless v. Ireland,572 the Greek Case,573 Ireland v. UK,574 Brannigan 
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and McBride v. UK,575 Aksoy v. Turkey576 and Marshall v. UK.577  There are a variety of 
understandings adopted by Member States when examining what constitutes an ‘imminent 
threat’ or a ‘public emergency’. The Greek case,578 remains an example of failure by a 
Member State to demonstrate ‘public emergency’ to the extent to warrant derogation from 
the ECHR whereas in Ireland v UK Article 15 had been satisfied on grounds of ‘a particularly 
far reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the UK’.579 This reiterated the 
complexities in identifying full proof arguments when applying for a derogation order from 
the ECHR – something which appears not to have been achieved fully in the eyes of the 
Lords when judging Re A.580 
Lord Bingham reiterated the argument presented by the appellants in Re A 581 stating there 
was no public emergency on three accounts: if the emergency was not actual, it must be 
shown to be imminent, which could not be shown here;582 the emergency must be of a 
temporary nature, which again could not be shown here; and the practice of other states, 
none of which had derogated from the ECHR, strongly suggested that there was no public 
emergency calling for derogation.583 Neither imminence nor temporariness are expressed in 
Article 15 of the ECHR or Article 4 of the ICCPR, but have been treated by the ECtHR as a 
necessary condition of a valid derogation as well as from the Parliamentary JCHR who in its 
eighteenth report observed that ‘derogations from human rights obligations are permitted 
in order to deal with emergencies. They are intended to be temporary’. With the position of 
other nations movement resolution 1271 adopted on 24th Jan 2002 by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Council of Europe resolved that ‘in their fight against terrorism, Council of 
Europe members should not provide for any derogations to the ECHR’, calling on members 
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to refrain from using Article 15 of the ECHR.584 Ultimately the JCHR, the Parliamentary 
assembly for the Council of Europe and the UN Human Rights Committee all expressed 
limits and reservations on the use by States of Article 15. 
The Attorney General representing the Home Secretary responded to these points.585 He 
submitted that an emergency could be properly regarded as imminent if an atrocity was 
credibly threatened by a body such as Al Qaeda which had demonstrated its capacity and 
will to carry out such a threat, where the atrocity might be committed without warning at 
any time. The government is responsible for the safety of the British people and need not 
wait for a disaster to strike before taking necessary steps to prevent it striking. The Attorney 
General also resisted the imposition of any artificial temporal limit to any emergency of the 
present kind. Finally the Attorney General argued that there was little point looking at other 
states as it was for each national government, as the guardian of its own peoples’ safety to 
make its own judgment on the facts. The difference between the practice of the UK and 
other Council of Europe members’ could be found in this countries role as a prominent 
enemy of Al Qaeda. The House of Lords rejected these positions and declared the 
derogation was indeed unlawful in favour of the appellants.  
Proportionality: 
Proportionality will always be considered when looking for the balance between opposing 
elements. Article 15 requires that any measures taken by a member state in derogation of 
its obligations should not go beyond what is ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation’. Proportionality issues in this case were raised over Part 4 ss 21-23 of the ATCSA 
2001 as well as into the consideration of ‘threat’ which a nation faces. The appellants relied 
on the findings in De Freitas v. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries, 
lands and Housing,586 in determining whether a limitation is arbitrary or excessive. In this 
case the court found that it must be questioned when considering limitation whether; 
- the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental 
right 
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- the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to 
it 
- the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective. 
The appellants submitted that ‘even if it were accepted that the legislative objective of 
protecting the British people against the risk of Al Qaeda was sufficiently important to 
justify limiting the fundamental right to personal freedom of those facing no criminal 
accusation, the ATCSA 2001  was not designed to meet that objective and was not rationally 
connected to it. Lord Bingham of Cornhill summed up the proportionality issue in seven 
points;587  
I. Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 reversed the effects of Singh and Chahal (1996) 
II. The public emergency that the UK relied on for derogation was from the security of 
the UK presented by Al Qaeda terrorists and supporters 
III. While threat did come from foreign nationals, the threat to the UK did not derive 
solely from non-nationals 
IV. Sections 21-23 did not address (rationally) the threat to UK by Al Qaeda because (a) 
it did not address the problem by UK nationals; (b) it permitted foreign nationals to 
pursue activities abroad; and (c) sections 21-23 therefore permitted the detention 
and certification of persons who were not suspected of presenting any threat 
V. If the threat presented to the security of the UK by UK nationals suspected of being 
terrorists could be addressed without infringing their right to liberty, it is not shown 
why similar measures could not adequately address the threat presented by foreign 
nationals 588  
VI. Since the right to personal liberty is among the most fundamental of rights protected 
by the ECHR, any restriction must be closely scrutinised by the national court   
VII. In light of scrutiny ss21-23 cannot be justified 
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A number of these points will be examined briefly here.  
On the issue raised in point (III) the House of Lords referred to the Newton Committee589 
drawing attention to paragraph 193 which identified that what was important was the 
nature of the threat, not the ideology behind it or the nationality of the perpetrator. The 
Home Office has argued that the threat from al Qaeda-related terrorism is predominantly 
from foreigners, but there is accumulating evidence that this. Following the Home Office 
claims that the threat from Al Qaeda was predominantly from non-nationals the Newton 
Committee found that there was evidence to suggest that this is no longer the case; with 
30% of TA 2000 suspects in 2001 being British.590 Whilst this indicates that the threat was 
not purely from non-nationals, the statistic presented by the Newton committee 
consequently confirmed that 70% of the total terror suspects arrested under the TA 2000 
were non-nationals. The opposite to discrediting measures by the executive, with nearly 
three quarters of terror suspects arrested being non-nationals this may in fact enhance the 
executives decision to implement strict preventative measures on non-nationals.591 
In point IV it was argued that the threat was not being addressed as moves made by ss 21-
23 did not apply for certification and detention of nationals. Whilst the threat from UK 
nationals, was quantitatively smaller, it was not qualitatively different from that of foreign 
nationals.  
The final point for discussion is point VI. The right to personal liberty has a long tradition in 
English law dating back to the Magna Carta. In its treatment of Article 5, the House of Lords 
found that the ECtHR had also recognised the prime importance of personal freedom in Kurt 
v Turkey592 paragraph 22 indicating the need to interpret narrowly any exception to a ‘most 
basic guarantee of individual freedom’. The AG challenged this submitting that it was for 
parliament and the executive to assess the threat facing the nation, so it was for those 
bodies and not the Courts to judge the response necessary to protect the security of the 
public. These were matters of a political character calling for an exercise of political and not 
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judicial judgment. The House of Lords however followed the ECtHR in Fette v France,593 
maintaining that whilst any decision made by a representative democratic body must 
command respect, the degree of respect will be conditioned by the nature of the 
decision.594 One may argue that this comparison is not reflective because of the 
constitutional difference highlighted earlier595 between France and the UK with Article 3 
ECHR. The Convention regime for the international protection of human rights requires 
national authorities, including national courts to exercise their authority to afford effective 
protection.596  
Discrimination: 
The discussion on discrimination in this case was initially raised within the assessment of 
proportionality. Particular focus for this was on section 23 of the ATCSA 2001. The 
appellants argued that by being discriminatory, the section could not be ‘strictly required’ 
within the meaning of Article 15, and therefore was disproportionate. Discrimination was 
the main thread of the judgment in this case. The argument that Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 
was discriminatory was presented plainly and simply – treatment should not be different for 
suspected terrorists no matter what their country of origin may be. Lord Bingham of Cornhill 
posed the question whether persons in a relatively similar situation enjoy preferential 
treatment, without reasonable or objective justification for the distinction, and whether, 
and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment in 
the law.597  
In this case the appellants were treated differently from both suspected terrorists who were 
UK-nationals and who could not be removed and international terrorists who were not UK 
nationals but could be removed. Lord Bingham of Cornhill held there could be no doubt but 
that the difference of treatment was on the grounds of nationality or immigration status.598 
The Attorney General argued that a difference of treatment of the two groups was 
accordingly justified because there were non-nationals who could not be removed. The 
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Attorney General relied also on the old-established rule that a sovereign State may control 
the entry of aliens into its territory and their expulsion from it.599 He submitted that the 
Convention permits the differential treatment of aliens as compared with nationals. Even 
though in its resolution 1271 the Parliamentary assembly of Council of Europe recognised 
the obligation to take effective measures against terrorism, the restrictions on rights must 
be necessary and proportionate. In December 1985 the General Assembly of the UN 
recognised that States might establish differences between nationals and aliens but 
required that laws and regulations should not be incompatible with the interpretational 
legal obligations of the State. The biggest requirement was for enactments to meet any 
international obligations.  
Finally the AG submitted that international law sanctioned the detention of aliens in time of 
war or public emergency, drawing attention to a number of instruments including (a) The 
Geneva Convention to the protection of Civilian persons in time of war (1949), (b) The 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees – Article 9, (c) The Convention on the 
Status of Stateless Persons (1954), (d) The ICCPR Article 4, (e) The UN Declaration on the 
Human Rights of individuals who are not nationals of the country in which they live (1985), 
(f) EC treaty, (g) The ECHR Article 16, (h) reference made to United States authorities. The 
majority in this case believed that these materials were not enough to support the Home 
Secretaries advances, and a declaration of incompatibility was presented in respect of 
section 23 of the ATCSA 2001.  
Other Judgments: 
A number of Lords continued to add to the foundations presented by Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead reasserted that the governments’ principle weakness 
lay in the different treatment accorded to nationals and non-nationals. Consequently, non-
nationals may comprise the predominant and more immediate source of threat to national 
security, but they are not the only source.600 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead furthered that the 
right to individual liberty is one of the most fundamental freedoms, and detention without 
trial negates this. A controversial point was identified in paragraph 84 of the judgment when 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead expresses that the Government may have regarded the rights of 
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non-nationals in this field as less weighty than the corresponding rights of nationals. Whilst 
this is only conjecture, the inclusion of this in Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead judgement leaves 
a key implication off of this claim unanswered; namely, if this were the case (that the rights 
of non-nationals a less weighty), then it should not be acceptable?  
Lord Hoffman601 reasserted the position of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead of the ‘ancient 
values’ of liberty and analysed the State’s ability to derogate under Article 15 of the ECHR. 
His ultimate assertion came in paragraph 90 where he identified that until the HRA 1998 the 
introduction of powers of detention could not have been the subject of judicial decision; 
essentially there could be no basis for questioning an Act of Parliament by Court 
proceedings. This reiterated the impact that the introduction of the HRA had on the balance 
between the courts and the executive. It highlighted that the HRA had bridged the gap 
between the ECHR and domestic legislation providing the Courts with greater opportunity to 
martial law with wider international implications, a point reiterated earlier in the case of 
Rehman(2001).602   
The only dissenting argument in this case came from Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe. For Lord 
Walker of Gestingthorpe the moves were reasonable and used responsibly. In the context of 
national security the number of persons detained is relevant and proportional.603 Lord 
Walker of Gestingthorpe identified that the court should show a high degree of respect to 
the Secretary of States’ appreciation based on secret intelligence sources of the security 
risks.604 Ultimately the court must allow for the fact that it may be impossible for the 
intelligence services to identify the target or predict the scale of the attack. Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe also relied on judgments made by some of the Lords in previous cases such 
as that made by Lord Hoffman in 2003. In his speech in the case of Rehman,605 Lord 
Hoffman simply noted ‘if there is a danger of torture, the Government must find some other 
way of dealing with the threat to national security’. Ultimately this is what Part 4 of the 
ATCSA 2001 aimed to resolve. Issues over public emergency were identified by Lord Walker 
of Gestingthorpe in that a danger of terrorist action may be imminent even though there is 
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uncertainty as to when, where and how terrorists attack.606 On the grounds of 
discrimination the difference for nationals and non-nationals has been described as 
technical. Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe diverted from this, arguing that it is by no means a 
technical concept but a fundamental difference in persons; British citizens have a right of 
abode; they cannot be deported. For Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe non-nationals had the 
option to leave, whilst detention without trial of a non-national terrorist suspect was a 
cause for grave concern; the judgment of parliament and the Secretary of State was that 
measures were necessary and the 2001 Act contains several important safeguards against 
oppression.607 
Case summation: 
The case of Re A 608 went in favour of the appellants and a declaration under section 4 of the 
HRA 1998 was made that section 23 of the ATCSA 2001 was incompatible with articles 5 and 
14 of the ECHR.609 This case was a landmark decision in the debate of security and rights. 
Even though there was clear dissent displayed in both Houses of Parliament throughout 
debate on the ATCSA, this did not prevent it becoming law, nor were the controversial 
aspects amended. As witnessed in previous chapters, the balance and discussion on these 
areas was extremely limited. The proposals under Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 evaded 
principals of judicial review and overlooked the potential compatibility and verification 
process that the SIAC could have on proceedings.610 The fact that these issues were only 
acknowledged and not addressed demonstrates why processes such as the separation of 
powers are vital for checks and balances. The courts should not be seen therefore as 
competing against the functions of the Executive but providing a tier of challenge to prevent 
the executive acting ultra vires. Re A611 demonstrates how the judiciary have been prepared 
to challenge long held assumptions that the executive have prerogative in identifying 
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overriding factors.612 The perceived nature of Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001 towards non-
nationals left the judiciary with no option but to clearly indicate to the Government that 
Part 4 was incompatible.613 Arguably the judiciary is not susceptible to the same day-to-day 
pressures that politicians are and as such maybe more inclined to make decisions based on 
fact as the legal experts. Politicians are more inclined to look to the immediate effect of 
their actions on public opinion and on the likelihood or their getting re-elected.614 Because 
judges do not have this pressure, there is room for them to be brutal in the application of 
law and, where given weight by the HRA, also therefore the ECHR in domestic case law. 
Whilst the judiciary stated that the legislation was in violation of the Convention, the 
judgments identified a split in the reasoning as to why the legislation was wrong. This shows 
that the judiciary can be divided on issues, provide different reasoning, and yet still 
conclude the same decision, suggesting that at best there were more than one inconstancy 
with the ATCSA 2001.615  
Having now reviewed the issues associated with the need for derogation and the case law 
which demanded a change in the ATCSA 2001 focus will now turn to look at the PTA 2005. 
This examination will follow a similar format to that presented in chapter four.  
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Chapter Five:  
The PTA 2005 – Control Orders: 
22nd February 2005 – PTB introduced to Commons floor 
23rd February 2005 – Second reading of the PTB 
28th February 2005 – Committee and remaining stages of PTB 
09/10thth March 2005 – Consideration of Lords’ amendments 
11th March 2005 – PTB receives Royal Assent 
Introduction to Chapter Five: 
The following chapter will review discussion undertaken in the Houses of Parliament and the 
JCHR relevant to the PTB 2005. A brief socio-political background will be discussed providing 
a backdrop to the debate.  
To maintain continuity across all assessments, a brief overview of key discussion points will 
also be presented. The aim of this is to demonstrate some intrinsic issues which stem from 
discussion but do not come to fruition in the case study but play an integral role in 
understanding the decisions arrived at by parliament. To omit such briefing could weaken 
analysis later in discussion. 
Following this analysis, discussion will turn to the case study, reviewing control orders. Two 
themes will be specifically explored in this assessment of control orders. Firstly, the 
necessity for distinction between derogating and non-derogating control orders and 
secondly, a review of the debate undertaken on the powers extended to the Home 
Secretary in relation to control orders. As with the previous chapter it is important to note 
that discussion is thematic and not chronological.616  
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5.1 Background to the PTB 2005: 
The PTB 2005 was introduced in response to the ruling in A and others v Secretary of State 
(Re A).617 Following the detention of 16 non-nationals under Part 4 of the ATCSA 2001, a 
legal challenge was made arguing that detention without trial was unlawful. Part 4 section 
23 of the ATCSA 2001 was subsequently declared incompatible with the ECHR. The 
introduction of the PTB 2005 was to allow the Home Secretary to impose control orders on 
individuals suspected of terrorism. Control orders aimed to satisfy the gap in legislation 
created by the declaration of incompatibility.  
The government continued to base their argument for necessity of control orders on the 
threat to the UK; a reminiscent tone of that presented in the ATCSA 2001. Whilst scepticism 
remained over the credible threat to the UK, especially as this Bill was presented prior to the 
events of 7/7, Bamford suggests that evidence existed of specific and credible threats to the 
UK. Examples of these included: a plot to gas the London Underground in November 2002; 
the ricin plot that was uncovered in January 2003 resulting in the death of Special Branch 
detective Stephen Oake; and the security alert at Heathrow airport in February 2003, due to 
intelligence reports suggesting the possibility of terrorists targeting passenger aircraft with 
shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles.618 Threat to UK interests overseas was also clear. Since 
the introduction of the ATCSA 2001, among the 202 persons killed in the Bali bombing 24 
were British tourists. In November 2003, suicide attacks against the British consulate, as well 
as the London-based HSBC bank in Turkey, were the first successful attacks that specifically 
targeted the UK and her interests abroad, resulting in 30 deaths.619 
Following the introduction of the ATCSA 2001, the UK had also witnessed British citizens 
accused of terrorism overseas. Recent examples included Zacarias Moussaoui ("the 19th 
hijacker"), Richard Reid ("the shoe bomber"),620 Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh (sentenced to 
death in Hyderabad in 2002 for journalist Daniel Pearl's murder), suicide bombings in Tel 
Aviv in April 2003 by Asif Mohammed Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif and the dozen British 
                                                          
617
 [2004] UKHL 56. 
618
 Bamford, B. (2004); The United Kingdom’s ‘War against Terrorism’. Pp. 738.  
619
 Ibid. Pp. 739.  
620
 He has been sentenced to life imprisonment: The Times, January 31, 2003. Pp. 1. 
Page 179 of 323 
 
citizens detained in Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.621 The extent of planned attacks 
and atrocities, combined with evidence supporting increased awareness of British 
involvement in attacks, helped provide a backdrop for the executive to present such 
measures as those presented within the PTB 2005. 
5.2 Key themes to emerge out of PTB debate: 
A brief overview of key areas of concern, aside from control orders, is presented here to 
acknowledge some wider issues associated with the case study in this chapter.622 These are 
provided to support later analysis. As the previous chapter identified, it became apparent 
that, even though the House of Lords adopted a systematic approach in reviewing 
legislation, debate in the House of Commons was less structured. Lack of continuity in 
debate makes this brief overview integral in examining how justifications may have been 
formed. Two discussion points have been acknowledged here as issues which relate to the 
later discussion of control orders whilst assisting the review in light of security and rights.  
Aside from the balance made between security and rights in relation to control orders, the 
establishment of whether a balance existed has been considered for a brief overview at this 
juncture. This was based on the significant influence this was deemed to have on the crux of 
debate. Sunset clauses have been reviewed as it became apparent that, where the balance 
was not right for some, the sunset clause provided a safeguard for securing a review.  
5.2.1: Rights v Security; the establishment of ‘balance’: 
The balance of rights, liberties and security infiltrated the debate separately from that 
raised within control orders. In the debates infancy David  Winnick noted: 
‘The job of the Committee is to try to balance concern for civil liberties against the 
danger of terrorism. If we do not achieve a proper balance, we are not doing our 
job as Members of Parliament’.623 
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As previously established academics such as Lazarus and Goold have questioned whether 
‘balance’ exists, however statements such as this confirm that elected members believe 
they have a duty to balance. A lack of clinical guidelines for the provision of balance fosters 
a purely subjective assessment based on the reviewers’ personal, moral and political 
framework and as such leads to research such as this.   
In ascertaining this balance, it was identified that the role of the public was an influential 
factor and, as with the ATCSA 2001, particularly the need for the executive to be seen to be 
doing something.   
‘We must never forget, as we consider the very important legal and other arguments 
about the balance of security versus the issue of individual liberty, that what the 
British people want us to do is to protect their national security’.624 
Charles Clarke acknowledged the ‘needs’ of the British public inclusive of expectations about 
protection, Sir Patrick Cormack confirmed that it was not only the public who felt a need to 
do something, but political figureheads as well: 
‘I saw, as I am sure almost everyone present will have done, the poll in The Daily 
Telegraph this morning, which showed a large majority of people taking the line, 
which broadly I take, that if it is necessary to sacrifice a little civil liberty for overall 
civil protection, then so be it’.625  
Even though the public had been relied upon as a political tool, the JCHR, in its 10th report, 
reiterated that this was no longer an acceptable justification and, therefore, one which 
should not dictate a decision reached in political assessments. 
Having acknowledged that a requirement for balance existed, and awareness that whether 
legitimately or not, the pressures of the public could and did influence some decisions, a 
briefing was provided that in ‘times of war’ the ‘balancing’ of rights, liberties, and security 
changes. A fundamental part of this balance, therefore, became the influence of the courts.  
‘I have to say that there are a whole string of precedents to demonstrate that, in 
wartime emergencies, the courts have been reluctant to support civil liberties. As I 
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have said, we are now in a twilight position whereby we live in peacetime, but face 
emergencies. That poses a curious and difficult dilemma over the balance of 
judgment between preserving civil liberties and dealing with terrorist activities’.626 
The concept of balance is subjective. There have been discussions on the potential for 
competing interests between the judiciary and the executive, particularly in light of the 
extension of powers provided as a result of the HRA. The influence of the courts was 
particularly prevalent in this debate based on the emergence of control orders resulting 
from the Law Lords decision in Re A.627  
5.2.2 Sunset Clause:  
The sunset clause is acknowledged here because of the role it played in demonstrating that 
both Houses of Parliament were uncomfortable with such extension of powers. This 
position, in line with that demonstrated in the debate on the ATCSA, reiterated that whilst 
an extension of powers would arise, a review of such extension must take place. Reiterating 
both the dilemma of the situation faced and therefore the necessity of the sunset clause, Mr 
Heath noted:  
‘The reason for having such a clause is very clear. The legislation is imperfect and it 
is being rushed through Parliament, yet it needs the proper attention of both 
Houses of Parliament. It has been brought forward in haste, simply because nothing 
was done for three years to correct the deficiencies of previous legislation. We now 
face an unacceptable potential hiatus in our protections against terrorism. That is 
why we need emergency legislation to go through, but equally why such legislation 
should lapse. The sunset clause is therefore crucial’.628  
This position identifies a number of reasons for the sunset clause. Firstly, Mr Heath’s 
reference to the speed undermining the ability of Parliament to give proper evaluation of 
the Bill and, secondly, it highlights the inadequacies of the ATCSA 2001 requiring change. 
The reason why ‘we need emergency legislation’, however, is not clearly identified by Mr 
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Heath. It may well be the result of poor legislation or perhaps the decision made in Re A;629 
however, the unacceptable potential hiatus in our protections against terrorism demanded 
legislation. The requirement of such a clause, however, reiterated the defects within it.  
‘The idea of a sunset clause weighs heavy on my heart because I think that the Bill 
should not be going through the House at all. I ask for a sunset clause only because 
it is a backstop so that we can reconsider such important issues at more leisure’.630  
Views such as these highlight the mixed opinions which existed, demonstrating that a 
balance was explicitly made. For some, the balance was simply the protection of security 
balanced with the loss of rights for a small minority. This statement, however, also 
demonstrated that the balance for some MPs was somewhat more complex, with some 
choosing to rationalise their position based on the ‘best’ situation available under the 
circumstances. 
As noted in the previous chapter, in pressing for a sunset clause the Bill became palatable 
for those who loathed it and, in its current state, functional for those supporting it. This is 
not to say, however, that it was accepted by all.631 Two main practical concerns were raised 
within the debate on the sunset clause; firstly, the realistic implementation of the sunset 
clause and the review undertaken within it,632 and, secondly, the practicalities of managing 
current detainees.633 Neither of these positions carried particular force within the debate 
and will not be considered further here as, although essential to the liberty of those 
detained, it is not integral to the further analysis of the way in which laws were made.   
5.3 JCHR: 
The ninth report of the JCHR was limited in assessment, by its own admission.634 The paper 
identified that its purpose was to provide:  
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‘A first indication for members, of human rights issues arising at the earliest 
opportunity in light of the very limited time available for parliamentary scrutiny of 
the Bill’.635  
Consistent with its concern raised on the ATCSA 2001, emphasis on the speed of the PTB 
2005 and the limited time for scrutiny were identified as weaknesses. Whilst only a 
preliminary report, it was identified early on by the JCHR that limited scrutiny of the 
legislation was a factor to be considered in the interpretation of the Bill. The paper 
identified four clear legal and constitutional positives from the proposed Bill: 
(1) The acceptance of the House of Lords’ judgement 
(2) The decision that, although the scale of the threat is such to amount to a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, at its current level deprivation of 
liberty cannot be strictly required 
(3) The decision to replace an inflexible system of detention without trial of non-
nationals suspected of being international terrorists with measures which are both 
generally applicable to both nationals and non-nationals and capable of being 
individually tailored according to the level of threat posed by the particular 
individual 
(4) The degree of judicial involvement provided for in the Bill in relation to derogating 
control orders goes some of the way to meeting the important concern about the 
lack of judicial involvement in the making of control orders.636 
Even though positives were identified by the committee, a number of concerns remained. 
Four core concerns were raised compounded with a final generic concern entitled 
miscellaneous. Aside from ‘miscellaneous’,637 the concerns raised questioned; 
(1) The necessity for “derogating control orders”638 
(2) The lack of prior judicial involvement in orders depriving of liberty639 
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(3) The use of a special advocate procedure in deprivation of liberty cases640 
(4) The limited judicial control of non-derogating control orders641 
As this particular paper was the preliminary paper it offered limited insight and examination 
into these concerns. Boundaries between these concerns became blurred making isolated 
assessment of each individual concern much harder to perform. The assessment presented 
in the 9th report was less substantive than those carried out on the ATCSA 2001 although a 
brief review of the tenth report from the session of 2004-2005 has marginally enhanced the 
Committee’s findings.  
The tenth Report of Session 2004-2005 was also limited in analysis and content. In the 
introduction it was explicitly stated that:  
‘We regret that the rapid progress of the Bill through Parliament has made it 
impossible for us to scrutinise the Bill comprehensively for human rights 
compatibility in time to inform debate in Parliament’.642  
The tenth review explicitly identified that it would be confined to a consideration of the 
human rights compatibility of the ‘three most significant Government amendments to the 
Bill tabled to the Lords’.643 The review provided a very brief assessment of: 
(1) Adequacy of prior judicial involvement in deprivation of liberty cases644 
(2) Limited judicial control of non-derogating control orders645 
(3) Torture evidence646  
Concerns over the lack of prior judicial involvement in deprivation of liberty cases and the 
need for prior judicial authorisation of such decisions were deemed fundamental to the rule 
of law and, therefore, vital to get right. At the point of review, derogating control orders 
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were to be made by the High Court rather than the Secretary of State but only in the order 
of ex parte. This, however, still proved problematic for the JCHR. Concerns arose that the 
amendments proposed failed to extend to non-derogation orders. The committee further 
noted concern over whether the procedure contained in the government’s amendments 
secured ‘sufficient degree of prior judicial involvement to be compatible with the 
Convention’.647 This concern was based on three limitations. Firstly, that the application by 
the Secretary of State was ex parte and, therefore, meant that there would be, ‘no 
adversarial procedure before the making of a derogation control order’.648 Secondly, the 
Committee noted concern grounded in the low level threshold for the making of a judicial 
order which would deprive the individual of liberty. The Committee felt that the test applied 
would effectively be whether there was a ‘prima facie’ case for the making of an order.649 
Finally, the Committee were concerned that the procedure at the ‘subsequent inter partes 
hearing’ would include closed sessions during which the interests of the subject of the order 
would be represented by a special advocate.650 The Committee remained unconvinced by 
the argument presented by the Home Secretary about a gap in the law and, therefore, 
raised concerns of compatibility with the convention’s requirements that deprivations of 
liberty ‘must be lawful’.651 
Further concerns over limited judicial control of non-derogating control orders were raised 
in both the ninth and tenth report from the JCHR.  It was raised that the ‘court’s function on 
appeal against the making of a non-derogating control order would not be sufficient to 
satisfy the right of access to Court in Article 6’.652 It also implied further convention 
obligations concerning the restrictions to supervisory jurisdiction.653 Even though the 
government presented two defences to the provisions the Committee maintained that, in 
their view:  
‘The unprecedented scope of the powers contained in the Bill, and the potentially 
drastic interference with Convention rights which they (the Government) 
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contemplate, warrant a greater degree of judicial control than access to an ex post 
supervisory jurisdiction’.654  
Aside from this, the Committee also made it explicitly clear that non-derogating control 
orders would be capable of imposing restrictions which fall short of deprivations of liberty 
but which, regardless of this, would still be capable of restriction of liberty and, as such, 
should still be subject to prior judicial authorisation.655  
The final focus for the Committee looked at the use of evidence obtained from torture. The 
Committee raised particular concern over the lack of omission for responsibility for 
identifying whether the evidence had been obtained under torture. With this limited scope 
for ‘proving a negative’, the Committee confirmed that they remained ‘concerned about the 
possible use of torture evidence by UK authorities’, recommending that the government 
‘implement the UNCAT recommendation that it give some formal effect to its expressed 
intention not to rely on or present in any proceedings evidence which it knows or believes 
to have been obtained by torture’.656 This particular concern raised by the JCHR received 
relatively little exposure within parliament.  
It was clear that the emphasis of the Committee’s findings focused on the need for greater 
judicial control. The Committee found the claims that the Home Secretary and the Prime 
Minister were best placed to make decisions on control orders to be unsubstantiated. The 
government grounded its argument for the proposition of lesser judicial control on the basis 
that is wished not to be accused of failing to do more to protect the public in the event of a 
terrorist attack succeeding. It was held that this type of comment demonstrated ‘precisely 
the reason why independent safeguards are required’.657 The Committee further 
emphasised the need to preserve the role of the independent judiciary particularly as it is 
fundamental to both the rule of law and the protection of human rights.658 The remainder 
of this chapter will now look at specific debates aligned with control orders.  
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5.4 The ‘necessity’ of procedural differences in control orders: 
As identified by the JCHR reports, a number of concerns were raised over potential 
incompatibilities within the PTB 2005. Attention focused on the procedural differences in 
derogating and non-derogating orders. From this, two further concerns emerged as focal 
points for debate and review within the Houses of Parliament. They were, firstly, the point 
at which a non-derogating order crossed the threshold and became a derogating order and, 
secondly, the difference in judicial procedure between the orders, with particular concern 
over the involvement of the Home Secretary.  
The final overview looks at the notion of necessity of the PTB 2005. The inclusion of a sunset 
clause established to some extent, a perceived need of the Bill. As with the ATCSA 2001, in 
pressing for a sunset clause, the PTB 2005 became palatable. It met the needs of the Home 
Secretary while allowing parliament to review the legislation as protected by the sunset 
clause. This measure may appear as parliamentary procedure succumbing to the claims of 
the protection of national security; however, it may also be seen as a victory for 
parliamentary procedure providing for a return to examine the legislation at a later date 
whilst, in the meantime, protecting security based on the information provided for debate. 
Nonetheless, the necessity of moves and indeed the proportionality of such moves were 
called into question. As with the previous discussion on the ATCSA 2001, particular 
emphasis was placed on the speed of the Bill through parliament and the scrutiny afforded 
to the Bill in its infancy. As David  Davis noted:  
‘This question, which runs right through the debate, must be asked: what is the 
immediate emergency that demands that draconian powers against British subjects 
should be rushed through the Houses of Parliament without proper consideration, 
scrutiny or debate? What is the emergency that has arisen in the past 12 months 
that demands that we give the Home Secretary the right to fetter the liberty of 
British subjects—from restricting their ability to communicate right up to and 
including house arrest—without proper debate?659  
This position demanded not that the legislation be scrapped, but that there had to be 
significant proof demonstrated to necessitate such extension of powers.   
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As acknowledged earlier, this examination is not exhaustive. The aim of this review is to 
provide an indication of the issues raised by parliament. This will start with a review of the 
executive’s position. 
5.4.1 Executive Position: 
Two types of control order were presented within the PTB 2005; derogation orders 
considered necessary in the event of deprivation of liberty under Article 5 ECHR and non-
derogating orders which would not require derogation, although it was widely accepted that 
these may restrict liberty.  
Throughout debate the executive maintained that they had:  
‘tried to establish a legal framework that balances national security with individual 
liberty, but it is vital that we convey the message that we want to make this 
country the most hostile environment in which terrorists could consider operating. 
That is why we need a series of control orders that are proportionate to the threat 
that we face and non-discriminatory, in compliance with the European 
Convention’.660 
This statement confirmed that the executive were avidly aware that infringement of rights 
could arise, but that such infringements were acceptable, indicating that it was appropriate 
to legislate restricting individual rights if security measures required it.  
The Home Secretary confirmed that all control orders, irrelevant of type, would impose 
greater restrictions of individuals’ activities and movement. Mr Clarke expressed that there 
was no doubt that control orders could interfere with convention rights such as ‘the right to 
respect for private and family life—Article 8—freedom of expression—Article 10—and 
freedom of assembly and association—Article 11’.661 However, these restrictions were not 
of concern in this instance as, under the convention, interference with those rights was 
permissible provided that it was justified by a legitimate aim and was proportionate, a well-
established principle.662 As no deprivation of liberty was invoked, derogation was not 
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required.663 This interpretation was supplemented by Lord Falconer of Thoroton who 
identified that the drafters of the ECHR recognised that the rights of individuals must always 
be held in balance with the rights of others. As such, the rights set out in Articles 8 to 11 of 
the Convention:  
‘may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, for a range of 
purposes, including the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and, in the 
case of Articles 8, 10 and 11, national security’.664  
This reinforced the hierarchy of rights, validating the understanding that some rights must 
give way in times of emergency. This, however, does not avert the vulnerability of rights as a 
result of this interpretation. In legal terms, the particular rights outlined were ‘qualified 
rights’ and, as such, were ‘subject to a test of proportionality to determine their legality’.665 
The question this leaves is what is ‘proportional’ within the framework presented? Should it 
be as explicit as the majority versus the minority or should it simply be infringement of 
rights as recognised? As previously established, no right is absolute, but proportionality is 
also a malleable concept thus requiring clearly identifiable parameters to ascertain 
‘proportional’ assessment. 
Reiterating the distinction between a restriction of liberty and a deprivation of liberty was 
vital. Charles Clarke announced that a deprivation of liberty was ultimately found in ‘the 
extent to which a person's physical liberty is curtailed; it must be of a degree and intensity 
sufficient to justify a conclusion that liberty has been deprived and not merely restricted’.666 
In commenting on the amendments suggested to control orders Hazel Blears expressed: 
‘We have accepted the balance of probabilities for derogating orders because 
deprivation of liberty is a severe sanction. However, we do not accept it for non-
derogating orders because there is a distinction between restrictions on liberty and 
deprivation of liberty’.667  
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This distinction was the crux of the executive’s defence. Lord Falconer of Thoroton 
identified that, ‘no combination of restrictions contained in an order made under clause 1 
may breach the Article 5 threshold of a deprivation of liberty. If it were to do so, the order 
containing it would be quashed by the court’.668 This reaffirmed the importance of the 
judiciary in maintaining checks and balances, a point acknowledged by the JCHR.669  
The executive supported these distinctions because they were based on distinctions made 
by the ECHR itself: 
‘We draw the line between the two because the ECHR draws the line between the 
two. Of course it is possible to say that the connection between the lower end of 
the derogating order and the upper end of the non-derogating order might be 
close, but in practice there will be a very significant difference’.670  
The resilience this offered to the justification for the executive’s position on control orders 
allowed the executive to warrant the moves and manifestly enhance their own position with 
the wider European agenda. Nonetheless the debate over the difference between 
derogation orders and non-derogation orders and the associated processes was not 
satisfied by the propositions by the Executive. The on-going debate will now be reviewed.  
5.4.2 Non derogation and Derogation – the debate: 
As was seen from the executive discussion, the difference between derogating and non-
derogating orders appeared to lie in the interpretation of ‘restriction’ and ‘deprivation’. The 
executive demonstrated that the difference presented was not one of their doing but in 
principles laid down in the ECHR.671 The lack of a clinical formula and guidelines allowed 
differences between the two orders.  
As with the ATCSA 2001 the PTB 2005 faced opposition. Lord Donaldson of Lymington 
expressed that the ‘outstanding feature’ was the ‘extraordinary difference’ between the 
control orders, a concern which raised a number of subsidiary debates. It was these 
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‘extraordinary differences’ which caused concern. One anomaly identified with the 
procedure was that derogating orders could last up to six months and were not renewable, 
whereas non-derogation orders could last up to twelve months and were available for 
renewal. Taking a logical approach, Lord Donaldson of Lymington guided the house through 
the process undertaken for a derogating order: 
‘A derogating order must be referred to the court immediately it is made by the 
Home Secretary and the court is required to start consideration of it within seven 
days. That consideration is on the merits, it is of vital importance to notice. It is a 
full appeal. It is not concerned, as is judicial review, with whether the Secretary of 
State had the power to make the derogating order. Whether or not he was right to 
do so is another matter altogether, one with which the consideration is 
concerned.672 
Following this, Lord Donaldson of Lymington proceeded to review non-derogating orders:  
‘The non-derogating order is not referred to the court. It is left to the person 
subject to the order to decide whether he wishes to appeal. However, his only right 
of appeal is to persuade a court that the Home Secretary had no power to make the 
order, which is a very different matter from being persuaded that he should not 
have made it. It is said that proportionality redresses the balance, but I do not 
believe that it does. In this area, a judge would have no idea what was 
proportionate or not; he simply would not have the information’.673  
This brief assessment provided by Lord Donaldson of Lymington, encapsulates how the dual 
process raised concerns not only in who oversaw provisions but in how it was applied, the 
proportionality of the moves, the arbitrariness of the procedure and the legitimacy of it.  
Whilst it was established that a difference between the orders existed, the origins of such 
distinction still remained. In the opening debate, Mr Marshall-Andrews asked where the 
distinction between control orders presented in the ‘note on non-derogating control orders’ 
came from: 
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‘It (the note on non-derogating control orders) describes deprivation of liberty as "a 
technical term" from the outset and at the end draws a distinction between liberty 
being deprived and liberty being restricted. May I ask the Home Secretary where on 
earth that distinction can be found in the ECHR, or, indeed, in any other legal 
authority known in this country?’674 
The Home Secretary responded with: 
‘My point, which I make powerfully, is that it is legitimate under that convention to 
restrict liberty, provided it is justified by a legitimate aim and provided it is 
proportionate’.675 
Probed further following this initial response, and with a weak and uncertain reply, the 
Home Secretary declared: 
‘I do not have the article in front of me. I am advised that it is Article 5, but I would 
be wary of putting that on the record’.676 
This lack of certainty undermines the entire executive argument. The Home Secretary failed 
to recall the executive’s primary defence on the issue central to the entire PTB 2005, 
bringing into question the validity of the moves. However weak this justification for control 
orders they were not challenged with the vigour which may have been expected to be seen. 
Alongside procedural concerns, apprehensions were also raised as to what parameters 
justified a requirement for derogation or non-derogation orders. 
This response by the Home Secretary not only failed to answer the question but further 
failed to provide substantive evidence to support the executives’ justification for the 
legislation. The lack of evidence to support the executive position was to be an on-going 
theme throughout the terrorism provisions. This lack of overarching principles left gaps for 
scepticism about the Bill. It was later identified that: 
‘It is extraordinary that the Home Secretary persists with the artificial distinction 
between derogating and non-derogating orders. Indeed, many Labour Members 
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have said that there should no difference in legal process between those two types 
of order. There is no logical reason for a separate judicial process between 
derogating and non-derogating orders, and I still hope that the Home Secretary will 
agree that matter with us’.677 
This ‘artificial’ distinction between control orders was no better understood in the House of 
Lords than with Lord Forsyth of Drumlean describing the lack of clarity as ‘as clear as 
mud’.678 Lord Falconer of Thoroton, however, maintained that the line was drawn because 
‘the ECHR draws the line between the two’.679 Proof of this ECHR distinction failed to come 
to fruition on several occasions of asking; another matter to deflate the impact of the 
executive position.  
Concerns were also raised over a blurring of boundaries between the two orders. 
Challenging this risk, Boris Johnson asked what amounted to a restriction of liberty and 
further what ‘combination of restrictions of liberty could amount to a deprivation of 
liberty?’680 The question still remains, however, where a definitive list of combinations 
might exist and how such combinations would be compiled in the first instance. By asking 
and requesting examples the focus returned to the Home Secretary to answer directly 
responding:  
‘An example of a restriction of liberty might be being forbidden to have a mobile 
telephone or to contact another named individual, who is known to be a terrorist 
organiser of some kind. A deprivation of liberty would be a matter of what is 
colloquially called house arrest or of actual detention. The question of whether a 
combination of restrictions adds up to deprivation depends on the particular 
combination’.681  
Aligning the legitimacy for moves alongside the acceptance that combinations of restrictions 
may add up to a deprivation, Mr Marshall-Andrews explored the reliability of the ECHR 
distinction: 
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‘He (the Home Secretary) has told the Committee that the ECHR provides a 
distinction between deprivation and restriction of liberty and that it specifically 
allows for restriction of liberty, so will he please tell us in which particular article 
that appears?682  
This reiterated frustration and enhanced distrust in the failing by the executive to provide 
measurable boundaries for moves supported by the ECHR framework. Without clear 
boundaries, it becomes impossible to delineate where restriction on liberty ends and 
deprivation of liberty begins. The question became how far a restriction could go? There 
was genuine concern over what ‘combination or constellation’ of measures set out in non-
derogating orders could amount to a derogating order under Article 5 ECHR. It remained the 
core argument of the executive that derogating orders involved deprivation of liberty 
whereas non-derogating orders involved restrictions on liberty.683  
As Charles Clarke informed the House of Commons: 
‘What is necessary for deprivation of liberty to take place? It is about the extent to 
which a person's physical liberty is curtailed; it must be of a degree and intensity 
sufficient to justify a conclusion that liberty has been deprived and not merely 
restricted’.684 
Common throughout debate was a lack of clear and quantifiable answers from the 
executive. This led to frustration within parliament. Following continued requests for clear 
guidance on issues, challenges came through a series of hypothetical scenarios to ascertain 
boundaries. These challenges were articulated predominantly within the House of Lords. 
‘In his opening speech he (Lord Falconer) suggested that a curfew order would not 
be a deprivation of liberty. I find that extraordinary. Surely if someone is to be 
required to stay in a building, let us say from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. that must be a 
deprivation of his liberty’.685  
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This was countered with Lord Falconer of Thoroton identifying that:  
‘It is not a deprivation of his liberty under the jurisprudence of the ECHR. It would 
be legitimate only as a non-derogating order if it were pursuant and proportionate 
to a legitimate aim’.686  
It was identified throughout discussion that the judiciary had a crucial role to play in 
legitimising control orders. If the executive could not identify where the boundaries 
between the orders lay, or where reference to parameters were located, then an 
independent judiciary to review issues was imperative. Assessing the role of the judiciary in 
deprivation of liberty scenarios, Vera Baird asked: 
‘A combination of measures could amount to deprivation of liberty under Article 5. 
That document refers to control orders, not derogating orders. My right hon. 
Friend accepts, therefore, that it is possible to take liberty away through a non-
derogatory control order. If liberty is taken away under clause 2, he must go to a 
judge first. He can take liberty away under clause 1 but without going to a judge, 
except that there would be a right of appeal. In both cases, liberty is taken away, so 
how can a different procedure be justified?’687  
Outlining that restriction of liberty could in some instances lead to deprivation of liberty; 
Vera Baird challenged the need for different processes between control orders and 
particularly the procedures carried out by the judiciary. This concern emerged from rights 
and liberties being sacred and that they should not be encroached upon by the executive, a 
position underpinned by the established theory in Chapter Two. The independence of the 
judiciary was, therefore, seen as a necessary component in administering good, fair law; a 
well-established principle. It remained, however, that the executive believed their choice of 
procedure offered sufficient safeguards. On concerns over the different procedures, Charles 
Clarke informed the House that:  
‘First, a Home Secretary who, on advice, including legal advice, sought improperly—
that is the implication of the question—to deprive someone of liberty, whether by 
an individual derogating control order, or by a combination of non-derogating 
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control orders, would be acting wrongly. Moreover, having acted wrongly, he 
would be overruled by a judge on appeal and the case would then have to be 
referred immediately, under the derogating procedure, to the higher level judicial 
authority set out in the proposal. That is a clear guarantee to meet the sort of 
concern that my hon. and learned Friend is raising’.688 
Judicial appeal by way of improper action by the Home Secretary provoked concern about 
the realistic oversight, and protection, offered by the judiciary. The margin of error which 
accompanies the possibility that the Home Secretary has acted wrongly could be mitigated if 
enabled by the earlier intervention of judicial review. To sit and wait for wrong decisions to 
be made undermines the duty to protect, particularly when a review process could be 
incorporated to independently review the individual case: 
‘The distinction that the Home Secretary draws between non-derogating and 
derogating orders is very difficult in many instances. For example, a person's ability 
to work could be restricted by orders relating to the use of the internet. Only a 
judge can determine whether what the Home Secretary calls non-derogating 
matters are proportionate. Therefore, ultimately, the orders should come before a 
judge who can decide that question under the terms of the convention and our 
human rights legislation’.689 
The Home Secretary maintained from the outset that there was a qualitative difference 
identified by the ECHR between a deprivation of liberty and a restriction of liberty. Even 
though concerns were fervently expressed on this, the Home Secretary insisted that case 
law had confirmed that a difference existed.690 As Mr Denham noted:     
‘There is a qualitative difference, but where does that provide the justification for a 
difference of process? What is going on is this terribly difficult issue of assessing 
what the intelligence services are telling us, the national risk and the role to be 
played by an individual. We must either decide that we are to involve the judiciary 
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at the outset, or that we are not. Having decided that we are, we must do that 
across the piece’.691 
What this observation by Mr Denham signifies is that, whilst it can be established that a 
qualitative difference exists, there is no clear rationale or evidence to warrant a difference 
in the process or the standard of judicial involvement. Judicial review has been a 
fundamental part of the constitutional framework for centuries. As such, unless the 
standards are essentially required to be different, then the necessity for the process not to 
exist should be removed.  
Having briefly reviewed the difference in procedure between control orders, there appear a 
number of inseparable issues between decision-making powers, the role of the Home 
Secretary, and the judiciary. From the debate examined it remained apparent that clear 
distinction between deprivation and restriction of liberty was weak and unformatted. This 
was further clouded by the blurred boundaries and legalities of decision-making powers 
between the judiciary and the Home Secretary.   
5.5 Decision-Making Powers – The Home Secretary and the Judiciary: 
‘It cannot be right that a citizen of this country should be put under house arrest by 
the diktat of a member of the executive, rather than by the courts’.692   
As identified earlier, it would be negligent not to consider the division of powers discussed 
throughout debate over the procedural differences and respective decision-making powers 
extended to the Home Secretary and the judiciary. After ascertaining the framework of 
these roles, two further issues will be considered; firstly, the importance of independence 
and secondly, accountability of actions. Due to the interwoven nature of this debate, it is 
likely that a number of the issues may become blurred as they are not able to be neatly filed 
into clear areas for review.   
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5.5.1 Position of the Executive: 
Extension of powers to the Home Secretary to restrict and deprive an individual of their 
liberty raised concern in the House of Commons but gained particular momentum in the 
House of Lords.693 With such far reaching powers it was vital for the executive to identify 
why they were required. The Home Secretary identified: 
‘I accept that he and his colleagues have argued throughout that a judge, not a 
Minister such as the Home Secretary, should take these decisions in various areas. 
The reason why, ultimately, I do not agree is that the principle of Ministers' 
accountability to the House and Parliament is important, particularly in cases of 
national security, where the Government are charged with the responsibility of 
addressing those questions’.694 
The executive’s primary defence for extension of power to the Home Secretary was 
grounded on a security agenda – a position well established in security theory.695 The 
judiciary, after all, were not completely removed from the process of control orders. The 
question then became where in the process the trigger existed to induce judicial 
involvement in control orders and the role they fulfil.  
‘The difficulty with control orders, which everyone has eloquently identified, is this: 
the decision about security is normally a decision that would be made by the 
executive—in practice, the Home Secretary. But, plainly, you cannot just leave it to 
the Home Secretary. There must be some judicial oversight to protect the citizen in 
relation to it and that judicial oversight must be as fair as it possibly can be to the 
citizen’.696  
This statement by Lord Falconer of Thoroton identified that despite the fact that security 
concerns were routinely undertaken by the executive, there must be judicial oversight, 
judicial oversight as Lord Falconer of Thoroton presents however, could be the process of 
review offered after a non-derogating order has been made, whereas in the process of 
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derogating order the judiciary is involved from the outset of the order being made. 
Therefore, even though there is judicial oversight in non-derogating orders, the point at 
which involvement is invoked may in fact be too late to gain optimum protection for the 
individual.  
5.5.2 The role of Judicial Review: 
As identified from this review of the executive’s position, there was no doubt that judicial 
review took place in both derogating and non-derogating orders The existence of judicial 
review however was less the concern and more focused on where, in the process of non-
derogation orders, the role of the judiciary should be incorporated: 
‘‘We acknowledge that the Government have moved some way in terms of 
strengthening judicial review, but the difference between us remains that the 
Home Secretary still considers that the judge should review his decisions, while we 
believe that it should be judges who take the decisions, not politicians. If he is 
prepared to let a judge overrule his decision, I do not understand why he is not 
prepared to let a judge take that decision in the first place. Does the Home 
Secretary realise that if he were to apply to judges for the control orders he would, 
in our judgment, still be meeting his responsibilities as Home Secretary in terms of 
dealing with national security?’697  
As outlined by Mark Oaten, the fact that the judiciary may overrule the findings of the Home 
Secretary undermines the executive’s claim that they need to be in control of issuing such 
orders. If the ability to overrule is available then why is the safeguard not embedded from 
the outset?  This is a point that was noted particularly in the House of Lords by Lord Forsyth 
of Drumlean.698 
After debate, the point of contention remained at which juncture judicial review should be 
activated in a non-derogating order. From the debate it is clear that the executive believe 
that judicial involvement should be invoked following a Home Secretary decision contrary to 
the position presented by the Liberal Democrat benches who maintained that judicial 
intervention should be from the outset. Mark Oaten maintained that judicial involvement 
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was an important principle because in its current format ‘a politician is being given the 
ability to restrict the liberties enjoyed in this country solely on the balance of probabilities’. 
In consolidating his argument regarding the powers extended to the executive under this 
Bill, Mark Oaten confirmed that such extension of powers ‘represents a break with years of 
our history and the Liberal Democrats are extremely uncomfortable with it’.699 This 
confirmed the importance of constitutional principles in protecting the individual. So why 
was there a need for judicial review prior to the decision? Two fundamental attributes have 
been identified as rationale for the need of judicial review; firstly, independence and 
secondly, accountability. 
5.5.3: Independence: 
The separation of powers and the independence of decision-making represented a 
significant percentage of discussion points received on the PTB 2005. Constitutional 
principles appeared at the heart of speeches and framed much of the debate on rationale of 
moves presented by the executive. Mr Griffiths commented: 
‘As the Bill stands, the Secretary of State will be the prosecutor, judge and jury in 
the first instance for both types of order’.700 
Powerfully reiterating concerns in the composition of the Bill, the emphasis on ‘prosecutor, 
judge and jury’ explicitly condemned the acquisition of powers the government were 
claiming for themselves – advances such as these are a constant reminder of the necessity 
and maintenance of constitutional principles.   
Even though apprehensive with the use of control orders, parliament acknowledged their 
necessity. The composition of them, however, evidently had room for manoeuvre.  
‘We accept, as we have always said, that control orders are necessary at least for 
the time being and that we will assist as we can in achieving a control order system 
that is fair and just and effective. But it is surely a constitutional issue of the utmost 
importance that decisions which are restrictive of the liberty of the individual 
should be taken by the judiciary on the application of the Home Secretary and not 
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by the Home Secretary. To allow executive decisions to lead to infringements of 
liberty is the beginning of a downward path which leads where we dare not 
think’.701  
If these moves were necessary, then what could be done to make these effective, 
functional, legal and in line with historic values and traditions?  
‘The balance between the roles of the judiciary and of the executive is not trivial. 
The traditional checks and balances on the executive have stemmed from the 
independence of the judiciary to make the primary decision’.702  
This vague response by the Home Secretary, alluded to previous statements of support. 
Failing to mitigate concerns, the Home Secretary acknowledged that a balance between the 
judiciary and executive was necessary and particularly at the higher level of deprivation of 
liberty as he had noted in his statement on the 26th January 2005, he also believed that the 
current process provided judicial confirmation,703 clearly differentiating between ‘higher 
levels of deprivation’. This demonstrated that, even though rights were protected under the 
ECHR, a ‘hierarchy of rights’ was applied making the protection of some rights redundant.  
The independence provided by the judiciary is necessary and is based on two key factors 
according to Lord Donaldson of Lymington. First of all, as the judiciary are independent of 
ministers they can offer alternative interpretations. They are not assumed to be influenced 
by the political agenda in ways which may burden a politician, such as influences which may 
force politicians to protect national security thus avoiding accusations of failing to deal with 
the problem. Pressures such as these are not faced by the judiciary in the same way as the 
judiciary do not have executive ‘responsibility’. Secondly, because of this independence, the 
judiciary represents a process independent from the government, as demonstrated within 
the procedure of separation of powers and the maintenance of the rule of law.704 This 
reliance on the independence of the judiciary prevents elective dictatorships emerging and 
guarantees protections to the individual in the knowledge that their case has been 
independently reviewed and judged. The use of the independent judiciary also averts the 
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possibility of ‘group think, arising among a small group who have access to secret 
information’.705  
The value of judicial independence was also reiterated when examining the context of trust 
placed on the executive as Lord Plant of Highfield expressed, the whole Iraq debacle still 
hung heavy over the executive. Lord Plant of Highfield expressed that following the WMD 
fiasco there were major problems about trust in the state of intelligence and its 
interpretation.706 Therefore, to prevent this, the role of the judge would provide an 
independent review of evidence to ensure its veracity. Reiterating the opinions stated 
earlier, independent review could prevent misrepresentation of information, swaying the 
balance of power and control into the hands of the executive, something which the ‘WMD 
fiasco’ demonstrated. 
Independence, however, was not a standalone issue. Supplementing the foundations of 
independence lay in the provision of accountability within the state. 
5.5.4: Accountability - the role of parliament: 
Interpretation of duties, elected rights and prerogatives provided for on-going debate about 
the weight afforded to historical, legal and political provisions associated with accountability 
to the electorate. Although the executive maintained they had accountability to the public, 
parliament maintained that they too had a duty to protect the public: 
‘The Home Secretary's reason for refusing to countenance prior judicial 
authorisation of the deprivation of liberty is that that would be to abdicate to the 
judiciary the Executive's responsibility for national security, for which it is rightly 
accountable to Parliament, was an eccentric interpretation of the constitutional 
doctrine of the separation of powers’.707     
Accountability of the executive to parliament also emerged:  
‘In considering how to deal with this difficult problem, does the Home Secretary 
recognise that it has never been the basis of the rule of law in this country that the 
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executive decide and are accountable to Parliament for which individuals are 
locked up on the ground of criminality?708  
It is left to ask, however, what the value of this challenge was. The lack of direction and the 
open-ended nature of this claim allowed the Home Secretary to provide a subjective and 
non-prescriptive response. Further, this particular question reiterates the need for 
independence and accountability underlined by the fact there are deeply ingrained 
constitutional principles to direct this. Nonetheless, the acceptance of ‘principle’ is long 
established and should be recognised accordingly; however, it does not permit a 
government from developing processes in line with the needs of a nation. As the Home 
Secretary identified: 
‘I accept that there is a legitimate difference of opinion, which we have discussed 
before, about the relative roles of the judge and the Government Minister or the 
Home Secretary. That is not an unreasonable, wrong or ignoble difference, and we 
can debate it in Parliament just as it has been debated outside Parliament. The 
reason for my decision and my proposal is that the Home Secretary's Executive 
responsibility for the security of the country is a paramount issue and should be 
dealt with in that way’.709 
Emphasis relied on the paramount notion of national security in determining legislation. 
This position, presented by the Home Secretary, does lack clarity as to why the security of 
the country might be put further at risk if the judiciary were to be involved.710 A point the 
Home Secretary was later challenged on:  
‘He reminded us that the purpose of the legislation was to try to ensure, so far as 
we can, the protection of the people of the United Kingdom. How will they be 
better protected if he pronounces the order in cases of non-derogating orders, 
instead of a judge doing so?’711   
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To which the Home Secretary responded: 
‘By definition, someone from the executive would have access to all the 
information in a way that a judge would not. However, I also accept the argument 
that, in the case of deprivation of liberty, the penalty is so great that judicial 
involvement is required’.712 
The balance presented here returns to similar arguments undertaken on security, 
intelligence and access to information raised in the debate on the ATCSA 2001. What this 
demonstrated is that over the duration of four years little, if any, progress had been made in 
the practicalities of the relationship and information sharing, not only between the 
executive and the judiciary but also between the executive and parliament. It remained part 
of a feature which questioned whether competing functions exist between politicians and 
the judiciary. 
Concluding remarks:  
On arrival for Royal Assent it was established that the government had made a number of 
concessions to enhance judicial involvement in control orders. Nonetheless, it is evident 
from the examination of the PTB 2005 that emphasis focused on the procedural aspects of 
the moves rather than the potential inconsistencies with the European agenda. 
Considerable emphasis was placed throughout debate on the balance between the Home 
Secretary making decisions on control orders as opposed to the judiciary. As David Davis 
informed the house: 
‘There are good reasons why the Home Secretary should not take such decisions. 
Imagine the pressures on any politician and on the Home Secretary in particular, 
after a terrorist outrage. Imagine the temptation to be better safe than sorry and to 
put away everybody, which are precisely the circumstances in which a miscarriage 
of justice will occur’.713  
This position does not detract from the main theme of this examination on control orders. 
The emphasis on procedure and the discussion on derogation are intrinsically linked. By 
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probing the procedure presented by the government, challenges were indirectly made to 
the conditions upon which the derogation framework is based.  
There was also awareness over the direction in which anti-terrorism legislation was moving 
in this modern age and that ‘It is a fact that we are giving greater priority to human rights 
and civil liberties in these procedures than in any previous type of such legislation’.714 Aside 
from this it was recognised that:  
‘for the past 20 or 30 years, none of us has been happy with the way we have 
legislated on terrorism. The measure we are discussing today is not as bad as some 
aspects of the old PTA and it is certainly not as bad as the internment Acts’.715  
Observations such as these were further supplemented by the change in threat which has 
demanded such measures.  
‘A major change has taken place in the security context since then? At the time of 
the PTA, we did not have suicide bombers or bioterrorists, for example. The nature 
of the threat that our citizens face is now much greater’.716 
There is no doubt that a number of MPs maintained that the distinctions between the 
processes, inclusive of measures to bring the procedures in line with one another, were 
unacceptable. Aside from the different burden of proof—reasonable suspicion in the case of 
non-derogating orders and balance of probability in the case of derogating orders concerns 
remained most notably over the difference in judicial review. Whilst a judge would be 
brought in at the very beginning in the case of a derogating order, a judge dealing with non-
derogating orders will never reach the point of deciding at first instance whether the orders 
are correct and whether the proposed measures are reasonable. It was this lack of review 
power and the influence of the Home Secretary that caused considerable concern.  
‘All that a judge can do at judicial review is deciding whether the Home Secretary 
has behaved, at first instance, in a reasonable way—reasonable in terms of both 
process and decision following examination of the facts. The process will involve 
second-guessing the Home Secretary's decision all the time. That is the 
                                                          
714
 HC Vol. 431, Col. 1594, C. Clarke. 
715
 HC Vol. 431, Col. 1574, C. Soley. 
716
 HC Vol. 431, Col. 1606, D. Anderson. 
Page 206 of 323 
 
fundamental difference between the ways in which the two kinds of order, and the 
judicial roles, will operate. The existence of two processes involving orders that are 
very similar, and in some instances different only in terms of degree, is a recipe for 
potential disaster’.717  
This observation by Mr Betts raised a number of ‘what if’ questions which could be seen to 
play devil’s advocate with the involvement of judges. Questions included: What if the Home 
Secretary says that he believes, in a certain case, that the balance of measures under clause 
1(3) makes a derogating order necessary? What if that is subjected to due process and 
reaches the judges and the judges decide that the balance of measures is wrong? What if 
they decide that fewer restrictions are appropriate in that specific case? What if the smaller 
number of measures then becomes the subject of a non-derogating rather than a 
derogating order? The court will not be able to deal with a non-derogating order. 
Fundamentally for Mr Betts, all that the court could do was decide on judicial review 
whether the Home Secretary was right to impose a non-derogating order.718 Each of these 
questions underpins the concerns over the impact of control orders.     
There was no doubt that discussion on the difference in procedure was identified as a 
fundamental role in parliament and a duty to stand up for what they believed to be an 
important constitutional issue. The ability to have impact and influence over the decisions of 
the liberal frame work was further evidenced when it was explicitly acknowledged that ‘at 
the other end of this Place we have a House where a party that received 40 per cent of the 
vote at the last general election has 60 per cent of the seats’.719 This apparent observation 
reiterating the continued belief that impartiality on deciding the way forward with issues 
affecting justice should be undertaken by the principles of liberal democracy.  
Outside of acknowledging Re A720 as the trigger for the PTB 2005, there was surprisingly 
little reference to it throughout the discussion on the PTB 2005. The decision in this case 
demonstrated the important role that the judiciary can play in legitimising legislation. It is 
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questionable whether, if judicial review and advice had been undertaken and listened to in 
the creation stages of the ATCSA 2001, such case as Re A721 would have arisen.  
The PTB 2005 was in a state of complete chaos throughout debate which made 
interpretations particularly difficult to understand and follow. The lack of structure in the 
debate may have been associated with the speed of the PTB 2005 through parliament. 
The final case study to be reviewed is the TB 2005. Although this arrived at parliament 
following the events of 7/7, it had already been established by the Prime Minster that such 
legislation was on the agenda. The events of 7/7 simply provided a context within which to 
the legislation.   
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Chapter Six: 
TA 2006: 90 days Pre-charge detention: 
13th October 2005 – 1st Reading of TB 
26th October 2005 – 2nd Reading of TB 
02/03 November 2005 – Consideration in committee of TB 
09th November 2005 – Report stage on TB 
10th November 2005 – Third Reading of TB 
15th / 16th February 2006 – Consideration of Lords’ Amendments 
30th March 2006 – Royal Assent 
The following chapter will review discussion raised on the Terrorism Bill 2005 (TB).722 A brief 
background will be presented providing a backdrop to debate including a brief overview of 
the Bill’s origins. A summary of key themes of debate outside of 90 day pre-charge 
detention will also be presented. The aim of this is to demonstrate intrinsic issues which 
stem from the quantitative analysis but fail to come to fruition within the case study. As 
with the previous case studies, to omit such consideration could weaken later analysis. 
Following this, discussion will focus on the designated case study. The findings of the JCHR 
will be presented as a source of review separate to the main debate.723 The case study in 
this chapter will focus on the examination of issues raised in conjunction with the original 
wording of clause 23 proposing 90 day pre-charge detention. This examination will also 
consider the House of Lords’ mooting of the amendment from 28 days to 60 days pre-
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charge detention.724 As with the previous chapter, this discussion is thematic not 
chronological to aid the flow of analysis and prevent repetition of content.  
6.1 Background to the Terrorism Bill 2005: 
In 2001 it was legislated in the ATCSA 2001 that there would be indefinite detention without 
trial for non-nationals who could not be removed from the UK for fear of breaching Article 3 
ECHR. Following the decision in A v Secretary of State (Re A),725 the executive drafted the 
PTB 2005 presenting control orders. Derogating and non-derogating control orders were 
applicable to any terror suspect irrespective of nationality. Both acts aroused concern; 
however, it was not until the TB 2005 that significant revolt in order of change was evident. 
Shortly after the introduction of the PTA 2005, where scepticism over the ‘threat’ faced by 
the UK was raised, London succumbed to a terrorist attack. The series of coordinated 
attacks targeting the public transport system claimed the lives of 52 individuals with over 
700 injured. These attacks were followed two weeks later by attempted attacks which were 
however apprehended following police investigations. These incidents confirmed executive 
claims that, at least in the middle of 2005, the UK faced a real threat.  
6.2: Key themes to emerge out of Terrorism Bill debate: 
On its introduction to parliament, the TB 2005 proposed a number of unsatisfactory 
measures. Whilst much of the Bill was accepted with minimal discussion, substantial debate 
was undertaken on clause 1-3, including the glorification and encouragement of 
terrorism,726 and clause 23 which presented pre-charge detention for 90 days. Unlike the 
previous two Acts discussed little, if any, concern was raised over the speed through 
parliament.  
Debate on the TB 2005 appeared clearer in structure than observed from the previous Acts. 
This clearer, and evidently more methodical review of the legislation, may have been the 
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result of the longer review period allowing for inconsistencies and concerns to be addressed 
within a timely manner.727  
A visit will now be paid to five themes to emerge as influential in the debate on 90 day pre-
charge detention. The first of these considers the influence of 7/7 and the claims of 
associated threat. The second overview looks at the emerging debate over the ‘concept’ of 
performing a balance based on rights and security. This was the first time that such a clear 
review of balance had been discussed within the parliamentary debate examined. This may 
reinforce the growing awareness of the impact of controlling terrorism within a liberal 
democracy and the necessity to preserve the notion of justice. The third encompasses the 
notion of risk whilst the fourth acknowledges that individual rights were considered not 
necessarily superior to collective rights. The final theme acknowledges the concern that 
security is not inevitably enhanced with the constriction on liberties.  
6.2.1: 7/7 and the threat to the UK: 
The realism of the threat to the UK had been contentious since 9/11. Post 9/11 references 
were made to a ‘new and continued’ threat, however, without a direct attack on the UK, for 
some the threat was no greater than that experienced with Northern Ireland. It was clearly 
established, however, that many MPs felt, though failed to prove, that a significant 
difference existed between the acts of the Irish and international terrorism as witnessed 
post 9/11. ‘The terrorist threat that we face now is significantly different from the Irish 
threat in many ways’.728 This ‘difference’ to Irish terrorism had been referenced in both the 
ATCSA 2001,729 and the PTA 2005.730 To an extent, and on one level, the threat was different 
as for example, whilst it was suggested that the political focus of Irish terrorism often 
provided warnings of targets, the current emphasis on the willingness and desire to commit 
suicide differing significantly from anything the UK had dealt with before created a different 
situation. The gravity and nature of these acts, compounded with the complexities and 
differences to current dangers, necessitated a complex and different response from counter 
terrorism measures. Terrorists of the past wished to escape to perpetrate further acts, the 
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emphasis on suicide in 21st century terrorist tactics identified investigation and the handling 
of potential terrorists as being different.731 The wider threat posed on society was 
supported by the list of terrorist atrocities around the world including ‘New York, Nairobi, 
Sharm el-Sheikh, Bali—tragically twice—Madrid and even in the period since the 
introduction of the ATCSA had been attacks in Amman and Karachi’.732 This list of atrocities 
allowed the executive to use threat rhetoric generating the belief that the measures within 
the TB 2005 were a legitimate response to the threat.   
Although international terrorism was discussed and numerous incidents cited, it was the 
London bombings which confirmed beyond doubt that the UK was a target; at least at that 
moment in time. The bombings confirmed the ‘grave challenge’ which, despite a prolonged 
experience of IRA terrorism, presented significantly new features. The threat could no 
longer be thought to be invented or exaggerated by the authorities or the media.733 This 
threat was not only destructive in intent, but the reliance on suicide presented new 
challenges to the security services and the police in detection and prevention. This 
influenced assessments on risk and stabilised the necessity of a pre-emptive response.734 
Terrorism for some now was the single biggest threat to security in the UK and the hideous 
atrocity that took place on 7 July 2005 confirmed this.735  
7/7 triggered a consciousness about the implications of failing to react to a threat. Lord 
Desai acknowledged that the position taken on the contents of the TB 2005 had been 
‘disturbed or enhanced’ by the events of 7/7, commenting further ‘perhaps I should not let 
such events influence me, but I do’.736 This consciousness of the implications also 
invigorated awareness of the rights not only of the suspect but of all individuals. This drove 
the legislative framework back towards the notion of collective security and measures 
perceived necessary to protect the wider public. 
The events of 7/7 justified the executive in reviewing the ‘adequacy of legal measures’ 
within the anti-terror repertoire. The fact that attacks had taken place was:  
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‘Highly relevant evidence in an assessment of the level of terrorist threat, which 
itself is relevant to the proportionality of any interference with rights that can be 
restricted in the interests of public safety and security’.737 
Previous clams of risk to the UK were qualified and as noted by Freedman, with 
indiscriminate killing and no strategy, the level of terror presented by the acts of 7/7 led to 
vulgar risk assessment. Whilst the public may view their own security as the government’s 
most important responsibility and therefore inadequate action or a failure to take action 
would be ‘a flagrant dereliction of duty,738 it did not go unnoticed that proportionality was 
key in decision making; ‘all measures taken by states to fight terrorism must themselves 
respect human rights and the principle of the rule of law’.739 
Following a number of brief reflections on the threat of terrorism and the events of 7/7, 
discussion within parliament progressed to discuss the emerging likelihood of balance 
between security and rights. This balance was not solely assigned to particular clauses 
within the TB 2005 although emphasis was placed on pre-charge detention. When 
considering the threat and the consequent need to balance, members from both Houses of 
Parliament expressed that their role was to ‘prioritise the protection of our people in the 
face of a new and lethal threat’.740 It is unsurprising that MPs directly responsible to the 
public would openly and boldly talk about a ‘new and lethal threat’, particularly in the 
aftermath of 7/7 however, as established in Chapter Two, the existence of such threat 
remained unsubstantiated in both the academic community and indeed within the Houses 
of Parliament. Therefore, the length to which provisions should extend in return for 
protection against the incalculable threat was integral to the debate on the TB 2005.  
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6.2.2: The TB 2005 peripheral view on rights & security – the acknowledgement of 
balance: 
Following the events of 7/7 it was determined early in the gestation of the TB 2005 that 
moves undertaken by the government were under pressure based on two competing duties; 
the perceived competition between protection of the lives of citizens through security 
measures and, the duty to protect individual rights. However viewed, it became evident that 
any outcome would demand that a balance be struck.741 Nonetheless, as previously 
established,742 with no clear formula to ascertain balance the process could not be clinical. 
David  Davis identified that parliament must:  
‘balance between effective laws and fundamental freedoms, between security and 
freedom and between defending our way of life and defending the values that 
define it’.743  
As tough as that balance may be to arrive at, it is a job which parliamentarians must do to 
keep ’fundamental freedoms’ and the ‘county safe’.744 This parliamentary duty was 
enhanced with a ‘criteria of necessity’ for moves. These criteria ascertained that when 
examining moves, weight should be ascribed to the likelihood of the moves working, the 
possibility for alternatives and the ‘proportionality’ of the proposal. This should all be 
framed within the constraints of a comparable scale with the threat the measures were 
trying to prevent.745  
Even though debate acknowledged the rights of the public, focus throughout debate 
remained primarily on those of the suspect. It was identified early on that the particular 
debate on pre-charge detention was a balancing exercise between the safety of the public 
and the fundamental rights of individuals not to be detained for lengthy periods without 
charge.746 The problem then became how various risks (to the individuals’ rights or to 
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national security) were to be weighed against one another in light of the existing threat and 
the legal protections afforded to individuals.  
6.2.3 Risk: 
Discussion on the pre-charge detention of individuals for up to 90 days sparked debate on 
the impact that such a clause would have on individuals. Contrary to this, for the first time in 
the debates examined, the right of the ‘innocent’ bystander was raised. Baroness Symons of 
Vernham Dean identified that the first duty of the legislator was ‘to protect the innocent 
and their fundamental right to life and not to take risks with their safety’.747 The 
consequences of taking risks with the lives of innocent citizens was advocated throughout 
parliament.748 The events of 7/7 aroused the need for protection of the security of 
individuals.749 The harsh reality of ‘the man and the young woman who lost lower limbs in 
the terrorist acts of 7 July in London and will spend the rest of their lives in wheelchairs’750 
shifted the goal posts in how debate for and against the act was presented. Summarising a 
number of similar views Viscount Brookeborough identified:  
‘On the evidence that I have heard, and because I do not want to take risks with 
other people's security, I support the amendment’.751   
Even though this declaration made by Viscount Brookeborough was for 60 not 90 days pre-
charge detention it nonetheless demonstrated a rationale for support in the extension of 
pre-charge detention periods.  
Whilst acknowledged that the risk of unnecessary incarceration was undesirable, for some, 
the risk to a few was outweighed by the risk to the collective.752 A balance had to be struck 
between liberty and life and between loss of liberty and loss of life. The necessity to balance 
was therefore inevitable. Response to the nature of risk posed post 7/7 led Lord Foulkes of 
Cumnock to note:  
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‘to have one or two people perhaps—perhaps—held in gaol for a few days extra: 
that loss of liberty. Which is more important? That loss of liberty or the loss of life? 
I know which side I am on’.753  
Justifications such as these are particularly crude. If this response was a comparison 
between the state killing and the state removing liberty then the statement makes sense 
but if it is between the state removing liberty and the state trying to avert a threat it is 
different. The threat, risk and infringement are not necessarily proportional and run counter 
to historic principles of justice.  
It is, therefore, necessary to examine the physical ‘risk’ as the events of 7/7 but also the 
balance of risk to individuals, both the suspect and the public. As identified in Chapter Two, 
different types of terrorism raise different concerns over risk, warnings and targets. It was 
the ‘indiscriminate killing’ that forced vulgar risk assessments to be made on the 
unknowable thus forcing decisions to be made, which at first may seem reactive to the 
horrors rather than well-established protocol.754 This understanding of risk identified that 
individual rights are not necessarily seen to be superior to collective rights.  
6.2.4: Individual rights are not seen as superior to collective rights: 
In facilitating the wider justification and framework in the balance process, reference was 
made to a social contract which is entered into as an ‘everyday currency’ of society 
whereby: 
‘In any society we have to accept that there are some restrictions on our freedoms 
in those crucial areas where they are necessary for the greater security of innocent 
civilians. Such restrictions are the everyday currency of what one might call the 
"social contract" that we all enter into as part of a secure society’.755  
With this understanding that a ‘social contract’ is entered into, the balance between the 
greater good of security and the preservation of individual liberty is weighted more in 
favour of the former. This, however, pulls on the notions identified in the introduction to 
Section II that confusion remains over the notion of the legally protected right of security. In 
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fact, this may be considered little more than a ‘good’ for which rights should be used. Belief 
that UK legislation needed to be more robust to satisfy its first duty to protect the safety 
and security of its people was furthered with the observation that, whilst a prisoner has 
rights the public also has them.756 Confirming the existence of consequentialist opinion 
within parliament, it was suggested that:  
‘Is it really such a hardship to spend up to—and only up to—three months in 
custody, protected from abuse by the whole force of the law, if you have given the 
authorities reason to believe that you are a possible threat, and a great deal of 
possible supporting evidence exists that must be examined? We must not, in 
fighting for the rights of the individual prisoner, forget that the police are doing 
what society requires of them’.757  
Despite the fact that society might require the police and other services to protect security, 
society also requires the police to enhance freedom. Such general statements overshadow 
the notion that a balance is required in every decision and in every case. Speaking in such 
clinical terms deflects from the reality, that whether legal or theoretical in the 
understanding of rights, decisions are rarely so definitive. The contested nature of rights: 
what they are, who they protect, when they are overridden, when they are absolute, all 
feed into arrival at a decision where balance or compromise has been considered and 
hopefully rationalised.  
This explicit balance in the rights of the individual compared with collective rights was 
reaffirmed when it was acknowledged that: 
‘I hope we shall think not only of the few who want to destroy innocent lives, but of 
the many who deserve protection, and who want and expect their democracy and 
human rights to be protected by this parliament’.758  
This fails to account for individuals mistakenly accused and triggers the theoretical debate 
underpinning rights law. It was to be the ‘innocence and diversity’ of 7/7 that drove some 
for the first time, to ‘instinctively wanting’ security to be placed above liberty. Such ‘abrupt 
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and cruel death’ demanded that security be treated with utmost importance.759 This 
position is understandable as is the political rhetoric to respond, however, this is exactly the 
type of situation for which human rights are developed; when rhetoric and the majority 
want rights to be ignored for their own ends.  That is why law protects individual rights. 
Nonetheless, proclamations such as these by Lord Griffiths of Burry Port reaffirmed the 
influence of the rights and security debate. 
Whilst generic discussion undertaken on the balance between rights and security 
commanded support for security in light of the London bombings, such events did not derail 
all speakers from the beliefs which they held on rights and liberties. Many of the arguments 
in favour of liberties centred less on the incursion that such moves as extended pre-charge-
detention would have on individuals, but more so on the power which the executive was 
appropriating. This position was identified when Mr Gummer presented that;   
‘Is it not always true that there are two arguments for destroying human rights: 
one is, "We have never had a situation like that before"; the other is, "We have no 
intention of making it worse later on"? Both those arguments are very dangerous, 
and this House should not accept them’.760 
This was advice against the prospect that the government would hijack the events of 7/7 to 
create legislation that did not deal with the problem and which would be used to curb 
freedoms. Nonetheless, it remained important that in the face of terrorism the democratic 
system should not be ‘overwhelmed by revulsion and a desire to act’.761 This need to 
protect, however, was not conducive with enhancing security whilst constricting liberty.  
6.2.5: Failure of enhancing security with constrictions of liberties: 
As seen earlier, even though a view is pertained that the public will accept restrictions on 
liberties in return for increased security, scepticism over the damage this will cause in the 
long term remains within parliament. Concerns were raised that by increasing the 
possibility of a very small number of prosecutions, the sacrifice of a number of fundamental 
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rights was too big a stake to make.762 Whilst commentators did not ‘actively’ prioritise 
rights over security, they did identify the damage that could be caused should parliament 
not consider the impact of legislation carefully. Using the experience of Northern Ireland 
Lord Kingsland expressed that: 
‘It is important that we do not fall into the trap of assuming that a nation's security 
is enhanced by the constraint of its citizens' liberties. This lesson was no more 
vividly learnt than during the period of the Troubles in Northern Ireland when the 
policy of internment was pursued. It sharpened the differences between the two 
communities; it exacerbated the problem we faced in the no-go areas and, 
perhaps, above all, it proved a massive disincentive to Catholics to provide 
information to our security forces’.763  
This example does not deter from the threat, the risk, or the need to protect society, 
however, it warns of the backlash which may emerge should parliament, in legislating, 
forget the protection of individuals in its bid to protect security. This interpretation still 
leaves the pertinent question of just how far a Bill can go in ‘destroying’ liberty in an effort 
to stop terrorist activity.764 David  Davis acknowledged the origins of habeas corpus and the 
need for protection against imprisonment without trial, and established that whilst this 
tradition existed, a shift in the need for protection of security sometimes requires support 
for liberties to be qualified – detention without charge may happen. Balance, therefore, 
becomes a process of rationalising potentially conflicting goods.  
‘If the period of imprisonment is too brief, the civil liberties   of suspects may be 
protected, but the lives of innocent people may be endangered. If the period of 
imprisonment is too long, locking up people without charge risks becoming the first 
resort of the authorities rather than the last (…) The House knows the serious 
consequences for our national security and our civil liberties if we get the balance 
wrong in any direction’.765  
                                                          
762
 HL Vol. 677, Col. 1230, Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws. 
763
 HL Vol. 675, Col. 1389/1390, Lord Kingsland. 
764
 HL Vol. 675, Col. 1414, Baroness Williams of Crosby. 
765
 HC Vol. 439, Col. 346/347, David Davis. 
Page 219 of 323 
 
This warning is indicative of much of the debate in the balance between rights and security. 
It appears that individuals against the moves originally presented within clause 23 avoided 
overtly supporting rights focusing on the lack of necessity portrayed within the evidence 
relied upon by the executive. 
Each of these themes explored above create a picture amongst which discussion on the TB 
2005 was framed. The acknowledgement that constriction on liberties would not 
necessarily enhance security, the events of 7/7 demonstrated that the UK remained 
vulnerable to attack. This subsequently led to explicit discussion that a balance may be 
required between rights and security indicating that, in some cases, it is not perceived that 
individual rights should take priority over collective needs. Each of these influences fuelled 
debate over clause 23.      
Following this brief overview, findings from the JCHR on the TB 2005 will now be presented. 
These findings could form a fundamental part of the review process in assessing the 
compatibility of the legislation presented. However, as has been seen thus far, reliance on 
the information and resources explored by the JCHR appears limited from either side of the 
debate. 
6.3 JCHR: 
The JCHR released its formal report on Counter Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 
Terrorism Bill and related matters on the 28th November 2005. As with the previous reports 
from the JCHR, the paper provided a wider framework than required for the purposes of 
this chapter. The Bill was considered to present potential incompatibilities with human 
rights standards in that the definition of ‘terrorism’ remained the same.766 Aside from pre-
charge detention, concerns were also raised over clauses discussing deportation and 
exclusion, encouragement and glorification, training for terrorism and, immigration 
legislation amongst others.  
It was accepted that 7/7 constituted ‘gross violations of human rights’ and the attacks were 
also a violation of the ‘foundational values of democracy and the rule of law’.767 It was also 
recognised that human rights law imposed onerous positive obligations on states to take 
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steps to protect the ‘lives and physical integrity of everyone within their jurisdiction against 
the threat of a terrorist attack’.768 The increasing recognition of the rights of victims further 
pushed states to fulfil such obligations,769 further accepting the government’s argument 
that threat had heightened as a result of 7/7. The attacks realigned the balance of threat 
with interference of rights which could be legitimately restricted in the interests of public 
safety and national security.770 Whilst a response was necessary, concern remained for the 
risk of alienating communities, confirming that if the measures were counterproductive, 
‘the state will be failing to fulfil its positive obligations’.771 
As mentioned previously, encouragement and glorification of terrorism was heavily 
assessed within the JCHR findings. It was examined as to whether clause 1 of the TB 2005 
would be compatible with Article 10 ECHR. On reviewing the necessity, proportionality and 
legal certainty of the clause it was concluded that, as drafted on arrival before the 
committee, the proposed offence of encouraging terrorism was too wide to satisfy the 
committee.772 The JCHR also indicated that a subjective test of recklessness should be 
proved ‘as an alternative to intent’ to satisfy the need for legal certainty.773 Further 
questions were asked regarding the compatibility of the TB 2005 with the Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism. It was signalled by the Committee that clause 1, as drafted, 
failed to meet the two requirements774 of the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 
resulting in the failure to ‘faithfully’ implement Article 5 of the Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism.775 The JCHR also found that the proposed control over the 
dissemination of terrorist publications, and the charges which accompanied were 
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incompatible with Article 10 ECHR. The offence was further deemed to lack connection to 
incitement to violence and the lack of intention clause.776 
Pre-charge detention appeared to be central to discussion in the paper. In a bid to 
contextualise the pre-charge detention timeframe, the committee provided a brief review 
of the evolution on the law on pre-charge detention in terrorist cases. This assessment 
dated back to the PTA (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 and included brief 
acknowledgement of the derogation of Article 5(3). It further acknowledged the impact of 
the TA 2000 which maintained a detention period of 7 days but which introduced judicial 
control to enable derogation from Article 5 ECHR. The final Act referred to was the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 which, in section 306, extended the maximum period of pre-charge 
detention from 7 to 14 days subject to ‘judicial authorisation’.777  
The committee guided the report through an extensive review of pre-charge detention. The 
JCHR acknowledged evolution of the law on pre-charge detention in terrorist cases; the 
current position of detention under the TA 2000, the effect of the provisions contained 
within the TB 2005 and the associated human rights implications, including safeguards to 
the detainee.778  
The committee found that the TB 2005 introduced three significant changes for pre-charge 
detention. It increased the period of detention from 14 days to 3 months; it provided that 
each period of judicially authorised extension must be for seven days unless other special 
circumstances dictate; and finally that grounds for extension may be extended under clause 
24(1) ‘pending the result of an examination or analysis’.779 Following the escalation in 
changes, the committee identified 3 overlapping aspects of the right to liberty which were 
engaged by the extension to pre-charge detention through Article 5(1),780 5(2)781 and 5(3)782 
ECHR. In examining the implications of these overlapping aspects of pre-charge detention 
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on the right to liberty the JCHR reviewed the evidence available. Evidence came from the 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner,783 NGOs,784 the Home Office,785 the Carlile report786 and 
the Home Secretary.787 The police noted that relying on lesser charges might increase the 
risk of bail being granted. The police saw the control order as a ‘useful complement for pre-
charge detention, not a substitute’ based on the degree of control afforded to a control 
order.788 The Carlile report concluded that a maximum of three months was ‘probably a 
practicable and sensible option’,789 whereas NGOs, such as Liberty considered that ‘more 
appropriate and proportionate ways of meeting the police concerns were available’.790 The 
committee also received advice from Professor Clive Walker who claimed that ‘a 
proportionate case is not made out’, accepting that, whilst there were operational 
difficulties faced by the police, there was a lack of evidence which had prevented the police 
from prosecution in any given case.791   
The committee observed that the government had correctly noted that there was no ECtHR 
jurisprudence which set a clear limit on the length of time for which a person may be 
detained pending charge. This was countered by the Committee identifying that there had 
been cases where the ECtHR had found violations of Article 5 in cases of detention for 
periods of less than 14 days.792 The other constraints examined by the Committee also 
incorporated the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment under 
Article 3 ECHR and the right to a fair hearing Article 6(1) ECHR. Concern was also raised over 
the reliability of evidence obtained after extensive periods of detention. This could result in 
evidence being excluded under section 78 of the PACE.793  
The committee concluded that 90 days would have been disproportionate based on the 
deficiencies in the procedural safeguards for the detainee and could bring about 
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‘independent breaches of Article 3 ECHR’.794 It was accepted that the current 14 day period 
needed extending but that had to be proportionate to the threat. The legitimate aim was 
ultimately for parliament and the courts to decide. In the Committee’s view any increase 
beyond 14 days would require amendments to the relevant provisions within the TA 2000. 
Further to this the committee stipulated there should be nothing less than a full adversarial 
hearing before a judge when deciding if detention was necessary.795 
Having reviewed the wider influences on 90 day pre-charge detention and the 
observations, findings and recommendations from the JCHR, attention will now turn to the 
case study of this chapter. 90 day pre-charge detention was identified as an area of 
significant contention and was ultimately amended to just 28 days. 
6.4: Pre – charge detention – the 90 day debate: 
Clause 23 in its initial format raised concerns for MPs.796 While the events of 7/7 warranted 
an extension of detention powers for some,797 others felt that there was no evidence to 
indicate such extension.798 Pre-charge detention had witnessed an evolution in recent years 
and, for some, an extensive catalogue of legislation already existed which could be called 
upon before requiring an extension to pre-charge detention.799 The evolution of pre-charge 
detention in terrorist cases began following The PTA (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 which 
provided detention without charge for up to seven days without judicial authorisation.800 
The ECtHR, in the case of Brogan,801 however, found this to violate Article 5(3) ECHR on 
grounds that individuals have a right to be brought promptly before a judge. In order to 
keep the seven day pre-charge period, the UK derogated from Article 5(3). This derogation 
was upheld by the ECtHR in 1993 in the case of Brannigan and McBride v. UK802 as being 
‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.803 The TA 2000 maintained the 7 day 
pre-charge detention period but introduced judicial control over the period of detention. 
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This judicial review allowed the UK to withdraw its derogation from Article 5 ECHR. In 2003 
the Criminal Justice Act, whilst extending the maximum period of pre-charge detention 
from 7 to 14 days, maintained the protocol of judicial authorisation.        
Significant debate was undertaken on clause 23 pre-charge detention. The difference in this 
analysis, compared with that of the previous two acts examined, is the alteration of the Bill 
prior to its review by the second chamber. These changes were necessary in order to 
ensure some extension to the normal pre-charge detention periods.  Therefore, on arrival 
at the House of Lords, amendments had already been made to reduce pre-charge detention 
from 90 days to 28. Even in its amended state, discussion on the need for 90 days was 
mooted and in later debate an amendment was introduced to the House of Lords 
advocating for a 60 day detention period. This fell in the House of Lords and 28 days 
remained. Nonetheless, this demonstrates the variation across both houses on the period 
of pre-charge detention deemed acceptable.  
As noted throughout this thesis, the influence of public opinion is a significant factor in 
policy creation; the TB 2005 was no exception. Sky News commissioned a YouGov poll prior 
to the vote on clause 23 in an attempt to assess public views on an increased pre-charge 
detention period. The poll identified 72% support for 90 days with just 22% opposed; 
however, the use of this data should be approached with the same caution as all data.804 
Even though the public had identified detention without trial as acceptable to protect 
against terrorism, parliament was less convinced. Nonetheless, with figures such as these at 
the disposal of the executive, it is unsurprising that the debate and vote on clause 23 of the 
TB 2005 remained tight.   
6.5: Exec position on 90 day: 
The executive’s evidence to support clause 23 appeared limited and unsubstantiated, 
relying heavily on the ‘say so’ of the police, the security services and the Carlile report.805 
Whilst the Carlile report did not justify 90 days pre-charge detention, it did acknowledge 
that it might be acceptable. This acceptability was grounded in ‘several operations’ that 
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Lord Carlile of Berriew was personally aware of in which arresting early in order to avoid 
terrorist attacks had led to problems in the gathering of evidence after arrest to be able to 
charge at all, or at the appropriate criminal level.806 This was further supported by his belief 
‘beyond doubt’ that: 
‘there have been situations in which significant conspiracies to commit terrorist 
acts have gone unprosecuted as a result of the time limitations placed on the 
control authorities following arrest’.807 
On the 26th of October 2005, Charles Clarke808 informed the House of Commons that the 
executive believed the position for extension of pre-charge detention was justified. 
Justification laid heavily on the ‘compelling case’ strongly supported by the police. UK anti-
terrorism legislation over the past 30 years had been geared towards dealing with the 
different problem of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. This challenge had now been 
replaced by international networks of terrorists.809 Based on this new threat, prevention 
became vital, as is consistent with the pre-emptive theories of Zedner et al.810 As a result of 
the early apprehension required of terror suspects, greater time to collect evidence after 
the arrest was requested by the authorities, a position supported by the independent 
review of Lord Carlile of Berriew.811 This rationale, however, suggests that prevention of 
terrorist atrocities works on the proviso that authorities will arrest first, ask questions and 
establish evidence later. The executive maintained that, based on the information provided 
to them by the police authorities, it was identified that the international dimension and the 
complexities of information gathering across different jurisdictions meant enquiries took 
longer to complete and consequently extended periods of detention were required.812 
Emphasising the problems the international nature of terrorism has on the speed of 
evidence gathering, Mr Clarke identified concerns with the limited resources available to 
deal with translation of materials and having interpreters who are able to fulfil the role in 
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such cases.813 With all these considerations ‘I believe that there is now widespread 
recognition in the House that an increase beyond 14 days is necessary’;814 a position 
previously expressed by the JCHR.815 
Challenges on the strength of the case were made to the executive. Mr Clarke cited the 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Peter Clarke, who had referenced a particular case as an 
example of terrorists evading justice because of the lack of such provision as 90 day pre-
charge detention. In the case of the ‘ricin plot’ of 2002 Mohamed Meguerba, according to 
Peter Clarke, may have been prevented from absconding from the UK if the 90 day provision 
existed.816 Summating his reference to the input from Peter Clarke, the Home Secretary 
confirmed that the case of Meguerba was ‘a compelling argument that 90 days might have 
made a difference and allowed things to be dealt with far better’.817  
In the midst of all debate it was presented that such extensive pre-charge detention would 
constitute internment similar to that experienced during the troubles in Northern Ireland. 
Charles Clarke explicitly denied the potential correlation confirming that ‘the measures we 
are discussing today cannot in any sense be equated with internment. That is simply not the 
case’.818 The executive relied on the police and support from independent reviews that 
moves were acceptable. An obvious weakness in this is the lack of clear evidence 
documented or verifiable proof to scrutinise thus reducing the opportunity to counter 
claims against pre-charge detention. 
Having undergone a review of the executive’s rationale for 90 day pre-charge detention, 
examination will now focus on the wider debate on clause 23.   
6.6 Clause 23 – Overview: 
The right not to be imprisoned without charge and the notion of habeas corpus were cited 
as central to democracy and the rule of law. As such, warnings were presented that 
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parliament should be ‘hesitant’ in locking people up for 90 days.819 However, challenges to 
clause 23 focused primarily on the executive justification for extension of provisions. 
Such extension to pre-charge detention was identified by a number of MPs and Lords alike 
as potentially detrimental to the efforts of the anti-terrorism legislation.820 Increasing pre-
charge to 90 days would ‘be playing into the hands of the enemy by enabling them to tell 
one part of our community that it is being victimised’,821 an outcome warned of by the 
works of Ashworth and the fundamental contradiction thesis.822 By aiding the recruitment 
of martyrs, clause 23 may undermine the benefit which the introduction of the legislation 
intended. Legislation, as a recruitment aid, was identified as comparable with the 
recruitment of terrorists in Northern Ireland during the Troubles.823  
The necessity of clause 23 was also questioned. Diluted by claims that 7/7 was not caused 
by any gaps in terrorist legislation,824 it was argued that the enhanced safety of constituents 
would not be guaranteed by 90 day pre-charge detention.825 Unsatisfied by executive 
justifications, the constant demand for proof by parliament frustrated the executive’s claims 
of the necessity of clause 23. A lack of succinct and clinical evidence to validate clause 23 
facilitated challenges. This was made easier by parliament with the lack of substantive facts, 
figures and findings to counteract these challenges.  
For the executive, whilst it was established that a balance between rights and security was 
difficult, the extension of pre-charge detention to over 20 times longer than the pre-charge 
detention for murder, the incompatibilities with Article 5 ECHR and the breach of habeas 
corpus were all outweighed by police requests for 90 day pre-charge detention. These 
requests were centred substantively on the increase of trans-jurisdictional investigations 
and the quantity of data requiring analysis. Yet claims of transnational crime and mass data 
mining failed to hold sufficient resonance with many in the house. This lack of support 
based on data mining and transnational investigation was ingrained in the comparison made 
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with some white collar crime where investigations of this size already operated. These 
transnational investigations had not required such extensive powers and, therefore, reliance 
purely on those factors in this legislation failed to necessitate clause 23.826 
Whilst not central to the debate, risks associated with the quality of evidence obtained from 
an individual detained for an extended period of time were raised in line with the 
protections offered under PACE.827 Under clause 23, with up to 90 day detention and days 
of questioning, it was considered that risks to the authenticity of confessions may 
undermine the whole process.828 This draws potential complications in the process from the 
rule of law, due process and the protections offered by Article 6 ECHR for fair trial.829 
Responding to these concerns, the Home Secretary maintained that such moves would be 
adequately protected by the instruments under the rule of law and the ECHR to prevent 
inadequacies in the process from arising.830 Whilst this raised concerns over infringements 
that may be caused, it did not balance in favour of one position over another. 
With the acceptance of a ‘new threat’, inclusion of new complexities, an international 
framework and new technologies831 it was advanced by members of the executive that to 
ignore advice from the police, the primary justification for clause 23, would not only be 
naïve but would also put the wider public at risk.832 This raises the question of the rationale 
for clause 23 amendment at a time when the electorate appeared to support the measure. 
Why was 90 days detention contested when a number of lives had been lost at the hands of 
terrorists on July 7th 2005 and why did such negativity surround the police requests? One 
explanation was the requirement for substantive proof from agencies; a requirement 
warranted following the emerging evidence surrounding Iraq, the WMD fiasco and the 
Hutton enquiry. 
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6.6.1: Police provisions: 
The influence of the police over the executive aroused much of the concern regarding clause 
23 justifications. Intrinsic themes for the increase of pre-charge detention focused on the 
threat faced, the time required to fulfil investigative requirements, the nature of 
internationalism and the necessity for prevention which had forced a different approach in 
policing. By listening to police advice, critics insisted that a number of damaging features 
would be created by clause 23. Although the integrity of the police was not called into 
question, the support which the government had shown to police proposals was based on a 
two page summary provided by ACPO in July 2005.833  
Reliance on police assessment was of concern for a number of MPs.834 Concerns were 
emphasised in the second chamber that the duty of parliament as the legislature was to 
‘temper the demands of various parts of the executive and their agencies’.835 Whilst the 
executive should listen to the advice of agencies, they should not accept them blindly. With 
a key justification of ‘acting on police advice’ the balance had to be made by parliament not 
the police.836 Lord Hurd of Westwell indicated:  
‘Ministers should not suspend their own powers of judgment, or come to 
Parliament telling us that it is the view of the police or the agencies so we must 
accept it. Nor should the police urge Parliament to suspend its views or judgment, 
but that is what has been happening’.837  
None of these claims against the position of the police, however, underestimated the 
difficult task which the police perform. This included the primary task of protecting citizens 
from crime and terrorism. It was reiterated that the job of parliament was to balance the 
‘primary task’ of the police with other considerations including institutional history, liberty, 
judicial procedure, presumption of innocence and habeas corpus.838 Based on the 
unsubstantiated evidence to support police claims, of necessity there were concerns that 
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‘work would expand to fill the time allotted’.839 This concern was intensified when it was 
perceived that: 
‘If one has not found out what one wants from a suspect in 14 days of questioning, 
I cannot think of a conceivable legitimate reason that, on its own, can be a ground 
for further detention’.840 
Comparison was also made with the lack of detention measures across Europe. It was asked 
why police in the UK needed the extension contained in clause 23 when nations such as 
Spain, who had experienced similar events to the UK with the Madrid bombings, had not 
required such extension of powers.841 As established in the ATCSA 2001, the reply reiterated 
that comparisons were not possible based on the ‘very different legal systems’ operating 
across Europe.842   
Whilst concerns about clause 23 based on police justifications were evident, support for 
police provisions was also present. This support was grounded primarily on the proximity of 
the threat demonstrated by the events of 7/7. Support focused on the need for parliament 
to take advice from ‘experts’. Professional judgements were held to be undertaken in all 
fields and the professional judgement of the police should be no exception. The situation 
which the UK was in had no scientific resolve and, therefore, judgements by the police 
offered a ‘professional best estimate’.843  Ultimately when the lives of citizens are at stake:  
‘Members must think   very carefully before rejecting the advice of professionals 
who have all the facts at their disposal, and who make honest and straightforward 
recommendations to the Government of the day, using professional knowledge and 
expertise that we, inevitably, cannot share’.844  
The fact that police had requested 90 days as a maximum and not as the norm, 
compounded with provisions of judicial review and a sunset clause it was arguably 
demonstrated to parliament that the intention of the clause was a genuine commitment to 
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go only as far as necessary in response to the threat. In light of the fact that attacks were 
taking place in the UK it was articulated that: 
‘If I am not well, I seek the advice of a doctor. If I have a legal problem, I seek advice 
from a lawyer. If I have a security problem, I seek advice from the police. That is 
exactly what our Government have done, and they have acted on it. If we want the 
police and the security services to protect the citizens of our society, we must heed 
their advice or suffer the dire consequences that are very likely to follow’.845      
Even in light of the expertise offered by the police, questions were raised over the 
calculation of 90 days pre-charge detention and particularly its necessity.846 The lack of logic 
in 90 days pre-charge detention was deepened by the lack of evidence to support the 
current use of 14 day pre-charge detention.  
On the wider issue of the success rate of detention Mr Mullins informed that house that of 
the:  
‘895 people arrested under the TA 2000 up to 30th September 2005, only 23 were 
charged—not convicted, but charged—with any form of terrorist offence. Some 
300 others were charged with other offences, some of which were quite minor, and 
496 were released without any charge at all. Under the Bill, it would have been 
possible to hold those 496 people for up to 90 days instead of up to 14 days, as can 
be done at the moment’.847  
This point was later resurrected by Mr Greive who again questioned the real value and 
necessity of such extreme legislative moves.848 When challenged why no one had yet been 
detained for 14 days, suggesting the leap from 14 to 90 days to be unsubstantiated,849 the 
Home Secretary indicated that the 14 day limit was precisely the reason why the small 
number of cases referred to in discussion had not exceeded the 14 day detention period.850 
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Relying on statistics to substantiate debate, Mr Khan assessed previous detention records 
in line with quantifying data recognition and hard drive assessment post release of a 
suspect. Mr Khan expressed that: 
‘Since the change in the law in 2004, there have been 11 instances of detention for 
13 to 14 days, and in all of them the detainee has been charged. There have been 
12 instances of detention for between seven and 13 days, and in all of them the 
detainee has been released without charge. In none of those cases has someone 
been rearrested once the computer has been decrypted or further evidence has 
been gathered’.851 
This particular assessment brings into question the actual value of decryption and the 
necessity of the provision grounded in the time taken for decryption. The indications from 
this statement by Mr Khan suggest that, whilst decrypting information does take longer, the 
value may not justify the necessity of cost to rights and liberties. However, the need for 
intelligence and the time taken to decrypt continued to unfold throughout debate. Whilst 
some warned of the potential damage caused by not listening to the experts852 based on a 
‘little bit of knowledge about computers or encryption’,853 others maintained that whilst 
encryption work was clearly needed, 90 days was not an appropriate period of pre-charge 
detention.854  
The Home Secretary explained to the house that the unequivocal advice from the National 
Technical Assistance Centre was that ‘a 14 or even 28-day period will not allow them the 
time they need adequately to investigate the most heavily encrypted data’.855 The pervasive 
nature of modern encryption and the need for forensic requirements could lead to the 
hardest cases taking months.856 Whilst this expert advice demonstrated, at least 
theoretically, that it could take months for examinations to be completed the necessity of 
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clause 23 failed to be accommodated. The argument, whilst convincing for extension from 
14 days, failed to arouse a totally justifiable timeframe for extension to 90 days.857  
Professional advice from agencies such as the SIS, GCHQ, the Home Office, the Foreign 
Office and the police remained pertinent. This network in dealing with terrorism is a 
resource ‘unparalleled’ in any other jurisdiction’ and, as such, warranted some reliance on 
their advice. It was presented that simply discussing individuals of real concern requires 
more than 28 days. The experience of dealing with issues of an international agenda 
demands a longer pre-charge detention period than 28 days.858 Although, as seen earlier, 
the international nature of investigations were similar in time, resources and transnational 
relationships to that associated with white collar international investigations. With such a 
framework already operational the claims for detention periods may be redundant.  
Another consideration in supporting clause 23 remained the emphasis on the interpretation 
of ‘up to’ 90 days pre-charge detention. The ‘up to’ consideration meant precisely that – 
simply giving police the buffer zone required if they could justify to a judge the need for the 
extension.859 It did not dictate that in all cases suspects would be detained for 90 days. It 
was also utilised in support of the use of existing legislation and how efficiently measures 
had been warranted: 
‘I also draw comfort from the fact that, over the past two years under the current 
laws, only 11 people have been held for the full allowable period and all 11 were 
charged. That suggests that the new legislation will be used sparingly and only 
where the likelihood of charges being brought is high’.860  
As such, the record of actions under the existing legislation supported the notion that 90 
days would be used in accordance with the necessity to do so. This position however failed 
to prove the necessity of clause 23.   
Outlining the timeframe of evidence gathering from 7/7, it was identified that it took over 
two weeks for the emergency services to gain access to all the sites required just to extract 
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the necessary evidence. This was extended by a further six weeks required to complete the 
examination of forensics. A total of 42 days was therefore required to complete 
examination. This, according to Martin Linton, rendered beyond doubt that the current 14 
day pre-charge limit would have been inadequate had there been survivors to prosecute.861 
This observation, however, does not coherently justify an increase to 90 days,862 it simply 
acknowledges that had there been any survivors (suspected of terrorist links) there would 
need to have been time to gather evidence before any arrests were made. These 
observations generated two further challenges. Firstly, that whatever legislation was in 
place it would not have prevented the events of 7/7,863 secondly, was a return to the logic 
behind clause 23. As Mr Heath noted, whilst the extraction of evidence took 42 days, the 
same argument would have been presented by the police if requesting 120, 365 days or 
even permanent detention.864  
When dealing with anti-terrorism legislation, it was acknowledged that both the police and 
the government may be afforded the benefit of the doubt in decision-making, however, 90 
days pre-charge detention was identified as exceptional without substantive proof of 
necessity. Claims by government that the police needed time to extend inquires and encrypt 
footage held limited resonance865 and, for some encountered the same problems in an 
increase from 14 to 28 days.866 It was identified that exactly the same arguments as those 
presented to the house in 2003 had been presented again but with no added substance.  
Against the backdrop of 7/7 it would have proved difficult not to consider the 
recommendations presented by the police and the government, particularly in light of the 
Carlile report. Parliament had to establish just how far they would be prepared to go along 
with extensions in powers of detention, modest or otherwise.867 The lack of a ‘proper police 
working group, no systematic assessment of their experience and international experience, 
no discussion of options, and no evaluation of the difference between 30, 60, 90 or 
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120 days’.868 This undermined the influence of the police requests for extension of pre-
charge detention periods. Indeed, whilst the house accepted the need for longer detention, 
evidence substantiating 90 days was not forthright requiring revaluation of pre-charge 
limits.869  
Challenge towards the need for 90 days pre-charge detention was well established 
throughout debate, alongside this, the illogical nature of the number of days selected also 
permeated the amendment requests to extend the period from 14 days to 28.870 It was 
presented that, in discarding the police requests for an extension to 90 days based on it 
being an arbitrary deadline, the same issue of an arbitrary deadline could surely be 
extended to the members’ arrival and support (for the majority) for the extension of pre-
charge detention to 28 days.871 It was assumed that although the need for an extension had 
been successfully presented the extension to 90 days was enormously damaging and could 
wreck lives. Whilst the world had changed since the IRA halted its terror campaign, the 
inability to calculate the necessity of 90 days left room for possible abuses of power. No 
justification was ever provided by the police for why they wanted 90 days as opposed to any 
other period. The government adopted 90 days as their mantra on the back of a press 
release and the images of two victims of the 7/7 atrocities,872 neither of which sustained the 
90-day thesis.873 This was furthered by the need for parliament to be seen not to ‘reject 
police advice’. A lack of ‘concrete reasons’, ‘scientific explanation’ and an apparent plucking 
of figures from the air, led to a compromise of 28 days pre-charge detention based on the 
threat.874 The reality remained that the arrival at the period of 90 day pre-charge detention 
was not as a result of an ‘exact science’. With advantages and disadvantages to 90 and 28 
days respectively, 28 days would be an acceptable compromise to parliament.875  
                                                          
868
 HC Vol. 439, Col. 375/376, J. Denham. 
869
 HC Vol. 438, Col. 389,  P. Robinson. 
870
 Elfyn Llwyd questioned whether extension of pre-charge detention was even required at all, indicating that 
he would be ‘reasonable and open to argument in deciding whether to agree to some form of abridgement’. 
This appears the only point throughout the debate where the case for the need for extension was raised at all.  
HC Vol. 438, Col. 383/384. 
871
 HC Vol. 439, Col. 348, I. Lucas. 
872
 See The Sun newspaper Tuesday 8
th
 November 2005. 
873
 HC Vol. 439, Col. 505, D. Grieve. 
874
 HC Vol. 438, Col. 934/935, K. Clarke; HC Vol. 438, Col. 351/352,  C. Mullin; HC Vol. 439, Col. 503,  D. Grieve. 
875
 HC Vol. 439, Col. 542, P. Robinson. 
Page 236 of 323 
 
Arguments remained fluid over the number of days deemed acceptable for detention 
without trial to satisfy the needs of the police in dealing with terrorism. Further to this, it 
was also mooted that other methods could be used instead of relying on such extended pre 
charge detention. In two separate debates David Davis referred to alternative methods 
which could be used to reduce the need for such extensive periods of detention. 
Referencing the five terrorism acts the Labour government had introduced between 1998 
and 2005, Mr Davis felt that the number of worthwhile provisions had not prevented the 
atrocities of 7/7. This alone was proof that the battle against terrorism could not be won 
with terrorism legislation alone. Mr Davis noted that working in conjunction with anti-terror 
legislation, the government could do more to secure borders. Immigration and asylum were 
not isolated topics of discussion from terrorism and throughout the period examined, the 
government released a number of papers discussing immigration and asylum. However, as 
7/7 demonstrated, the threat remained just as prevalent from within. As such, Mr Davis 
suggested further that the government might fund the security services properly by 
scrapping ID card plans and facilitating real investigations into suspects. The final suggestion 
by Mr Davis, in a bid to facilitate anti-terror legislation, was to appoint a minister to deal 
directly with terrorism. The expertise held by this individual and the ability to coordinate, 
draw on information and resources, work internationally with developments in legislation 
and advise committees, parliament and other public authorities would all help, according to 
Mr Davis, in the fight against terrorism which, as established, legislation alone could not 
do.876 Legislation, according to David Davis, however, could be used to help tackle some 
areas aligned with the prevention of terrorism. As Mr Davis notes:  
‘One argument says that it takes time to crack encryption codes to access evidence 
on computers. That argument is dealt with by invoking the powers in the RIPA 
2000, which made withholding such codes a criminal offence’.877  
These options were similar to those presented by the NGO, Liberty in the JCHR report.878 
There was no doubt that the extension of pre-charge detention in clause 23 to 90 days 
aroused concerns over the conflict between extension in powers and Article 5 ECHR.879 This 
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potential conflict was clearly raised by the JCHR, however, this was referenced less than 
anticipated throughout debate. When raised as being on the cusp of acceptability with 
Article 5 ECHR880 and with the potential for invoking considerable incompatibilities with 
PACE rules,881 it was identified by the executive that such infringements, if indeed they 
existed, would be entirely a ‘matter for the Home Secretary’.882  
As noted from the outset of this chapter, clause 23 was amended from 90 to 28 days pre-
charge detention by its arrival at the second chamber. The proposition for 90 days 
detention, however, was still considered by the House of Lords. Even though this debate 
had no influence on the amendment to 28 days, it would be detrimental to later analysis if a 
brief overview was not provided. With a similar content of debate to that identified in the 
House of Commons, particular emphasis within the House of Lords addressed: the proximity 
of threat,883 public opinion towards 90 day pre-charge detention,884 the independent report 
by Lord Carlile of Berriew,885 the increasing nature of the threat posed by technology886 and 
the use of experts in addressing the international nature of the threat faced.887  
6.6.2: 60 day pre-charge detention: the amendment: 
Even though it has been demonstrated that there were numerous arguments highlighting 
the advantages and disadvantages of 90 and 28 day pre-charge detention, it cannot be 
ignored that an isolated debate took place in the House of Lords which considered an 
amendment from 28 to 60 days pre-charge detention.888 The amendment presented in the 
House of Lords was an attempt to deal with doubts within the House who ‘genuinely feared 
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that up to 90 days was a step too far’ but who felt 28 days might not be sufficient.889 Much 
of the debate referred to was resurrected from the House of Commons with little to add to 
the ‘mythical’ magic formula for arrival at a pre-charge period of detention.890 Lord Sewel 
presented arguments in favour of 60 day detention with conviction. He identified a number 
of benefits to the increase from 28 days but the decrease from 90 days to a medium of 60 
days. For Lord Sewel this potential for 60 day pre-charge detention required at least the 
opportunity to be tested and, for him, a strong case existed for the extension from 28 to 60 
days. The safeguards already inbuilt into the process got the balance right between ‘security 
and liberty, between collective rights and individual rights’.891 Although some felt the 
increase to 60 days was necessary, as the result of decreasing from 90 days, others felt that 
the increase to 28 days should be tested before considering an increase to 60 days.892 The 
moves from 7 to 14 to 28 days were dreadful enough, however, further extensions of 
executive powers through pre-charge detention were considered by the majority in the 
House of Lords to be wrong in principle.893 The final school of thought was those who were 
in favour not because of their interpretation of the arguments but because of uncertainty 
whether ‘28, 60 or 90 days offers a complete solution to our problems’, deciding to ‘come 
down in favour of the middle ground—the 60 days’.894 This argument is less than fool-proof 
within the decision-making process, but is possibly reflective of how some members arrived 
at their interpretation of pre-charge detention.     
6.7 Concluding remarks: 
The events of 7/7, similar to 9/11, provided a visual and emotive backdrop to the 
introduction of the ATCSB 2005. The speed of the TB 2005 through parliament, unlike either 
of the acts already examined, provided greater opportunity for parliamentary challenge and 
scrutiny. Each of these themes explored at the outset of this chapter create a picture in 
which discussion on the TB 2005 was framed with; the acknowledgement that constriction 
on liberties would not necessarily enhance security. The events of 7/7 demonstrated that 
                                                          
889
 HL Vol. 677, Col. 1217, Baroness Ramsey of Cartvale. 
890
 Arguments included listening to the advice of Lord Carlile, allowing the police the time they needed to do 
their jobs properly, increase of technical capabilities of terrorists requires more time (Vol. 677, Col. 1215/1216, 
Baroness Park of Monmouth). 
891
 HL Vol. 677, Col. 1209/1210, Lord Sewel. 
892
 HL Vol. 677, Col. 1230, Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws. 
893
 HL Vol. 677, Col. 1233, Lord Henley. 
894
 HL Vol. 677, Col. 1221, Lord Clinton- Davis. 
Page 239 of 323 
 
the UK remained vulnerable to attack, subsequently leading to explicit discussion that in 
some cases a balance may be required between rights and security. This illustrates that in 
some cases it is not perceived that individual rights should take priority over collective 
needs, each of which compounded debate on clause 23.      
Early in the gestation of the TB 2005, the JCHR concluded that 90 days would have been 
disproportionate based on the deficiencies in the procedural safeguards for the detainee, 
and further, that it could bring about ‘independent breaches of Article 3 ECHR’.895 It was 
accepted that, whilst the current pre-charge detention period of 14 days needed extending, 
this had to be proportionate to the threat. The legitimate aim was ultimately for parliament 
and the courts to decide.896 
It is possible that 7/7 realigned the balance of security with the interference of rights which 
could be legitimately restricted in the interests of public safety and national security.897 As 
the legitimate aim of the TB 2005 was, according to the JCHR, for ‘parliament to ascertain’, 
debate within parliament should have considered the necessity and proportionality of the 
Bill. As observed by Mr Malik, the question for the house was: 
‘not whether an increase is needed, but whether 90 days is justifiable. I am not 
100 percent convinced, but there is some reassurance(…)’898  
These reassurances for supporting 90 days lay: 
‘in the fact that Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of terrorist legislation, is a 
strong supporter of the Bill, and that extending the pre-charge period will require 
judicial review every seven days’.899   
These ‘reassurances’, however, did not prove the necessity and proportionality of the TB 
2005, rather, they simply identified safeguards; first from the opinion of an independent 
reviewer on anti-terror legislation itself; and second, on the safeguard of judicial review 
embedded within the process.     
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Whilst a number of issues were raised and debated on the need for 90 day detention, the 
question of how the government came about the increase from 14 – 90 days lay in the 
requests of the police.900 In presenting their justifications for supporting the police requests, 
the executive demonstrated a clear lack of testing applied to ascertain the ‘necessity’ of the 
extension of pre-charge detention. This lack of interrogation was a clear chink in the armour 
of the executive’s claims that the moves were necessary and an easy means of challenge to 
those unconvinced by the extension of power but who may not want to explicitly advocate 
against the detention period for fear of repercussions on their political status. 
Scepticism, however, came not as a result of the infringements of rights which may occur as 
the result of introducing 90 day pre-charge detention, but that it had not been proven that 
such extension was necessary:  
‘The Prime Minister is on the record as saying that the   case for the extension to 
90 days is "compelling". He   clearly believes that there is such a case, just as he 
believed in those famous weapons of mass destruction. However, the proven case 
for 90 days, like that for the weapons, simply does not exist’.901  
Against the backdrop of the Hutton enquiry and the expanding repertoire of intelligence, 
information and reports to emerge on Iraq and the WMD, the overarching principle 
remained proving the necessity of measures. This request for proof diametric to the ‘taken 
on trust’ approach was adopted by the Shadow Home Secretary regarding the measures 
contained within the ATCSA 2001.902 It was not sufficient to justify the extension for 
provisions based on claims over the length of time taken to deal with issues of terrorism 
overseas based primarily on the lack of sufficiently integrated procedures internationally.903 
This justification however remained flaky and devoid of substance. On this matter, the JCHR 
received advice from Professor Clive Walker who argued that, while there may have been a 
quantitative change since October 2003 when the period was last extended to 14 days, 
placing a greater strain on police resources, there had not been any significant change in 
qualitative terms: all the reasons now relied on by the police as reasons for the extension 
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were also relied on in the debate in October 2003 for the extension from 7 to 14 days and 
therefore ‘a proportionate case is not made out’.904 
In the on-going search for proof, lack of access to evidence remained a key concern for both 
parliament and the judiciary. Such limitations support the view that governments often 
place significant emphasis on the need for extra security but often without providing 
sufficient evidence.905 This aside, with greater encroachment on individual rights, Ashworth 
suggests that ‘there is a heightened need for supporting evidence rather than a mere 
assertion of worst case scenarios’.906 As discussed in the introduction, as the exploration of 
90 day pre-charge detention increased it became apparent that ‘balance’ was an inadequate 
means of examining if and how rights are compromised in order to protect security and that 
the legal requirement of ‘proportionality’ became the bedrock of challenge when demands 
for proof were requested in order to ascertain necessity.  
Confirming the existence of consequentialist opinion within parliament and the focus on the 
role of the police, it was suggested that:  
‘Is it really such a hardship to spend up to—and only up to—three months in 
custody, protected from abuse by the whole force of the law, if you have given the 
authorities reason to believe that you are a possible threat, and a great deal of 
possible supporting evidence exists that must be examined? We must not, in 
fighting for the rights of the individual prisoner, forget that the police are doing 
what society requires of them’.907  
Although society might require the police and other services to protect security, society also 
require the police to enhance freedom. Such catch-all statements overshadow the notion 
that there needs to be a balance performed in every decision made and in every individual 
case. Speaking in such clinical terms deflects from the reality that whether legal or 
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theoretical in the understanding of rights, decisions are rarely so clear and easy to make. 
The contested nature of rights - what they are, who they protect, when they are overridden, 
when they are absolute - all feed into the arrival at a decision where balance or compromise 
has been considered and hopefully rationalised.  
As established, the consensus to emerge from both parliament and the JCHR remained that 
extension of pre-charge detention powers was not disputed but the length of detention 
was. Unsophisticated assessments of this moral dilemma emerged within debate: 
‘to have one or two people perhaps—perhaps—held in gaol for a few days extra: 
that loss of liberty. Which is more important? That loss of liberty or the loss of life? 
I know which side I am on’.908 
Justifications such as these are particularly unrefined in that there is a failure to review the 
underpinning principles of what is essential not only legal (satisfying proportionality and 
necessity), but also moral. If this response was a comparison between the state killing and 
the state removing liberty then the statement makes sense but if it is between the state 
removing liberty and the state trying to avert a threat it is different. The threat, risk and 
infringement are not necessarily proportional and run counter to historic principles of 
justice.  
In situations and times such as this where security demands are high on the populist 
agenda, human rights must be protected, and indeed why they are legislated for:  
‘Suspected terrorists often claim respect for human rights – some of the very same 
rights they have violated themselves in their acts of focused or indiscriminate 
victimization. This raises the question of whether terrorists too should be allowed 
to enjoy human rights. The answer is ‘yes’. People accused of terrorist acts have 
human rights. That is exactly the difference between a situation of the rule of law 
and a situation where law is arbitrary. Do they have the same rights as victims? 
Again, the answer is ‘yes’, although this might go against our own feelings of 
justice. Everybody is equal before the law’.909   
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The comparison between these quotes emphasises the diametric interpretations held within 
parliament between rights, security and how these can be protected in a climate tainted by 
catastrophic events such as those presented by ‘New York, Nairobi, Sharm el-Sheikh, Bali—
tragically twice—Madrid and even in the period since the introduction of the ATCSA had 
been attacks in Amman and Karachi’.910 
Whilst the prospect for 90 day detention fell in the House of Commons, it did not go 
unnoticed that the moves had been supported by nearly 300 MPs.911 There was evident 
concern for the balance of 90 days, however, the role of the parliamentary whip and 
enforced voting were looming.912 On reflection of the falling of clause 23, emphasis was laid 
on the role of the democratically elected house in making such decisions,913 countered by 
claims that: 
‘Those in another place have changed the Bill in the period of detention 
permissible. That is of course their right in a democracy, but in a democracy I can 
also say: I believe that to be a profound misjudgement’.914 
Confidence was placed in the functions of parliamentarians to ‘debate and to strike a 
balance between conflicting and competing demands’ – a function which the liberal 
democrats felt they executed effectively.915 The amendment to 28 days was seen to remove 
a major barrier in support of the legislation.916  There was, however, clear concern from the 
Home Secretary about the house’s decision to ignore the professional advice of law 
enforcement and prosecution agencies.917  
Although this aversion to accepting professional advice received support, the effectiveness 
of legislation remained an issue of contention, particular whilst support for 90 day pre-
charge detention floated around the chamber. David Davis, unconvinced with such 
extension in the legislation offered:  
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‘to give way now to any hon. Member who can cite a single terrorist incident in this 
country that would have been averted by the 90-day proposal rather than by good 
police work or implementation of laws that are already on the statute book’.918  
This was further maintained with specific reference to the events of 7/7 when it was 
acknowledged that:  
‘It should be borne in mind that not a single life destroyed by the mass murderers 
on 7 July would have been saved if the clause had been in operation’.919   
It was clear from the analysis of TB 2005 that, unlike the previous two Bills examined within 
the thesis, the grounds on which to challenge were available in the public domain. Whilst 
clause 23 was amended from 90 days to 28 days pre-charge detention, it was never 
explicitly rejected because of the infringement on rights which such extended period of 
detention may have, but because of the failure by the government to demonstrate the 
necessity of moves. The wider political influences of the Iraq war, the Hutton enquiry and 
previous claims of WMD, all of which had been used in previous debates to orchestrate 
support, rebounded to undermine the strength of executive claims. This Bill unlike the 
previous two, was not about to be accepted on ‘trust’ alone. As discussion on 90 day pre-
charge detention did not pass between the Commons and the Lords, interaction between 
the two chambers was not a matter of concern for analysis yet it became apparent from the 
analysis of the House of Lords that not all members of the chamber were averse to 90 pre-
charge detention. What remains from this analysis is that, as with the earlier examinations 
presented, the ability to ascertain the emergence of discussion on ‘balance’ in the 
justification of measures is limited to the acknowledgement within the wider debate that 
‘balance’ has to be made.        
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Conclusion: 
‘Politics is about the relation between alternative interpretations, and whoever’s 
interpretation is legitimised enjoys power’920  
Overview of the thesis:  
From the outset of this thesis, questions have emerged over the rights and security nexus. 
Through accepting that balance exists, or at least is required, there comes the assumption 
that the protection of one right can be better than the protection of another. As identified 
in Section I, problems in the balance metaphor arise as there is an assumption that 
collective interests of security can be weighed against individual interests.921 This 
interpretation of balance, therefore, implies that a simple objective answer can be made on 
a calculated basis. This is too simplistic a dichotomy. Rights discourse assumes that there are 
certain things that should not be permitted as part of general political (state) power, even if 
they are there to protect the majority and that there are some things (e.g. torture) which 
should never be permitted. To conceptualise the discourse as a simple matter of balance is 
to lose some of the nuanced power of rights in protecting individuals from the tyranny of 
the state and of the majority. A further problem is that known interests are weighed against 
future uncertainties as prospective risk always threatens to outweigh present interest. Risk, 
amalgamated with security, rhetoric, and situational framing, supports ‘security’ as a 
slippery and open textured concept. The result is that it ‘furnishes a justification for widely 
divergent policies and practices’,922 acting as a catalyst in allowing the influence of risk and 
uncertainty to tip the balance.   
Through both detailed qualitative textual analysis and quantitative examination of 
parliamentary debates on UK anti-terrorism legislation during the period of 2001-2006, this 
thesis has tracked the influence of balance between terrorism, security and rights in official 
                                                          
920
 Ward, I. (2004); An introduction to critical legal theory; Pp. 148. 
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 This becomes further compromised if the individual also falls within a minority group which may be 
indiscriminately targeted. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, Liz Fekete has commented on the impact 
of post 9/11 anti-terror legislation on Muslim communities. As such, members of minority groups arguably 
face double incursions as both individuals, and further as a member of a minority group. This impact on 
minority groups whilst discussed in the wider debate, was not an emergent trend to the case studies 
examined. 
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 Zedner, L. (2005); Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal Justice. Pp. 516. 
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political discourse. It has been established that balance not only raises conceptual problems 
but also procedural problems in who performs balance: parliament or the courts. This 
procedural issue and the disputes and matters raised by it arise in, though are not fully 
analysed through, the present study, their full consideration lies out with the present work.  
Further to this, the quantitative findings demonstrated that balance was documented less 
frequently than anticipated. The quantitative chapter also presented findings from wider 
debates containing discussion on terrorism, security and rights. These results exhibited 
similar data to that found in the case studies.923  
Following the broader quantitative examination, Section II focused on a single case study 
from each anti-terror Bill examined. The aim of this was, through a system of coding, to 
determine the influence of balance. As identified in the introduction, there were two criteria 
for the selection of a case study. The first criterion was that the case study had to have been 
raised as a concern by the JCHR; this ensured that the case study legitimately raised human 
rights concerns. The second criterion was that the justification of security had to be 
demonstrated by the executive as a justification in warranting measures. As with the 
quantitative data presented in Chapter Three, the qualitative findings demonstrated that 
explicit balancing between rights and security was limited. On examination of the debates, 
the conceptual notion of rights and security, procedural concerns between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, the influence of case law, the influence of the HRA directing new 
constitutional practices and the global concerns over international terrorism, all fed into a 
complex recipe often resulting in a failure to deliver effective oversight throughout debate.   
As a backdrop to the thesis, the introductory chapters considered whether: concepts such as 
rights and security are either measurable and/or comparable and where the process of 
balance lies – in parliament or the courts. Following these considerations, the thesis moved 
to identify the use of ‘balance’ through specific case studies and consider whether balance 
had been used to legitimise rights or security. By addressing this question, it was hoped that 
the concepts explored within Chapters One and Two which provided the backdrop to this 
thesis, would be illuminated through the examination of the central question.  
                                                          
923
 In most instances, the number of debates engaged in was significantly higher than that found within the 
case studies. 
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To explore the central question in this thesis, analysis was performed by examining the 
political discourse of parliament. The purpose of this analysis was not to assess the 
legislation and its compatibility with international instruments; Nor to consider the potential 
repercussions of its enactment. Neither was the purpose of this thesis to provide definitive 
assessment of the rights and security debate. Rather, the purpose was to examine the 
processes undertaken in parliament as identified within political discourse so as to 
determine positions on the anti-terror legislation examined; and examine the richness of 
the debate concerning human rights and security and how effectively Parliament considers 
each and balances their competing expectations in its law making.   
Chapter One examined the conceptual notions of security, rights and balance establishing 
that if balance is not grounded in intelligence or evidence established on real threat but on 
projected numerical assessments of attacks, then rights may be unnecessarily eroded. 
Chapter Two assessed the relationship between oversight mechanisms and the resulting 
influence of the HRA on the judiciary. It also reviewed the reports of the recently created 
JCHR as an additional, though not constitutionally embedded, parliamentary oversight tool. 
This chapter established that the balance metaphor does not rely on myths or theory but on 
the need for rigorous scrutiny of the conditions under which security claims warrant the 
suspension of rights. Therefore, whilst accepting that the executive and legislature can 
instigate restrictions and legislation during times of national emergency, there is no doubt 
that if one is to trust in the separation of powers doctrine to provide legitimate legislation, 
oversight mechanisms must operate in their true role, each arm of power needs to have 
mechanisms to encourage full and reasoned consideration and ensure the correct 
procedures are followed, these mechanisms must be robust and fully adhered to. It is 
imperative that the executive and legislature do not overstep the powers and duties 
afforded within the separation of powers framework. As a check on their powers, the 
judiciary may be drawn in at a later stage to examine the legitimacy of actions performed in 
the creation of legislation potentially identifying infringements, sometimes infringements on 
the rights of individuals. Failure of the executive and the legislature to operate in their true 
role risks extensions of powers which can ultimately compromise the authenticity and 
legality of the legislation created. Although the separation of powers is intended to keep 
checks and balances, to prevent abuse of power, for it to operate intelligently parliament 
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should learn from or at least properly deal with not just the decision of the courts, but the 
reasoning in the case-law leading to actions by the executive and the legislature remaining 
within the boundaries of their power ideally delivering security whilst also ensuring 
individual rights. Chapter Three presented the quantitative analysis from the House of 
Commons from the period of September 2001 – until March 2006, using the control factor 
‘rights and security’ as essential in the selection of the measures being examined. This 
chapter identified the balance of rights and security as being less explicit than anticipated.  
Chapters Four, Five and Six each addressed one case study from each of the Bills reviewed. 
Chapter Four reviewed the necessity of derogation as a result of the inclusion of Part 4 
within the ATCSA 2001. Chapter Five reviewed the incorporation of control orders and the 
difference between derogating and non-derogating orders. Chapter Six reviewed the 
discussion of clause 23, which presented 90 day pre-charge detention, followed by the 
resulting observation of proposed 60 day pre-charge detention within the House of Lords. 
The central aim of this thesis has been to identify the use of ‘balance’ through specific case 
studies and consider if this is used to legitimise rights or security in establishing support, or 
used in rejection of draft legislation within UK anti-terror legislation between the periods of 
2001-2006. Findings of this thesis identified four overarching themes:924 
(1) Parliamentary systems: 
- speed killed debate reducing the opportunity for effective review; 
- the lack of structure within parliamentary debate made examination of intricate 
details and logical and effective debate difficult to achieve; 
- anti-terrorism legislation cannot be explored as an isolated issue. 
(2) Issues of contents– the lack of legal challenge: 925 
- In these debates there was a lack of legal expertise or lack of its use within 
parliament to argue points of law; 
- the findings of the JCHR and other committees especially the Home Affairs 
Committee, ministerial speeches or any other observations and analysis from the 
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enormous amount of literature available  failed to be fully integrated into the 
parliamentary review procedure, in many instances these materials were not even 
mentioned. Further, they were not effectively used to inform important issues of 
parliamentary debate such as how balance should be assessed.  
(3) The limits of ‘balance’: 
- difficulty remains over which oversight mechanisms produce balance; 
- limited use of balance was demonstrated; the result of focus on the establishment of 
necessity and proportionality 
(4) Rhetorical misconceptions – the misrepresentation of law and concepts: 
- the belief that collective security is a right which can be orchestrated to outweigh 
individual rights generating conflicting interpretations of risk and displayed a lack of 
understanding of rights discourse; 
- the use in debate of principles such as liberties rather than rights may have skewed 
data especially as the differences between these terms were not understood; 
- that the initial quantitative coding was performed using strict criteria to code rights 
and security, however, as the qualitative findings demonstrated, the misconception 
of rights actually generated debate not based on balancing rights against security 
within the strict criteria identified in the quantitative findings, but rather, a balance 
on individual rights against collective rights.    
 
Parliamentary Systems: 
This examination has identified a number of findings. The first theme assembles findings 
which collectively considered are seen as fuelling the parliamentary system. The first of 
these is the speed with which legislation is able to pass through parliament. Both the ATCSA 
2001 and the PTA 2005 moved through parliament with great pace.926 Such speed 
potentially killed debate927 thus reducing opportunity for in-depth review of draft legislation 
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 The speed of the Bills cannot be simply adjudicated on by the duration of the Bill through parliament, but is 
reduced further to the days and hours spent discussion the legislation. For example, as Simon Hughes noted in 
relation to amendments suggested to the ATCSA ‘One of the terrible consequences of this procedure is that 
we have an hour in total for this debate’. (HC Vol. 376, Col 923, S. Hughes). 
927
 It is not forgotten that parliament has the right to reject legislation irrespective of rationale for doing so, 
however, rejection based on the speed of the Bill through the house was considered unlikely, particularly in 
the early stages based on majority party weighting guided by Labour party whips.  
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supporting the findings of Brazier et al928 and meaning that the government control of the 
time to debate legislation (often along with its majority in the commons) ensures it enjoys 
significant control over the outcome of legislation. As noted in the findings, concerns raised 
over the speed of Bills accrued a significant percentage of discussion points.929 By raising 
these concerns, MPs took up precious time which could have been better spent addressing 
the quality and implication of the Bill however, such discussion indicated they understood 
the controlling nature of time constraints and the dangers they posed for good law-making. 
The quantitative findings support this observation with significant concern raised over the 
speed with which these Acts passed through parliament. Even though there is no evidence 
to prove the impact that the speed of the process has had, it cannot be overlooked that the 
limited timeframe in which to examine, analyse and debate the Bills left legislation 
vulnerable to ineffective scrutiny within parliament. 
Whilst the speed with which the Bills moved through parliament undermined the thorough 
examination of them, this problem was exacerbated by a lack of structure in debate. 
Although clauses were considered systematically when voting on the Bill, the lack of 
structure in the House of Commons in the early review stages hindered effective scrutiny. 
This was most apparent when coding the first and second readings of Bills. On commenting 
on the Bill, a number of speakers provided their overarching observations of it rather than 
drilling down to fundamental concerns. Although the opportunity to address matters 
existed, debate was too wide ranging to provide effective scrutiny. This format also left 
speakers vulnerable to distraction of challenges from other MPs, therefore, further reducing 
the conviction of the speech.930  
While the sporadic nature of review was less obvious in the House of Lords, the lack of 
scrutiny appears to be facilitated by a lack of structure in the review process. The paucity of 
structure within debate also hampered the review of committee and House of Lords 
amendments within the House of Commons. As the quantitative findings demonstrated, it 
was at these stages that rights and security discussion appeared at its lowest.  
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 Brazier, A., Kalitowskil, S., Rosenblatt, G., and Korris, M. (2008); Law in the Making: Influence and Change in 
Legislative Process. 
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 This was specific to the ATCSB 2001 and the PTB 2005 examined. 
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 Intentional or not, throughout MPs interjected with non-related links which then skewed debate slightly as 
the speaker dealt with the interjection. This in itself ate into the time the speaker was permitted on the House 
floor. 
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This issue cannot be completely independent from the speed of Bills through parliament. 
The lack of coherent debate may further be considered a factor in the lack of clarity 
emerging from the examination of the rationale, effectiveness, and legality of measures. 
Whilst throughout debate there is evidence that apprehensions were raised, thorough 
considerations of these failed to emerge within the case studies examined. The legislative 
discussion consisted more of disjointed comments than of a proper debate of the important 
issues. In many cases concerns about human rights or security were mentioned but no 
debate over these took place. There was never in-depth consideration of any issue which 
meant that balance was never really considered, merely mentioned by some 
parliamentarians.  Whilst the Lords provided a little more in the way of debate this was only 
a marginal improvement and even in the Lords there was not clear and full rational 
consideration of rights, security or how they should be balanced in a free society. This leaves 
concerns of clarity and legality unchecked beyond their superficial acknowledgment.  
Bridging between both the House of Lords and Commons furthered the considerations 
raised over the contents of debate; this research made clear that anti-terror legislation 
cannot be explored through a single lens as a standalone issue. As was identified within the 
quantitative findings,931 debate outside of anti-terrorism legislation932 raised similar 
percentages of rights and security based discussion to that found within anti-terror 
legislation.933 These discussions, although not directly attributable to the debate found 
within the case studies examined, cannot be overlooked as influential on debate whether 
through assessment or the dissemination of information. With a lack of time available to 
discuss anti-terror Bills, the opportunity to utilise wider political debate to rationalise anti-
terror legislation appears to have been missed. The discussion entitled ‘Human Rights’ on 
the 19th November 2001 presents a clear example of how discussion on anti-terror 
legislation found itself being rationalised outside of the debate which was being considered. 
This overspill of discussion on anti-terrorism legislation into non-legislative debate supports 
the notion that parliamentary systems interfered with the ability of parliament to scrutinise 
law effectively. The speed of the process and the structural paucity of debate appears to 
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 Found in Chapter Three. 
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 Political debate included ‘Acts of International Terrorism’, ‘Middle East Peace Process’, ‘Northern Ireland’, 
‘Afghanistan War’, ‘Defence Policy’, ‘International responses to terrorism’, ‘Coalition against terrorism’, ‘Iraq 
War’, ‘International Terrorism – generic discussion’, and ‘other debate’. 
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have driven debate outside of the legislative parameters and into a wider socio-political 
debate. These faults become magnified when we look at the scarcity of debate and 
particularly the lack of legal challenge.    
Issues of Contents – the lack of legal challenge: 
The problems caused by lack of time, structure and the illogical attempt to isolate issues are 
exacerbated by the content of the debate. This is in what it omits, but also the inferences 
made and interpretations presented buttressed by a lack of legal expertise or at least a lack 
of use of legal expertise within parliament.  
From the review of the case studies (above) and the wider statistical review of 
parliamentary material (in Chapter Three), it was apparent that a lack of, or use of legal 
expertise within parliament impinged on its ability to scrutinise with the utmost effect. This 
observation supports the thesis proposed by Tolley934 that parliament has an insufficient 
number of legally trained members to promote effective human rights debate. It is argued 
that this facilitates an unwillingness to engage in deeply entrenched legal debate and 
therefore, focus is drawn to contestable debate framed within socio-political terms. As 
noted above, this corresponds with the observation that political debate outside of anti-
terrorism legislation was used as a tool to justify, grasp and challenge issues of contention. 
The lack of legal expertise, or at least the lack of challenge to legal anomalies, was amplified 
by the lack of structure within debate (see above). Each of these factors enabled challenges 
to be structured around the individual strengths of the speaker rather than responding to 
the deep-seated legal problems ingrained within the Bill. The case studies indicated that 
neither rights nor security were sufficiently discussed through a legal lens.935  
Law is but one weapon in a massive political arsenal depoliticising political discourse. 
Discussion throughout the case studies, appeared to centre on often crude value 
judgements not fully proven nor even explored in a rational discussion.936 The lack of or use 
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 Tolley, M. (2009); Parliamentary Scrutiny of Rights in the United Kingdom: Assessing the Work of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights. 
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 This was particularly evident from the supporters of 90 day pre-charge detention found within the TA 2006 
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of legal expertise within parliament may also underpin the limited use of and reference to 
case law in validating or challenging proposed measures. Even following the decision in A v 
Secretary of State (Re A),937 the case studies show that debate within parliament lacked 
discussion of the case and its judgements.938 This supports the observation that either the 
legalities of the case pushed the boundaries of parliament’s legal understanding beyond its 
operable limits, or, reinforces that the boundaries between the legislature and the judiciary 
should not be blurred and, therefore, should remain autonomous of one another. However 
interpreted, it was apparent from the examination carried out that court judgements were 
not utilised to their fullest capacity. Parliament failed to learn from them or to deal with the 
weaknesses they pinpoint in the law-making processes.  Although the separation of powers 
is intended to keep checks and balances, to prevent abuse of power, for it to operate 
intelligently parliament should learn from or at least properly deal with not just the decision 
but the reasoning in the case-law.    
Linked to this, and exacerbating the problem, is the issue that not only did parliament fail to 
learn from external sources such as judgements in cases, but it also failed to utilise the 
expertise available to it through the rigorous review of the Bills performed by various 
parliamentary committees especially the JCHR and the Home Affairs Committee.  Evidenced 
within both the quantitative and qualitative findings, the JCHR reports were not used to 
their optimal capacity; in fact, at important junctures in the debate, they were often ignored 
and even when mentioned their discussions were not rationally explored. There is a growing 
field of literature reviewing the JCHR, its history, its functions and its anticipated evolution. 
The pre-legislative scrutiny process performed by the JCHR is a comparatively recent form of 
parliamentary scrutiny. As Smookler notes:  
‘The government decides which Bills should be subject to the process and, whilst 
they are under no formal obligation to accept any recommendations for 
amendment, the act of committing a Bill to pre-legislative scrutiny indicates a 
willingness on their part to improve it’.939  
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With the government’s influence over the process through which the direction of scrutiny is 
dictated Hiebert940 identifies several functions for the JCHR to work properly and provide 
another layer of parliamentary scrutiny to underpin decisions. First, its reports must be 
perceived as being motivated by principled and not partisan deliberations. Second, it must 
be able to review Bills and report back to parliament within a time frame that allows 
parliament to make use of its guidance. Third, it must be generally independent of 
governmental influence. Fourth, the Committee must command the respect of other 
parliamentarians and its reports must be taken seriously in parliamentary discussions - a 
position strengthened by the reputation and credibility of the JCHR legal advisors.941  
Feldman942 suggests that the JCHR satisfies functions one and three of Hiebert’s 
requirements; he acknowledges that the JCHR has developed its working methods to ensure 
that its ‘legitimacy and influence’ are likely to be maximised by parliament. These methods 
include the legitimisation of its findings by relying on independent bodies including 
government departments, and NGOs.943 The importance lies in the promotion of 
transparency in processes by publishing and evaluating correspondence with departments; 
coordination with other committees within parliament to best achieve the right balance yet 
maintain respect of the separation of powers between parliament and the courts as the 
committee ‘is not an adjudicative body’.944 As such, the JCHR objective becomes to ‘engage’ 
parliamentarians and government in human rights discussions. 
The second of Hiebert’s requirements seems to have been met in the case studies examined 
in that the JCHR reported in time for their reports to be used by parliament.945  The problem 
is, therefore, that their reports are not sufficiently utilised. These reports are highly 
respected by others; consequently, the lack of their use by parliament is perplexing and 
suggests a failure on the part of parliament to perform its function as an effective oversight 
mechanism. The scarcity of reference to the findings within the JCHR reports, coupled with 
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time for deliberation of draft legislation and as such Hiebert’s second requirement is not completely satisfied.  
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the lack of legal expertise within parliament suggests that resolution of this problem could 
be fostered through a mandatory review of JCHR reports and findings as part of the 
legislative scrutiny process performed by parliament.946 This would both allow for and 
encourage critical review of the findings thus potentially reducing anomalies in legislation 
which appear later through the findings of the courts.  
With greater emphasis on the work of the JCHR, MPs would be able to utilise the expertise 
and scrutiny afforded through the JCHR reports on to the Bill under review. The reports 
used by parliament would ‘inform and lend credence to their own means of seeking changes 
to a Bill’.947 Whilst the overall effectiveness of the JCHR in its current format has been 
questioned,948 more appropriate use of JCHR reports may cause a Bill to be challenged on a 
greater number of legal issues as a result of the knowledge gained from the reports.  
The JCHR however is not a standalone committee in the examination of anti-terrorism 
legislation. There is an enormous amount of literature which parliament could and should 
call upon. Digesting and examining these materials will in turn lead to a more intelligent law 
making process. Official reports from the Home Affairs Committee explicitly addressed the 
advancement of anti-terror legislation making recommendations based on the quality of the 
legislation presented, the need for continuous independent review of anti-terror legislation 
and the limited scrutiny legislation receives as a result of the speed through which 
legislation can be passed through parliament.949 Yet even with these explicit observations 
and recommendations, they remained overlooked and ignored, not even mentioned let 
alone considered (in its official capacity) from consideration throughout the debates 
examined.950 The limited use of such materials further demonstrates the paucity of 
parliamentary discourse in that broader discussions are not being utilised. Outside of official 
parliamentary reports, whilst it is noted that references were made to the media and its 
relationship with the legislation examined, it is argued that the media is used merely as a 
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backdrop to the debate based on the influence of the populace rather than as the result of 
any intellectual examination intended to enhance either the legislation itself or the 
procedural implications. As such, the use of these materials are considered less robust in the 
quality of their considerations and therefore, when relied upon in contrast to official 
reports, do not offer the same rigorous examination as that found in academic centric 
advice and recommendations, the impending result that debate remains ill-informed and 
shallow in depths of assessment. This reliance on the media suggests that MP’s are 
accurately aware of the influence which decisions made and positions advocated in 
parliament can have on later hopes of re-election choosing to advocate a position popular 
with the electorate rather than a more controversial challenge to the legislation.951          
However this is viewed, the influence of committee reports, and indeed their effectiveness, 
can only be as good as the use of the information documented. The ability of the JCHR 
amongst other committees to compile information, particularly in areas where it has been 
identified that parliament demonstrates weakness, can only be considered as strengthening 
parliamentary oversight if utilised to its best capacity. By applying information compiled by 
specialist committees who have been assigned to acquire, analyse and report on the Bill 
under review, parliament will strengthen its ability to challenge the executive and call it to 
account but, more importantly, will enhance its ability to pass balanced and fair legislation. 
The likely consequential effect of this would be to reduce the need for judicial oversight at a 
later stage by reducing the likelihood of the incompatibility of legislation with Convention 
rights. Not only will this reassert the historic function of parliament, but further, it 
legitimises decisions as rigorous scrutiny will be made by elected representatives reflecting 
the ‘will of the people’. 
The limits of ‘balance’: 
Identified from the outset of this thesis questions remained over the performance of 
oversight in the balance of rights and security. While academics such as De Londras have 
supported the independence and experience of the courts, the legitimacy of the judiciary as 
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an oversight mechanism is well documented.952 It is important not to simply undermine the 
value of the judiciary in the quest for balance, but to consider its role alongside the 
continued effective oversight of executive actions. As such, judicial legitimacy may arguably 
be seen through three principles: the courts as guardians of principle, the courts as tamers 
of politicians’ passions and the courts as arbiters of competence.953 Each of these principles 
extends support for the legitimacy of the judiciary as an oversight mechanism. However, 
although courts claim to objectively apply the law, all cases are necessarily affected by 
individual judicial discretion and the influence of this should not be forgotten. It is this 
discretion which has previously demonstrated inconsistencies in interpretation of the law by 
the judiciary, most notably here, the conflicting judgements made by Lord Hoffman in the 
cases of Rehman954 and Re A v Secretary of State.955  
To suggest that functions and discourses are competing assumes that somewhere previously 
criteria have been obtained to achieve legitimate standards. With the need to protect 
individuals from incursion on individual rights from political power substantiated as the ‘will 
of the people’, the legitimacy of standards of interpretation of the law need to be derived 
from a source other than the opinions of an individual judge, strengthened by the 
independence of the judiciary from political arms of government. This independence 
facilitates an unbiased and objective assessment of the legality of acts and decisions of the 
executive.956 However, even though judges claim objective application of the law the fact of 
their differing interpretations and judgements displays that there is some individual impact.  
For that reason, parliament should open up the issues discussed by the judiciary in order to 
clarify where the law should be.    
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The correct allocation of power between judges and politicians is not something which has 
yet been fully or objectively distilled, maybe this is not possible; rather it depends on one’s 
personal opinion as to the relative merits of elected and judicial institutions.957 If arguments 
are powerful enough they can be used to make others believe it is some metaphysical truth 
– a persuasive ‘meta-language’ used to convince those unaware of actual meaning.958 
Indeed, as Charles Clarke identified, ‘judges assess risk and what is necessary, weighing the 
public interest on the one hand against the need to protect the liberty of the individual on 
the other’.959 This therefore questions the oversight role performed by parliament (as this a 
role which parliament should be doing but fails to achieve in some circumstances) and 
further challenges whether it is a role that simply plays lip service to historic principles. This 
would certainly support the proposition that based on the parliamentary system, challenges 
to the executive, whilst acknowledged, often achieve very little change. Political challenge 
as previously established is stifled by the lack of legal knowledge within parliament. This 
inadvertently draws the judiciary into the process of balance as the oversight of balance 
based on principles of law are not made within the debate stages. Whether this is an 
established process is not clear from this research. The very fact that parliament invariably 
fail to integrate or examine what the judiciary are saying whether to agree or to disagree, 
suggests that parliament is not using the processes necessary to achieve proper, and 
legitimate balance. The judiciary have the opportunity to take a more discursive view on the 
legislation, its weaknesses, its strengths and indeed its legitimacy within the wider European 
framework. There is no question that with effective review of judgements and judicial 
discourse, as well as a full and rational consideration of the findings of relevant 
parliamentary committees parliament could have gained a significant insight into the 
balance between security and rights (particularly within the scheme of the European 
framework). This absence of a refined review of judgements and judicial discourse arguably 
places the parliamentary decision making process into question calling on, in particular, the 
lack of integrity applied in ascertaining the most informed deliberation of legislation 
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inclusive of its potential shortfalls.960 As mentioned above, to prevent abuse of power and 
for it to operate intelligently, parliament should learn from or at least properly deal with not 
just the decision but the reasoning in the case-law.  
This fundamental problem in balance between process as well as concepts is further 
strained by the influence of the HRA on the judiciary. The judiciary have now been perceived 
as a hybrid constitutional model, ‘straddling two rival theories: parliamentary sovereignty 
and judicial supremacy’.961 In reality and most notably since the enactment of the HRA:  
‘The courts determine the constitutional standards. Even with a range of wider 
influence, the courts perform the final analysis in determining whether the 
particular regime adopted by the legislatures actually satisfy those standards’.962  
The HRA has forced decisions to be made by the courts which formally would have been 
made by politicians in that judges can test parliamentary decisions against the standards set 
in the HRA. Despite the erosion of differences between what judges do and what politicians 
do, Nicol963  identifies an important difference between politicians and the judiciary, namely 
teleology. Whilst politics is a teleological activity, collective teleology is strained among 
politicians because, as Nicol notes, politicians hold a number of different ideals which are 
reflected by their different positions in the party spectrum. This could mean that politicians 
are more interested in promoting the strengths of their own parties’ commitment and in 
denigrating the capacity of other parties than in properly protecting rights.964 Contrasting 
this, under the HRA the judiciary appear to have a more united sense of aims with the Law 
Lords devoting much of their time to enforcing Convention rights and ensuring all legislation 
is within the vires permitted by the HRA.  
If a variety of legitimate justifications can be substantiated, then finding an absolute answer 
will prove an impossible task.  Established earlier, the incorporation of the HRA into the UK 
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changed the dynamics of judicial strength. Following the decision in Re A,965 comments on 
the influence of the decision were presented outside of parliament. In a speech in Kuala 
Lumpa, Cherie Blair praised the decision in Re A966 stating it as a landmark decision which 
showed the world that governments, even during crisis, must act within the law and voicing 
that any response that undermined basic values ‘cheapens our right to call ourselves a 
civilized nation’.967 As Feldman notes, Convention rights form part of the matrix of standards 
for both the courts and parliament. While courts decide whether legislation is compatible 
with Convention rights, Parliament must decide its legitimacy. In the end, parliament is 
supreme but must indicate that it is intentionally interfering with rights – if it does, it should 
explain why, so reducing the possibility of challenge.968  
The crux of this thesis lies in the establishment of balance as an influence in the rights 
security debate within political discourse. It was apparent throughout this examination that 
explicit discussion of balance between rights and security was limited; rather, critical 
assessment of the influence of evidence and intelligence in ascertaining necessity and 
proportionality of measures emerged. If balance cannot be grounded in intelligence, 
evidence or established on real threat but is rather based on projected numerical 
assessments of attacks or on unsubstantiated fears, rights will be unnecessarily eroded.969 
Such erosion of rights was demonstrated within all three case studies examined through 
indefinite detention, control orders and 28 days pre-charge detention.  
The focus on establishing the necessity of measures failed to progress examination to 
balance rights and security to satisfy grounds of proportionality. From the examination of 
the case studies, it emerged that challenges made to the measures examined were 
substantiated by the requirement of proof of necessity of moves overshadowing debate on 
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balance.970 This may have been constricted further by the speed of the Bill through the 
house facilitating only limited evaluation.  
Even with such hazy metaphors as ‘balance’, challenges to the government must be made. It 
is well evidenced that parliament has a responsibility to challenge the executive. Ignatieff 
suggests that to prevent executive power from ‘getting out of control’ in the war on terror, 
the UK had to strengthen the systems of parliamentary review.971 The ability to review 
legislative propositions engages a number of areas including social, political and 
international conditions. Irrespective of the position subscribed to, it must be supported by 
rigorous analysis of evidence. Securing greater information allows for rigorous 
parliamentary scrutiny to determine not whether an emergency exists, but whether the 
scale and nature of the threat is sufficient to warrant such measures.972   
The request for proof became particularly prominent following the WMD investigation 
which, consequently, infiltrated debate on the TA 2006. As identified from the case studies, 
parliament constantly strove for detailed information to be made available, arguing that 
access to this information could enhance a more meaningful and independent examination. 
The fact that 90 day detention was reduced to 28 demonstrates that parliament can and 
does make amendments to legislation. However, what this does not demonstrate is that 
there was a specific balance undertaken between rights and security to arrive at this 
reduction. In fact, as noted above, the arrival at a number of 28 was arguably just as 
arbitrary as the original 90 day provision. Even though it may be contended that the 
reduction in pre-charge detention from 90 days to 28 demonstrated a small victory for the 
role of parliament in its function of scrutinising executive actions, likewise, the increase 
from 14 days to 28 was based on the same evidence as presented for the increase to 90 
days. There was no rational justification for the extension of detention to 28 days, just 
simply the supposition that 28 days was better (or rather that it was less invasive)  than 90.  
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The reduction to 28 days exposed that challenges were made to the executive; however, it 
fails to detract from the lack of evidence required by parliament to support measures. The 
executive were not forthcoming in presenting evidence and proof of measures thus 
orchestrating an acceptance of infringements on individuals, whether proportionate or 
otherwise, based on ‘trusting’ the Home Secretary. This was particularly clear in debate on 
the ATCSA 2001.973 Such approaches continue to place emphasis on the need for security 
measures to demonstrate why they are encroaching upon rights. This includes an emphasis 
on risk assessments of actual risk, residual risk and intelligence based threat assessments, all 
of which have to be substantiated by evidence and most of all, accountability demonstrated.  
Security and rights, therefore, appear to be underpinned by the novelty and intensity of the 
threat evoking risk assessments, preparation of moves and consultation of effective 
measures. The second parameter looks at the limits of the proposed exceptional measures 
within the Bill – its necessity, legality and legitimacy.974 A lack of explicit use in the balance 
process clouds the rationale for true arrival at an end position in debate. From the 
assessments demonstrated in this research it would appear that the ‘impossibility of 
eradicating risk’ determines the realistic benchmark in how far measures should be 
stretched in favour of security or rights, not the explicit balance as previously expressed. It is 
however essential that to properly alight on the right laws, parliament has first to properly 
perform, full and in depth analysis of the issues; this was lacking in the debates analysed. 
 Rhetorical misconceptions – the misrepresentation of law and concepts: 
The findings above have addressed considerations such as lack of legal knowledge within 
debate, considerations of parliamentary systems and the limits of balance both through 
oversight functions and the conceptual interpretation. A number of these findings feed into 
the fourth broad theme to emerge which observes the misuse of key concepts.  
It was clear from the outset of the quantitative coding process that the interchangeable use 
of rights and liberties emerged as if they were identical protections. However, as damaging 
as this was, particularly from a quantitative perspective, the continued proposition of 
collective security as a right, directed debate between rights and security into a balance 
                                                          
973
 Refer to Chapter Four discussion to see this position. 
974
 Bigo, D and Guild, E. (2007); The Worst Case Scenario and the Man on the Clapham Omnibus. Pp. 108. 
Page 263 of 323 
 
between individual rights and collective rights. As noted in Chapters One and Two, varying 
interpretations remain over the understanding of the concepts of rights and security. It was 
particularly evident from within the House of Commons that an assumption existed that the 
‘right’ of security existed, often demonstrated through a collective security agenda. Whilst 
security of the individual is explicitly protected through various legal instruments, such as 
the ECHR, ‘collective security’ is not a legally protected right. It is, however, an ‘interest’ 
which states can use to contain certain rights granting enhanced power to the state.975 
Indeed the perception of collective security reinforces the early subscribed to observation 
that the lack of legal expertise within parliament hinders thorough debate of the issues.  
As examination into parliamentary debate unravelled, it emerged that an amorphous 
acceptance of collective security as a right existed in seemingly the same, if not superior, 
status to individual rights; through supporting ‘collective rights’ via security measures, 
individual rights’ protections may suffer. As identified in Chapter One, the Canadian 
Attorney General Irwin Cotler976 and Australian Attorney General Phillip Ruddock977 both 
advocate reconceptualising counter-terrorism legislation as ‘human security legislation’ to 
reduce the animosity between rights and security. This is directed towards securing the 
necessary preconditions for the enjoyment of human rights themselves.978 However, to 
accept the notion of anti-terror legislation as human security legislation may still facilitate 
the violation of rights, but through a rhetoric which may offer greater support to security in 
the underlying balance.979 As identified from the case studies, the protection of individual 
rights did not appear as the dominant rationale for challenge or rejection of measures, but 
the requirement of proof that measures were necessary to protect the public was 
demanded. Individual rights would, therefore, be curbed if public or ‘collective security’ 
could be warranted. Whilst the political discourse established has not been framed within a 
‘collective security’ framework, the analysis would indicate support of Hoffman’s analysis 
that the integration of ‘human security’ legislation may legitimise the violation of rights, 
through the rhetoric of greater support to security in the underlying balance. 
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This notion of collective security is further complicated by the reliance on risk and threat to 
substantiate provisions in support of security. In viewing risk through this lens, the 
protection against risk on the grounds of security through collective security (a notion 
established not to be a legally protected right)980 increases risk of harm to individual rights. 
‘Risk’ is frequently referenced in the restriction of rights and the extension of security. 
Therefore, the notion of risk is often used to try to claim that pre-emptive measures are 
legitimate.981 Accepting these boundaries it is arguable that, as with many other 
uncertainties captured within this debate, these influences on justifications of security 
create a further layer in the balance debate by incubating two competing risks; the risk from 
an attack competing against the risk to individual rights. Although these risks can be 
marginalised (with some known influences such as which rights may be infringed), the real 
assessment remains in ‘calculating the incalculable’.982 As with the examination undertaken 
to establish whether a balance between rights and security exists, in practical terms, the 
process of weighing up contributory factors received limited exposure throughout debate. 
From the analysis this limited exposure to exploring the underlying considerations to 
warrant such extension of measures was frustrated by the lack of information and evidence 
presented by the executive. Therefore, against the backdrop of ‘collective security’ as a 
notion, the lack or use of legal knowledge within debate within which to challenge, MPs 
were able to manipulate the concepts to fit their political interests and particularly how 
decisions would be received by their electorate. This was demonstrated in Chapter Four on 
the discussion over derogation whereby each of the major parties proposed measures 
which arrived at the same outcome but via a different method. This arguably supports the 
notion, that particularly within the House of Commons, the scrutiny of legislation is just as 
much about politics and voter support as it is about either security or rights. This 
observation enhances earlier findings that to incorporate the findings of the JCHR (a cross 
party body with strong independent membership) would legitimise decisions arrived at 
within parliament on the backdrop of effective scrutiny having been performed to justify the 
stance presented within the reports. 
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Cotler and Ruddock’s aspiration of ‘human security’, combined with the earlier observation 
by Tosulska983 that justice is no longer a protected right, penetrates parliamentary debate 
and fosters the moral aspiration that a right to collective security exists. This leads to the 
opening of debate and examination of what commonwealth counterparts are observing in 
the realms of collective security as a protected right. Collective security emerges as the 
‘theoretical’ protection to the legally protected individual right. Collective rights are not 
enshrined in law but are merely a linguistic tool used to interfere with rights and the 
protections offered to collective security cannot be substantially legitimised legally, should 
challenge arise.  As such, whilst the notion of security can, where necessary in a democratic 
state, be used to restrict certain rights such as Articles 8-11 ECHR, the use of collective rights 
to justify a blanket justification for infringing individual rights, may misguide the direction of 
debate. This demonstrates yet another example of where the incorporation of the 
committee reports would guide parliament in their examination of measures, allowing for 
informed debate and instructing MPs of the awareness of the way in which rights are 
prioritised and when certain calls in support of security measures may be available.  
This lack of clarity over legal principles, the conflation between liberties and rights, and the 
notion of collective security compromised much of the initial coding process. Whilst 
throughout the initial quantitative coding there were explicit differences between rights and 
security, it became apparent as the qualitative investigation evolved, that the 
misconception of rights what they were, who they extended to and, the framework within 
which they operate, had in fact generated a debate not based on balancing rights against 
security, but rather, individual rights (freedom) against collective rights (security and 
control). This ultimately changes the dimension of discussion within parliament. 
Infringements on rights appear acceptable, irrespective of their incursions (unless absolutely 
prohibited such as under Article 3 ECHR), providing that the executive can prove and justify 
why such measures are necessary. Therefore the ‘collective right’ to security, whilst 
arguably rationalised through threat and risk assessments, both attributes of the security 
framework - remained consequentialist; the ‘collective right’ of the majority prioritised over 
the infringement of individual rights. If this line of analysis and law-making continues it is 
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likely that legislation will be increasingly challenged as laws are being forged using incorrect 
ideas of legal concepts.   
Summary of thematic findings: 
Each of the findings presented above feed into the collective overview from the research 
process undertaken. The broad themes, upon which each of these findings fits, cannot be 
considered as isolated discussion points. As identified above, a number of findings link 
between the themes expressed here, identifying a number of weaknesses within the 
parliamentary system as an oversight and law-making mechanism. This displayed most 
alarmingly through the lack of legal rigour and rational debate throughout the process. A 
number of the findings result as the consequence of a further observation to the original 
examination, as such, the interweaving between the themes make it difficult for findings to 
be clinical in nature or addressed as standalone issues. The inherent interdependence 
between a number of the observations and findings within this thesis, indicate that this may 
be an inherent problem associated with assessing political discourse and more importantly 
addressing issues of concern.   
Key limitations of the thesis: 
A number of limitations during the coding process and analysis have impacted on the 
fluidity of this thesis. Although the sporadic nature of the structure of debate was identified 
as a finding, this was further compromised by the passing of Bills between the chambers. It 
was evident from this examination that debate within the House of Lords underpinned a 
substantial quota of challenges made to the Bills with the House of Lords debate partially 
compensates for the paucity of debate in Commons where the assessment never really got 
beyond political rhetoric. Taking only a snap-shot of the debate, therefore, compromises the 
underlying content analysis hiding the real lack of analysis of the debate within the 
Commons.  
Even with both quantitative and qualitative assessment of parliamentary debate, findings 
remain limited. This is compounded further by the findings already discussed above. As 
such, further examination is required to ascertain a better understanding of how anti-terror 
legislation proceeds through parliament and the tools used to examine the legislation. By 
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reflecting only a snapshot of the legislation through the lens of a specific case study for each 
Bill, the depth of detailed consideration of specific issues is strengthened whilst the validity 
of any summative conclusion is weakened.  
A further limitation of this study is the difficulty in the evaluation of rights and security 
based on the contestability of their composition. As Evans and Evans have identified, the 
subjectivity of the concepts gives rise to ‘pervasive disagreement’. This is particularly so with 
rights. The evidence in support of rights’ theory is soiled with ‘the peculiarities of context 
and the idiosyncrasies of the observer’.984 Indeed, what one group may regard as a step 
forward for rights, another may regard as a violation or even an abuse of rights. Ultimately, 
this contestability means that, in many instances, there is no external standard to which the 
evaluator can appeal.985 This subjectivity with parliamentary debate could have been 
minimised with the incorporation of the JCHR reports. This would have provided a clear 
platform from which every MP could work from, however, as previously demonstrated, 
even when there is a helpful context and level of knowledge, it is not utilised. The 
preference seems to be to use and interpret rights and security to fit their own agendas and 
not to illuminate or really explain debate diminishing the ability to delineate definitive 
answers from this assessment leading to debates and legislation based on political rhetoric 
rather than on ethical and rational considerations 
Applied Recommendations: 
The findings of this thesis can be used to justify some applied recommendations. First, in 
instances where concerns over the legality of legislation are raised, legal advice should be 
sought and externally sourced if required. To retain parliamentary sovereignty this may be 
achieved through a more stringent application of committee findings into the parliamentary 
review process. The embedding of committee reports such as those from the JCHR, the 
Home Affairs Committee, and supplemented with ministerial speeches and other expert 
examination such as that marginally applied in this process through the work of David 
Pannick QC prior to debate, may alert MP’s to further concerns contained within the 
legislation beyond that of those raised within the parliamentary discourse alone. By utilising 
these external materials and calling on such a plethora of expertise, decision-making powers 
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remain within parliament who ultimately assess, amend and vote based on the broadest 
possible scope of material and the likelihood of or need for judicial intervention/review 
should thereby be diminished. There is an enormous amount of literature which parliament 
could and should call upon which will in turn give a more intelligent law making process. 
Relying on the breadth and depth of literature available, including written resources and 
oral evidence from expert panels, information can be absorbed by the ‘decision makers’ and 
effective and reliably informed challenges to inadequate legislation can be entertained by 
parliament. Applying this knowledge allows parliament to perform its oversight function in 
the most effective manner.    
A second recommendation is to create a systematic process by which examination of 
legislation is guided through parliament. This would ensure that debate is clear, focused and 
available for optimum scrutiny. This would be triggered by the first reading of a Bill. 
Although a clear structure was evident on the voting procedure for clauses within the Bill, 
the process of coding demonstrated that there was a cataclysmic approach to raising issues, 
concerns or support of measures. Debate churned through the speakers in the House, and 
failed to allow an informed debate, but did enable party political discourse to be espoused. 
As such, even if issues of significance were raised, interventions often diverted the speaker 
from developing, expanding and informing the house of the issues being raised. In creating a 
systematic process by which the examination of legislation is guided through parliament, 
the reports of committees such as the JCHR and Constitutional Affairs Committee could be 
utilised to focus debate on the deep rooted concerns with a Bill and create a structure by 
which issues cannot be overlooked or ignored but are given time for effective scrutiny.      
A third recommendation is that, to enhance a wider discussion and thus potentially 
generate a more sophisticated debate, it may be beneficial to the scrutiny process if Bills 
requiring derogation from the ECHR to satisfy the conditions contained within it received a 
minimum number of hours on the house floor to ensure effective scrutiny. By standardising 
this process in line with the development of a systematic process of debate, not only might 
debate be enhanced, but further, it reinforces that legislation cannot be squeezed through 
parliament without sufficient opportunity to examine the potential repercussions of 
legislation. In providing minimum standards of review, parliament may have enhanced 
capacity to research and obtain expert advice and guidance to facilitate a critical assessment 
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in line with the first recommendation outlined above; however this can only be achieved if 
parliament utilises the materials available to it. Parliament has the opportunity, information 
unavailable to the wider public and discourse from case law both domestic and European. 
They also have access to a variety of parliamentary committees yet none of these resources 
are being used efficiently or effectively within the parliamentary assessment of legislation. 
By arguing that there should be a requirement to utilise a minimum standard in which 
parliament should engage these materials a number of conditions will be satisfied including 
a checking procedure on the powers being used as well as providing a legitimate cross 
examination of the legislation itself. As discussed on page 250, a significant number of 
resources are available to provide parliament with a sufficiently educated forum for debate 
within a broader holistic picture. Although MP’s are not expected to be experts on 
everything, they should be encouraged to seek wider advice from academics, NGOs, and 
other consultation procedures to enable parliament to construct effective oversight. Once 
all these resources have been utilised it is imperative that parliament use them. Failing to 
manage the information with which parliament have now been armed they will remain 
forever less capable of making intelligent and effective legislation. As the European agenda 
and wider influences penetrate the UK’s constitutional understanding of human rights and 
their application, access and use of these expert findings and external resources might 
encourage parliament to embrace rights and consider how best to guarantee their respect 
whilst still delivering on other requirements such as ensuring the security of citizens. It may 
further give them a flavour of the current human rights climate which reflects both the 
needs of the legislation and the individuals affected by the creation of inadequate legislation 
rather than focusing on the negativities which some people associate with some aspects of 
human rights application.986  
Whilst these recommendations do not directly address the issue of ‘balance’ between rights 
and security, each recommendation would broaden the scope for discussion to emerge.  
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Concluding remarks: 
Striking the right balance between security and rights is crucial for both the success of anti-
terror measures, the maintenance of long held democratic principles and the reaffirmation 
of confidence that the liberty of individuals will be protected.987 Post 9/11 debates have 
emerged publically, politically and legally, all of which have tried to rationalize the 
boundaries between security and rights.988 However, arguments appear so interwoven that 
it is impossible to identify definitive balance. Professor Bobbio explains that:  
‘The fundamental problem concerning human rights today is not so much how to 
justify them, but how to protect them. The problem is not political it’s 
philosophical’.989  
This claim by Bobbio, however, may not be correct. Whilst Bobbio might be right in his 
supposition that the problem may not be political, in law-making it also may not be 
philosophical. As exposed throughout this analysis, there appears to have been a clear lack 
in the incorporation of legal instruments, guidance and expertise in establishing the so 
called balance between rights and security. The UK’s European and International obligations 
have influence over domestic legislation, and as such, these legal protections cannot be 
viewed as an attachment to domestic law, but must work in collaboration with one another. 
By drawing on international reports, examining human rights such as those of the Office to 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the JCHR, parliament will be 
better placed to protect them. If Bobbio’s claim is correct and problems are not political but 
philosophical, the balance metaphor is unlikely to ever be rationalised within debate as the 
subjective nature of philosophy will continue to leave the balance of rights in uncertain 
terms.  
Holding both rights and security as equals seems contradictory and untenable; it is difficult 
to maintain both an ideal of rights relying on internal and external commitments whilst at 
the same time being fully committed to the ideal of national security. The central aim of this 
thesis was to identify the use of ‘balance’ and consider its use to legitimise rights or security. 
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From the examination of both the PTA 2005, and TA 2006, there was evidence that at the 
very least a limited weighing up or ‘balance’ between rights and security was required. 
However, the quantitative findings demonstrated that ‘balance’ was not significant in 
legitimising rights or security.  
Having established a number of themes within rights and security discussion, the impact of 
risk, the requirement of proof through intelligence and evidence and the debate 
surrounding oversight mechanism, the balance metaphor does not rely on myths or theory 
but on the need for rigorous scrutiny of the conditions under which security claims warrant 
the suspension of rights.990 This is a test this thesis demonstrates parliament fails to fulfil; a 
test performed by the courts. Although it has emerged that courts perform this role, it does 
not have to be a role performed by the courts. This role could effectively by undertaken by 
parliament if effective scrutiny was performed before legislation received Royal Assent; If 
they were to take JCHR and similar debates seriously parliament991 could successfully 
conduct this test and open this issue up to wider scrutiny thus reducing the opportunity and 
need for challenges to be made in the courts. If challenges did then arise in court, the 
discussion on balance would be likely to be curtailed, and likely to affirm the law made by 
parliament. This process would reaffirm parliament as an effective oversight tool and place 
law-making more clearly back with parliament, the courts only occasionally needing to act 
as a check and balance.  
What this research identifies is that the influence of ‘balance’ does not emerge within 
political discourse as a justification in the anti-terror legislation examined. The quest for 
balance raises issues beyond simply rights versus the security debate, including discussion 
on the parameters between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. These 
parameters between the executive, judiciary and parliament are enshrined in the balance 
debate and grounded in fundamental problems in the initial scrutiny phase by parliament. 
The executive are not suitably challenged due to a number of reasons including speed, 
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knowledge and political affiliation.992 For these reasons, bad legislation is created which 
eventually becomes challenged in the courts. This returns full circle to earlier observation 
that if parliament scrutinised effectively and in line with legal understandings, the scrutiny 
would facilitate rights and security balance within political discourse. What at first was seen 
to be a balance between rights and security does not emerge as the dominant debate but 
one constricted by a number of wider issues. Issues include friction between the elected and 
the unelected, the influence of judicial review and the establishment of necessity without 
further consideration of their proportionality.  
Looking at the opportunity to balance, it is important first of all to consider whether 
legislative procedures identify proposed legislation that raises potential human rights issues; 
and secondly, whether parliament triggers discussion to give proportionate attention to 
human rights’ issues.993 This thesis, therefore, does not look at the output of the legislation 
which can be influenced by the weighting of parliament but whether expert advice is 
sought, whether committee reports are introduced to reflect and discuss concerns, whether 
challenges are made to at least suggest that scrutiny occurs. Without such processes 
parliament undermines its role as the oversight mechanism and hands primacy intentionally 
or otherwise, to the judiciary. As has been seen, this is manifested by the incorporation of 
the HRA into the constitutional framework of the UK. 
What this research has demonstrated is that a number of external influences impact on 
parliamentary debate.994 As such, the ability to ascertain precise data of how parliament 
actively legitimises legislation becomes too difficult a task. The findings identified at the 
start of this chapter also identify that a number of weaknesses exist in the review of 
legislation performed by parliament. Failure to challenge areas of compatibility, whether to 
support the need for extension of powers as legitimate, proportionate and necessary, or to 
demand that such incompatibilities are ratified before legislation is agreed to, demonstrates 
that parliament may no longer be the democratic voice it once was.  
                                                          
992
 For further discussion see; Brazier, A., Kalitowskil, S., Rosenblatt, G., and Korris, M. (2008); Law in the 
Making: Influence and Change in Legislative Process. 
993
 Evans, C and Evans S. (2006); Evaluating the Human Rights Performance of Legislatures. Pp. 551. 
994
 See page 243 for review on external influences 
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It became too easy to accept the introduction of sunset clauses to justify extension of 
powers. Parliament had access to a number of resources and expert advisors to support in 
the challenge of executive measures; most notably the findings of the JCHR.995 The lack of 
reference to the JCHR and other parliamentary committees in both the quantitative and 
qualitative findings suggests that the effectiveness and expertise available were either not 
considered substantive enough to use, or more alarmingly, were unknown to members of 
parliament or, even more alarming, were not understood and subsequently ignored. If this 
is so, the increasing influence of the HRA in the UKs constitutional system may suggest a 
more permanent footing for the JCHR to work within, as identified by the recommendations 
in this chapter.  
Even though commenters suggest that parliamentary challenge is redundant due to the 
executive’s ability to ‘flood parliament’ for important votes, the reality is that very little 
challenge to issues of concern was documented. As such, irrespective of potential for 
flooding the house, even limited challenge remained limp. This undermines the potency of 
parliament as an effective oversight mechanism with the failure of MP’s to provide effective 
scrutiny. What this lack of challenge also demonstrates is a lack of theoretical underpinning 
to the foundations of modern politics. There appeared to be little confrontation between 
MPs from opposite ends of the political spectrum examining issues, challenging one another 
to justify why their interpretation is superior and best represents the needs of the nation. In 
various stages of analysis it appeared as if an appeasement had taken place and that 
compromise without challenge emerged.  
As this thesis is designed to examine the influence of ‘balance’ within parliamentary debate, 
the presentation of case law, rights and security theory are not designed to provide a deeply 
entrenched consideration, but provide examples and discussions – a necessary backdrop to 
the consideration of the strengths and weakness of parliamentary debate. This thesis 
demonstrates challenges made within parliament but fails to evidence any explicit ‘balance’. 
Challenges that were made were not qualified within a rights or security rationale, the MPs 
                                                          
995
 It should be noted that access to expert advice was not confined to the JCHR reports. It is arguable that 
Parliament could have done more in order to achieve the greatest scrutiny such as putting legislation out to 
consultation or as discussed earlier in this conclusion, contracting out initial reviews of the Bill to academics to 
hone in on effective consultation procedures. This, however, does not emerge as a procedure undertaken by 
parliament in their scrutiny of any of the legislation examined in this thesis.  
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missed these important issues. Before deciding whether the limitations and problems found 
here are particular to these debates or indicative of a wider lack on the part of parliament, 
more research would be necessary - this research serves purely as an exploratory 
investigation. As stated at the outset, it was not the intention of this thesis to provide a 
definitive answer to the balance dilemma but to investigate whether balance was explicitly 
used or abused in the creation of this legislation. This thesis has identified a number of gaps 
and presented clear recommendations laying foundations for future exploratory 
investigation into rights and security through political discourse.   
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December 2001.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 630 Monday 17 December 2001 - Friday 25 January 
2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 631 Monday 28 January 2002 - Friday 1 March 
2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 632 Monday 4 March 2002 - Thursday 21 March 
2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 633 Monday 25 March 2002 - Thursday 18 April 
2002.  
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- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 634 Monday 22 April 2002 - Friday 10 May 2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 635 Monday 13 May 2002 - Thursday 30 May 2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 636 Monday 10 June 2002 - Thursday 27 June 2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 637 Monday 1 July 2002 - Thursday 18 July 2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 638 Monday 22 July 2002 - Tuesday 30 July 2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 639 Monday 7 October 2002 - Thursday 24 October 
2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard: Volume 640 Monday 28 October 2002 - Thursday 7 
November 2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 641 Wednesday 13 November 2002 - Thursday 5 
December 2002.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 642 Monday 9 December 2002 - Thursday 9 
January 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 643 Monday 13 January 2003 - Thursday 30 January 
2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 644 Monday 3 February 2003 - Thursday 20 
February 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 645 Monday 24 February 2003 - Friday 14 March 
2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 646 Monday 17 March 2003 - Friday 4 April 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 647 Monday 7 April 2003 - Friday 9 May 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 648 Monday 12 May 2003 - Friday 6 June 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 649 Monday 9 June 2003 - Friday 20 June 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 650 Monday 23 June 2003 - Friday 4 July 2003.  
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- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 651 Monday 7 July 2003 - Friday 18 July 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 652 Monday 8 September 2003 - Thursday 18 
September 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 653 Monday 6 October 2003 - Thursday 23 October 
2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 654 Monday 27 October 2003 - Thursday 20 
November 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 655 Wednesday 26 November 2003 - Thursday 18 
December 2003.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 656 Monday 5 January 2004 - Thursday 22 January 
2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 657 Monday 26 January 2004 - Thursday 12 
February 2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 658 Monday 23 February 2004 - Thursday 11 March 
2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 659 Monday 15 March 2004 - Tuesday 6 April 2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 660 Monday 19 April 2004 - Thursday 6 May 2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 661 Monday 10 May 2004 - Thursday 27 May 2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 662 Monday 7 June 2004 - Friday 25 June 2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 663 Monday 28 June 2004 - Friday 16 July 2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 664 Monday 19 July 2004 - Thursday 16 September 
2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 665 Monday 11 October 2004 - Thursday 28 
October 2004.  
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- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 666 Monday 1 November 2004 - Thursday 18 
November 2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 667 Tuesday 23 November 2004 - Monday 22 
December 2004.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 668 Monday 10 January 2005 - Thursday 27 January 
2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 669 Monday 31 January 2005 - Thursday 24 
February 2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 670 Monday 28 February 2005 - Thursday 17 March 
2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 671 Monday 21 March 2005 - Thursday 7 April 
2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 672 Wednesday 11 May 2005 - Thursday 23 June 
2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 673 Monday 27 June 2005 - Thursday 21 July 2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 674 Monday 10 October 2005 - Thursday 27 
October 2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 675 Monday 31 October 2005 - Thursday 24 
November 2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 676 Monday 28 November 2005 - Tuesday 20 
December 2005.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 677 Monday 9 January 2006 - Thursday 26 January 
2006.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 678 Monday 30 January 2006 - Wednesday 16 
February 2006.  
Page 323 of 323 
 
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 679 Monday 27 February 2006 - Thursday 16 March 
2006.  
- House of Lords; Hansard Volume 680 Monday 20 March 2006 - Thursday 20 April 
2006.  
 
 
 
